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Abstract 
Emotions in theories of international relations have gained prominence the past years, 
but this is still an underdeveloped and neglected contribution in understanding 
relations between states. Daniel Shapiro (2010) has developed a theory in the cross 
section of international relations and cognitive theory. His Relational Identity Theory 
highlights important implications of emotional concerns that a group experiences 
towards another group. The rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran has gained 
prominence the past years, and have far-reaching implications for the region. The 
Saudi relation to Iran therefore serves as a useful and interesting case for investigating 
how one can apply the relational identity theory to better understand a case. This 
thesis investigates how the study of emotions in international relations can help us 
understand Saudi relations to Iran between 2011 and 2014 in a new way beyond 
traditional theories of international relations. It examines the official Saudi discourse 
on Iran to illuminate the type of emotional concerns that are embedded in the 
discourse, and what preconditions and possible changes for Saudi foreign policy this 
entails. The relational identity theory explains that the implications of these emotional 
concerns frame the regional environment in such a way that the Saudi political elite is 
facing strong incentives to disregard cooperation and prospects of mutual gains with 
Iran. Based on the official discourse and the practical application of the theory, the 
Saudi elite is rather drawn in a direction of polarization, isolation, a greater 
acceptance of violence and a greater likelihood of misinterpretations when it comes to 
dealing with Iran. This case study shows in a very concrete how the relational identity 
theory can be applied, and what additional information can be gained from such a 
study. 
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Introduction	  
 
International relations have traditionally been a field of study dominated by rationalist 
accounts of how power, interests and values shape foreign policy and relations 
between states. Emotions as a factor have largely been left out of the analysis either 
because it is not thought to have any influence or because the concept is too vague 
and elusive to be subjected to any scientific, rigorous analysis. Contrary to these 
assumptions emotions do however play a major part in shaping the space for foreign 
policy and motivating specific choices by state elites in the international arena. So far, 
this field remains under-theorized (Bleiker and Hutchison, 2014a:490), but steps have 
been taken by several researchers the past years to stake out new paths in the cross-
section of psychology and international relations. One such newly developed theory 
address intergroup conflict management, and shows how emotional concerns 
determine preconditions for a group`s behaviour vis-à-vis another group. This theory 
is called Relational Identity Theory and puts a new focus on important elements that 
contribute to managing conflicts in a more effective and fundamental way. 
 
This thesis is therefore devoted to studying emotions in international relations. 
Theories of emotions provide important input to studies of conflict, and I will use the 
relational identity theory to investigate the preconditions for actions an potential for 
change in a tense relationship between two groups. One such relationship is the 
contemporary relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and as will be explained later, 
this is a case that suits the theory`s area of application well. My research question is 
thus: How can the study of emotions in international relations help understand Saudi 
relations to Iran between 2011 and 2014? What preconditions and possible changes 
for Saudi behaviour do this entail?  
 
This thesis will show how the relational identity theory can be applied to a case, and 
thus use the theory in a way that has not been done before. I will focus on the bilateral 
relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran, but view it exclusively from the Saudi 
perspective. I will therefore not go into the Iranian perspective. This does not impinge 
upon the principles of the relational identity theory, because the relevant emotional 
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concerns are manifested within one group, although they are constructed in relations 
to another group. Even though I investigate the bilateral relationship between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran situations involving other regional and international actors will also 
be taken into considerations. This is in order to illustrate how the bilateral relationship 
is expressed by Saudi decision makers and to frame the relationship the same way the 
Saudi perspective frames it.  
 
A central question to ask before embarking on the research itself is why this is 
relevant at all. Traditional theories of power balancing is often used to explain 
regional rivalry such as the one between Saudi Arabia and Iran, so why do we need 
additional explanations bringing emotions into the picture? A central aspect of this is 
that emotions highlight other dynamics than pure rationalist or structuralism theories 
do. By focusing on emotions we detect other mechanisms that help us understand 
more specific elements of the relationship between groups and more about the space 
for action they operate within. To view disputant parties as rational actors may even 
be an impediment to conflict management (Shapiro, 2010:635), because it overlooks 
emotional dynamics that fundamentally affect their attitude towards each other. When 
managing a conflict it is not only important to look at what issues are at stake, but 
also who you are dealing with. The study of emotions in international relations is a 
growing field, but empirical studies remain scarce. The theory of relational identity 
for example, has to my knowledge never been used on a case study. This does not 
mean that the theory lacks empirical substance, but that the empirical backing it is 
built on relates to observations from experiments. It is about time the theory is applied 
to observations from real life international relations as well.  
 
Why then is it suitable to focus on Saudi Arabia and Iran to do such an analysis? This 
case is not chosen at random, but is selected based on the frames of the relationship, 
previous studies of the relationship and personal interest. Some have described the 
Middle East as “one of the most war-prone regions globally” (Stein, 2009:208) and 
the “epicentre of conflict, both old and new” (Korany, 2009:62). In this context the 
relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran is described as one of the most heated 
friction points in the region (Zambelis, 2014:4). This may not seem like the most 
significant conflict in the region, given the lack of direct military confrontation 
between the two countries, but the closer you look at their relationship the more you 
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realize how closely linked it is to other conflicts in the region which are highly 
violent. Such a tension in the relationship makes the relational identity theory 
applicable to this case. There has not been a lack of studies talking about the 
relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran the recent decades. Some have written on 
the historical development of their relationship (Badeeb, 1993; Badeeb, 2006), some 
have highlighted the role of the US in their relationship (Cooper, 2011), while others 
have looked at their responses to the Arab Spring (Gause, 2011; Kamrava, 2012; Al-
Rasheed, 2011), the role of sectarianism (Gause, 2014) or the role of identity 
construction (Al Toraifi, 2012). These studies make a good basis for showing how the 
relational identity theory offers additional insights that are lost in other theoretical 
approaches. The study of emotions goes deeper into the mechanisms of how identities 
are constructed and why the same structural conditions can result in different 
relationships. Balance of power theory and identity theories are not at all irrelevant, 
but emotional dynamics offer a more fine-tuned analysis of the preconditions for 
specific types of behaviour. This type of analysis of the Saudi relationship to Iran is 
yet to be made. Lastly, as will be highlighted later in the section on methods, 
complete objectivity is not realistic in social life. Research is part of this social life, 
and an acknowledgement of the limits of objectivity increases the openness and 
verifiability of studies. Even though there are several other cases that match the 
criteria for relevant frames and previous studies, Saudi Arabia was ultimately chosen 
over these because of my own personal interest in and background from the Middle 
East and Gulf region. 
 
This thesis will focus on the period from 2011 until 2014 because this is a period 
where the regional situation in the Middle East changed a lot. The uprisings starting in 
Tunisia in December 2010 spread around the region with impressive strength, and 
because it changed domestic political structures in some countries it also changed 
regional relations. These uprisings diminished the position of the traditionally 
powerful regimes in Cairo and Damascus, and this together with the demise of 
Baghdad since the American invasion in 2003 left the stage open for Riyadh to gain 
more regional power (Ryan, 2012). The turn of attention by Damascus and Cairo from 
their regional position to domestic unrest also presented Tehran with a greater 
opportunity to influence politics and opinion in the region. Syria and Egypt have 
traditionally been trendsetters in the region, and their turn of attention inward created 
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larger space for other actors to resume a leading regional position. Although these 
changes presented opportunities they also presented challenges. The Arab uprisings 
deepened the division between Sunnis and Shi`as (Ryan, 2012) and the dynamics of 
the cold war between Sunni dominated Saudi Arabia and Shi`a dominated Iran was 
amplified. Thus the rivalry was brought to a head in the period from 2011 until 2014. 
The thesis stops with the end of 2014 simply to include as much recent data as 
possible without having to change the analysis every other week because of new 
statements. Because of pragmatic reasons it would not have been feasible to conduct 
an analysis based on data from the start of 2015 and onwards.  
 
Even though the thesis looks at Saudi relations to Iran, the regional setting will also 
be given a place in the analysis. As explained, this is to better represent the frames 
that Riyadh places on their relations to Tehran. A spokesperson from the Saudi 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA, 2015) revealed some of Riyadh`s perspective on 
Iran when he said that Iran`s influence in the region means that “the region is almost 
boiling”. Gause (2014:1) portrayed their relationship as a “contest of influence [that] 
plays out in the domestic political systems of the region`s weak states”. The 
implications of the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran are thus reaching far 
beyond their own domestic boarders. This thesis captures this regional focus by 
referring to events, policies and views of situations in Syria, Yemen, Iraq and the Gulf 
in general.  
 
As stated I will use the relational identity theory to see how it can be applied to a case 
study. This theory focuses on two specific emotional concerns, and how they affect 
the preconditions for conflict management. These concerns are the perceived 
autonomy of Riyadh and the perceived affiliation they have to Tehran. The level of 
these two elements constructs the space for Saudi foreign policy on issues relating to 
Iran. To investigate these emotional concerns I will use discourse analysis 
supplemented by personal interviews. The discourse I will focus on is the official 
discourse of the Saudi political elite. This portrays the official view on Iran, and 
reveals the emotional concerns in the dominating Saudi discourse. Since the 
emotional concerns I investigate are collective they are manifested through speech. I 
do not intend to get inside the head of the decision makers to view their personal 
emotional concerns, but to view the collective emotional concerns of the elite as a 
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group. Discourse analysis is therefore a good way to access the elite`s expression of 
their concerns, and therefore also accessing the process of making the emotions 
manifested in the group as a collective.  The interviews I have conducted will function 
as a supplement to the discourse analysis to elaborate, support or challenge the 
findings from the discourse. The last step of the thesis deviates from the discourse 
methodology, and use hypothetical examples and personal evaluation to apply the 
recommendations of the relational identity theory to the case. This part of the theory 
cannot be investigated through discourse analysis, and I have therefore chosen not to 
let the methodology limit the thesis, but go beyond the framework of discourse 
analysis, to test the application of the theory in full.  
 
Outline	  of	  the	  thesis	  
This thesis will first of all present the theoretical framework of emotions in 
international relations. Since this builds on a social psychology constructivist 
worldview space is given to clarify constructivism as a basis. I will then move on to 
explain why and how emotions matter in international relations. The relational 
identity theory is then explained, with special emphasis on how autonomy and 
affiliation shape the frames of behaviour. I will also give a short overview of the 
overall purpose of the thesis, in light of the theoretical introduction, and how this 
analysis adds value to the research field. The methodological framework of discourse 
analysis is then outlined, with a view to the possibilities and limitations this 
framework has. The operationalization of the further analysis is then presented. After 
this a short background of Saudi politics and their relations to Iran is given, followed 
by a summary of other research on Saudi Arabia and Iran. The subsequent analysis is 
divided into four steps, following the example of Milliken`s (1999) discussion on 
practical use of discourse analysis. The first step will outline the official Saudi 
discourse on Iran, while the second step will show how autonomy and affiliation are 
portrayed in the discourse. The third step makes active use of the relational identity 
theory`s arguments and explains what implications this has for Saudi behaviour 
towards Iran and the frames of Saudi regional foreign policy. The fourth step briefly 
discusses ways that the perceived autonomy and affiliation can improve, using 
theoretical arguments from relational identity theory. The conclusion will then 
summarise the findings and explain the main value of the analysis.  	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Theory	  
Social	  psychology	  constructivism	  
This thesis rests on a social psychology constructivist foundation. This means that the 
basic assumption about the social world is that it is constituted by the perceptions of 
the actors in it. Beliefs, identities and perceptions frame our understanding of the 
world and therefor also our behaviour (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001:393; Hopf, 
2002:5). In international relations the constructivist view of the world poses an 
alternative to the more traditional theories of neorealism and neoliberalism, which 
places a greater emphasis on objective attributes of material factors. In a neorealist 
view the world and the actors in it are shaped by external structures such as military 
power, geographical attributes and relative deterrence capabilities. Systemic 
constructivists, like Alexander Wendt, also focuses on structures, but the approach in 
this thesis do not share this systemic focus. Such a focus on the system is often unable 
to explain in a systematic way why similar historical and cultural backgrounds can 
result in contradictory foreign policies (Wæver, 2002:22). Social psychology 
constructivism on the other hand does not denote such factors as insignificant, but 
rather moves the level of analysis from these material factors to the cognitive 
dynamics giving meaning to the factors. In this way a social psychology looks at the 
intersubjective formation of reality rather than just the effect of the material elements 
in that reality. 
 
Senge et. al (1994) explains the formation 
of reality by illustrating how mental 
models are used to make inferences. The 
“ladder of inference” shows how actors 
attain knowledge about the world and how 
this knowledge translates into actions 
through six separate steps.  
First of all, actors start out with 
observations of the world, and subjectively 
select which observations they will focus 
on. They then make subjective 
assumptions about the observation based 
Figure	  1,	  Ladder	  of	  inference,	  Senge	  et.	  al	  (1994) 
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on the meaning they add to it. Next they draw conclusions about the observation 
based on the previous interpretation. They then use those conclusions to adopt beliefs 
about the world, and lastly they act based on those beliefs. In addition, the beliefs they 
produce affect the subsequent selection of observations. In this way the construction 
of worldviews and insertion of meaning follows a circular mechanism, where the first 
steps in making an inference is influenced by previous beliefs and conclusions about 
the world. Thus, the ultimate form of power is not the ability to coerce or deter 
another actor by using or threatening to use material means, but to persuade and 
influence the beliefs and perceptions of that actor (Fjærtoft, 2011). A factor is thereby 
only significant in the way and to the extent that relevant actors perceive it to be. 
 
Emotions	  in	  international	  relations	  
In order to conduct a solid analysis of inter-group emotions in international conflict 
management, there is a need for a more comprehensive analytical framework. First of 
all attention will be given to why emotions have a place in international relations and 
what emotions really are. There are several problems with using emotions as an 
analytical concept, and the link between individual emotions and group emotions will 
be explained. Next, there will be a presentation of some elements of social 
psychology that helps understand how emotions relate to behaviour, and last but not 
least Shapiro`s theory on relational identity concerns will be explained. These 
elements do not give an exhaustive picture of emotions in international relations, but 
they will provide an adequate framework for analysing emotions in conflict 
management.  
 
Why	  emotions?	  
“Emotions play a central role in world politics, but so far remain under-theorized by 
international relations scholars” (Bleiker & Hutchison, 2014a:490). Many scholars 
would oppose this statement, not because they think emotions have been theorized 
adequately, but because they do not see emotions as a central part of world politics. 
The controversy surrounding emotions is related to the traditional divide between 
rationality and feelings (Bleiker & Hutchison, 2014b:494). These have been thought 
of as separate processes, where emotions distort rational thinking and prevent the best 
alternative from being chosen (Bleiker & Hutchison, 2014b:495). Drawing on the 
other hand on neuropsychology studies the division between cognition and emotion is 
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wiped away (Mattern, 2014:590).  Emotion and cognition cannot be separated in the 
brain. The distinction between the two is conceptual not causal (Mercer, 2014:521), 
and is in essence an artificial construct (Mattern, 2014:591 – 592). If we look at 
traditional theories of international relations none of them argue that cognition and 
rational thinking is separated from actions and behaviour. In one of the most 
dominating models in international relations, rational choice theory, the act of 
thinking is the essence of decision-making, because the actors are expected to 
evaluate their options and the possible outcomes. If cognition is accepted as an 
independent force in policy-making so should emotions be.  
 
On the other hand there are already plenty of examples of emotions in theories of 
international relations, although they are not explicitly recognized. In fact “few realms 
are more infused with emotions” (Bleiker & Hutchison, 2014b:494). The constitutive 
concept of international politics is anarchy, and its effects are based on fear. Hobbes` 
analysis of the “state of nature” was built on emotions of fear and mistrust, and 
Wilson`s 14-point program was built on emotions of empathy and trust. Security is 
thus more about trust than power (Fjærtoft, 2011). Even today we see elements of 
shame or judgement in international politics aimed at influencing the practice of states 
that break with common norms. Adler-Nissen (2014) points to this in her article about 
how states cope with stigma and how emotions related to reputation form the 
international order. Emotion is an element that influences behaviour, and is therefore 
also an area of power struggle. Power can shape both what we perceive as legitimate 
emotions and what sort of action an emotion should be translated into (Bleiker & 
Hutchison, 2014b:508). In this way emotions are both exogenous factors exerting 
influence on policy-decisions and endogenous factors receiving influence from 
policy-decisions. Emotions are both embodied in and produced by politics (Crawford, 
2014:537). The study of politics naturally entails the study of power, and the study of 
social power should not disregard the role of emotions. By overlooking emotions a 
central element of world politics is left out of the analysis, and the relevant question is 
therefore “not whether emotion matters, but which emotions matter, for which 
behaviour, and through which cognitive processes” (Mattern, 2014:591).  
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What	  emotions?	  
There is a multitude of definitions of emotions. Some definitions emphasize the 
internal attributes because emotions are being felt within a body, while others 
emphasize the external attributes because emotions connect individuals and 
collectives through social processes (Bleiker & Hutchison, 2014b:501). Another 
possible definition of emotions is that they are experiences of personal significance, 
which is “typically experienced in association with a distinct type of physical feeling, 
thought, physiology, and action tendency” (Fisher & Shapiro, 2005:209). Mercer 
(2014:516) defines social emotions as “a feeling that has intrinsic importance to an 
actor in some relationship with an entity”, while Crawford (2014:537) tries to specify 
emotions as “subjective experiences that also have psychological, intersubjective and 
cultural components”. In this thesis the term emotion is used in line with Mercers 
notion of social emotion. Since the focus of the thesis is on groups, all emotions 
experienced at this level are social (Mercer, 2014:517). Feelings can be non-social 
too, in the sense that we can feel fear of great heights or pain from a broken bone, but 
these are not as determinative for social behaviour as the relational emotions.  
 
When analysing emotions on a group-level there is an evident problem. A central 
element of an emotion is that individuals experience it, so how can this experience 
translate into collective forces? Mattern (2014:590) calls this the level-of-analysis 
problem, and tries to explain a solution by saying that emotions exist between people 
and are institutionalized in world politics. This explanation offers little more insight 
than showing that emotions exist between people and that’s why there are emotions in 
groups. Critics of the independent aspect of social emotions point to the bodily 
manifestation of emotions and point out that since groups do not have a body they 
cannot have emotions (Bleiker & Hutchison, 2014b:501). Crawford (2014:544) even 
states that “it would be imprecise and perhaps even dangerous to argue that a group 
feels something or even believes something.” Despite this the social constructivist 
assumptions about formation of meaning in the world help to explain how emotions 
matter beyond the neurophysics. Emotions are interpreted and do not prescribe any 
given behaviour in themselves. If someone feels angry it is not universally established 
how one should deal with this anger. The process of interpreting and reacting to 
emotions is highly influenced by the social and cultural environment you are a part of. 
“How we feel in response to particular political events depends on how society 
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suggests we should feel” (Bleiker & Hutchison, 2014b:504). The dominating trends in 
a group affects the evaluation of different emotions on a personal level, and even 
though a group cannot feel anything the same way a person can, a person can still feel 
something on behalf of a group (Mercer, 2014:515). In this way the dominating 
emotional trends among the members of a group can be experienced as the groups 
own emotions. This is not to say that the group has grown a body that experience 
endorphins or oxytocin, but that there is a collective understanding of a common 
experience among the members of the group. Group emotion as such is not an 
objectively definable phenomenon, but can only be understood and accessed through 
the subjective perceptions of the members of the group. Still, this is not a 
revolutionary new approach in international relations. Ideational structures such as 
norms, laws or principles are not dependent on a group brain, even though thinking is 
required in order to make sense of the phenomena. In the same way, a group body is 
not required in order to make sense of group emotions (Mercer, 2014:521).   
 
Identity	  and	  emotions	  
Because of this social aspect of group emotions, the experience of such emotions is 
closely tied to identity. Members of the group feel something as part of the group, not 
only on behalf of the group (Reus-Smith, 2014:569), and “identification depends on a 
feeling of attachment” (Mercer, 2014:522). Emotions can often promote certain group 
identities and strengthen loyalty. When confronted with emotions such as shame or 
fear members of a group tend to rationalize and justify the origin of these emotions 
(Crawford, 2014). When group members feel threatened by an external factor, this 
strengthens the loyalty to the group. Likewise when the group members feel 
threatened they may also develop hostility towards other groups.  
 
Even though people often relate to several identities (Reus-Smith, 2014:570), there 
can still be a common sense of belonging to one group. This does not mean that the 
group is monolithic, but even though the members are diverse the dominant emotional 
trend can be institutionalized (Crawford, 2014:547). These emotional trends 
contribute to structuring the way knowledge is perceived, and it sets a standard for 
framing different problems and offers a standardized solution to them (Crawford, 
2014:547 – 548). These structures shape the relations within as well as between 
groups in a fundamental way (Mercer, 2014:530). Who we are, is to a large degree 
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determined by what we feel (Mercer, 2014:522), and Descartes` old saying “I think 
therefor I am” can be modified into “I feel therefore I am”. In this sense emotions are 
tied to identity and a sense of group belonging, and are a vital part of a person`s sense 
of self.  
 
Underdeveloped	  field	  of	  theory	  
Emotions have an elusive nature and are often shunned by analysts because of the 
difficulties of defining emotions and actually observing their effect (Bleiker & 
Hutchison, 2014b:494). The role of emotions in world politics started gaining 
momentum in the 1970`s, but “it is only over the last decade that emotions have come 
to be seen as significant” (Bleiker & Hutchison, 2014b:507). The theoretical 
elaboration and debate on this approach is still sporadic and incomplete. The 
dominant approach within international relations is still the rational actor model1, 
where objective evaluation based on factual information is the ultimate mode of 
decision-making (Bleiker & Hutchison, 2014b:494). But the world is not comprised 
of stable objective rational people, and systems and procedures may malfunction 
because of irrationality (Fjærtoft, 2011). Political decision-makers tend in fact to 
rationalize after a decision has been made rather than behave as a rational actor before 
(Ibid.). Emotions are therefore central pieces to the puzzle to understand both 
seemingly irrational behaviour and how certain actions are legitimized and even 
normalized.  
 
Emotions	  and	  behaviour	  
The second most prominent problem facing scholars who study emotions in 
international relations is the causal process problem (Mattern, 2014:590). The link 
between emotions and action is to some extent circular, and cannot be observed in a 
direct manner. In one way, emotions shape the social framework of interaction and 
create standards for how individuals ought to feel and react in a certain situation 
(Bleiker & Hutchison, 2014b:508). This argument connects feelings to behaviour 
through the social framing and norms that are manifested in society. Another 
argument links emotional experiences to cognitive processes. As explained previously 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  See	  Allison	  (1969)	  on	  political	  decision-­‐making	  and	  the	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crisis.	  	  2	  Silence	  can	  send	  a	  strong	  message	  that	  the	  issue	  at	  stake	  or	  the	  relevant	  actor	  is	  not	  worth	  even	  mentioning.	  Such	  a	  neglect	  of	  addressing	  a	  person	  or	  an	  issue	  is	  also	  a	  form	  of	  communication.	  	  3	  See	  Appendix	  1	  for	  a	  list	  of	  Shapiro`s	  observations.	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(see the section “Why emotions”) neuroscience has shown that thinking and feeling 
are not separate processes, and the implication is that decision-making also entails 
emotions as well as cognition. Fierke (2014) builds on this last line of argument when 
she elaborates how emotions relate to intent, which in turn originates behaviour. She 
argues that emotions create intent, and that actions reveal those intents. Crawford 
(2014) examines emotions of anger and empathy in greater detail, and links these 
emotions to certain behavioural modes. Anger manifests itself in more risk-taking 
behaviour, while empathy is essential for the attainment of peace and justice. Low 
levels of empathy will for example promote low levels of positive interaction and 
social isolation (Crawford, 2014:542). Her analysis lies at a group level, and she 
thereby shows how group emotions manifest themselves in certain political 
behaviours.  
 
This nevertheless raises the question of what came first, the emotion or the action. 
Because emotions are in themselves reactions to interactions and the behaviour of 
others (Crawford, 2014:544), the tracing of the decision-making process becomes 
tautological. This is reflected in Deutsch`s crude law of social relations, where “the 
characteristic processes and effects elicited by a given type of social relationship also 
tend to elicit that type of social relationship” (Deutsch, 1973:365). Put bluntly, social 
relationships follow the pattern of self-fulfilling prophecies, where the expectations 
and perceptions of a relationship produce that exact relationship. Tautologies are 
therefore embedded in the nature of social science. Even though this is not ideal for 
analytical purposes, an acknowledgement of this will bring us closer to the elements 
we study.  
 
Relational	  Identity	  Theory	  
Drawing on psychology and negotiations theory, Shapiro develops a more specific 
model for analysing emotions and political behaviour in groups. He introduces the 
relational identity theory, which is “a complementary model for understanding the 
emotional dimensions of conflict management” (Shapiro, 2010:636). Shapiro builds 
on the same social psychology constructivism outlined in this thesis, and starts with 
the assumption that the social world is constructed through cognitive processes. In 
order to understand the social world we need to explore these cognitive processes, and 
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as the previous theoretical discussion has shown, emotions are important factors in 
such cognition. The foundation of Shapiro`s model rests on a series of experiments (a 
total of almost a hundred), where Shapiro has tested the formation of group loyalty 
when certain attributes of the group are threatened. The participants in the experiment 
are first of all divided into groups and told to define some core characteristics that will 
be common for all the group members. They are then told that the world is facing an 
apocalyptic threat, which can only be prevented if all the participants join one of the 
groups and take on their attributes. In all the experiments but a handful of times, the 
world exploded (Shapiro, 2010:635). This exercise “evokes emotional dynamics that 
are intrinsic to real-world conflicts” (Shapiro, 2010:636) and offer interesting insights 
into the effects of emotional states in inter-group relations.  
 
In the construction of the relational identity theory Shapiro actively makes use of the 
theoretical assumptions of emotions in international relations. The observations he 
makes are of individual actors, but the inferences he draws relates to groups. This 
builds on the assumption of the participants having a collective understanding of the 
dominant trends in the group, and the participants feeling like the group itself. Shapiro 
draws on the perception of these collective emotions to see how tense interaction 
between groups affects collective emotions within the group and behaviour between 
the groups. As such he puts focus on emotional development at a group level, making 
his theory relevant for international relations. He also compliments theoretical 
arguments of how emotions affect perceptions and decision-making, by observing the 
individual manifestation and collective expression of group emotions. Thus, the 
relational identity theory takes theories of emotions in international relation one step 
further, by empirically observing how changes in certain group emotions facilitate 
specific types of group reactions. 	  
Relational	  Identity	  Concerns	  
The Relational Identity Theory is to some degree a further development of arguments 
made in Fisher and Shapiro`s book Beyond Reason. Using Emotions as you Negotiate 
(2005). This book presents five core concerns, which are emotional experiences that 
are important to consider when managing conflicts. It is explained that the 
contentment with these core concerns give rise to certain emotions, which in turn 
result in certain modes of behaviour. Instead of dealing with emotions directly Fisher 
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and Shapiro suggest that we address the core concern and thereby the origin of the 
emotion. The five concerns are appreciation, affiliation, autonomy, status and role 
(Fisher & Shapiro, 2005:17). Appreciation fosters positive emotions and is valued by 
every person (Fisher & Shapiro, 2005:39). It can be encouraged by showing the other 
party that you understand their point of view, finding merit in what they think, and 
communicate your own understanding (Fisher & Shapiro, 2005:28). Affiliation is the 
subjective sense of connectedness we feel between others and us (Fisher & Shapiro, 
2005:54). By finding links with one another, treating each other as colleagues, and 
having joint activities we build affiliation and encourage feelings of confidence and 
trust. Autonomy is the freedom a group has to influence and make decisions about 
issues that concerns them, without anyone else interfering (Fisher & Shapiro, 
2005:54; Shapiro, 2010:636). By limiting our own or others` autonomy the space for 
exploring creative options disappears, and people may feel ignored or overruled if 
they do not take part in decisions that affect them. Status refers to the position we 
have vis-à-vis others. “If our status is demeaned, we may feel embarrassed, ashamed, 
or frustrated, and we may act unwisely” (Fisher & Shapiro, 2005:95). A role is a 
position linked to a specific set of expectations for behaviour and characteristics. If 
we chose an unfulfilling role or feel like our role is not acknowledged, we may feel 
unengaged or trivialized (Fisher & Shapiro, 2005:204).  
 
All of these five factors capture a “human want of personal significance, usually 
arising within a relationship” (Fisher & Shapiro, 2005:209), and the potential for 
improving relationships by addressing these concerns are great.  The concerns are 
core because they address how people want and expect to be treated (Fisher & 
Shapiro, 2005:211). These concerns are closely linked to emotional responses and 
offer “a powerful framework to deal with emotions without getting overwhelmed by 
them” (Fisher & Shapiro, 2005:15). The theorization of these factors has a distinct 
personal focus, which Shapiro modifies when he presents the relational identity 
theory later on. In the relational identity theory the emphasis is not placed on what 
individuals experience in isolation from the group they identify with, but rather how 
the general tendency in the group evolves. 
 
A relational identity is a group`s perception of the relationship it has with another 
group (Shapiro, 2010:636). This perception builds on only two of the five core 
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concerns according to Shapiro, i.e. affiliation and autonomy. These two concerns are 
the only two that are both relationally constructed and internally manifested. 
Autonomy and affiliation cannot be experienced without the presence of another 
group, but the comprehension of these concerns is not dependent on including the 
perception of the other group. The content of the concerns affiliation and autonomy in 
this manner is not necessarily something the parties agree on, but is defined by the 
way one of the parties sees that concern. Affiliation and autonomy for two groups, A 
and B, may therefore have two different forms, “the relationship AB seen from A`s 
perspective and the relationship BA seen from B`s perspective” (Norbert, 1978:126). 
When assessing group A`s emotions it is not necessary to deal with how group B 
defines the relationship. This does not make the perceptions that group A holds more 
or less true.  
 
When assessing the other three core concerns (status, role and appreciation), one 
immediately has to look at both group A and group B`s perception of the relationship. 
Status is defined vis-à-vis the position of another group, while role is created in the 
common expectations that both group A and group B have. You cannot play a role 
fully without getting recognition for it. Appreciation is in itself a verb that requires an 
actor performing the action, and group A`s perception of appreciation cannot be 
evaluated without a reference to what group B does. This differs from autonomy and 
affiliation, which can be assessed without any direct reference to another actor, but is 
independently manifested in the internal cognition of group A. In order to access 
information about these core concerns we only need access to the perceptions of one 
group, and this makes these two concerns more applicable when analysing group 
emotions within one group in international relations. This does not mean that the 
other three core concerns are irrelevant, but only that they are less useful when 
analysing internal emotions by one actor. In sum, autonomy and affiliation provides 
the best framework for understanding group emotions in international relations as an 
internally manifested but relationally created phenomena.  
 
Relational	  Identity	  Concerns	  and	  Behaviour	  
As noted, group emotions is not just interesting in themselves, but are relevant for 
understanding preconditions for behaviour. Shapiro elaborates on this in his 
Relational Identity Theory as well. Affiliation and autonomy both affect problem 
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solving and cooperation. In explicit, when the feeling of affiliation increase, the 
willingness to work together also rises (Fisher & Shapiro, 2005:54).  This is supported 
by Crawford, which explains that closeness “is related to empathic concern and a 
predictor of helping behaviour” (Crawford, 2014:541). Likewise, when the feeling of 
autonomy rises so does the cooperative behaviour and the prospects for mutual gains 
(Shapiro, 2010:637). This is illustrated in figure 2 where the combined level of 
affiliation and autonomy is linked to a corresponding behavioural mode.  
 
Here we see how emotions arising from affiliation and autonomy frame the different 
types of behaviour. This may be because of the constructed legitimization of these 
behavioural modes (as Bleiker & Hutchison argue), or because the emotion in itself 
affects decision-making as much as rational thinking does (as Fierke argues). The link 
between affiliation or autonomy and behavioural mode is nevertheless not related to 
the objective closeness to and freedom from another group, but relates to the 
subjective perception of that closeness and freedom.  
 
After examining the emotions stemming from autonomy and affiliation in the 
experiments, Shapiro generated a hypothesis called the tribal effect. This generally 
explains the “tendency for a tribe`s relational identity to become rigid”, thereby 
increasing the likelihood of polarization and violence (Shapiro, 2010:636). A tribe is 
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the term Shapiro uses on a group where the members strongly identify with each 
other. The members will see themselves as “(a) like-kinded, (b) kinlike in their 
relational connection, and (c) emotionally invested in their group`s enhancement” 
(Shapiro, 2010:637). This means that the group members see themselves as sharing a 
common identity, where all are of the same stock, and are willing and sometimes 
required to promote the group`s interests above their own individual interests. This 
sort of group is socially constructed and is not a given by gender or ethnicity, but is 
bound together by the socially constructed perceptions of its members (Shapiro, 
2010:638). This type of group relations also facilitates a strong expression of common 
emotions, and is ideal for examining group emotions.  
 
When a tribe of this kind, hereby called a group, experience a disrespect of its 
autonomy or affiliation a sense of animosity develops. The group will then experience 
a more rigid relational identity vis-à-vis the other group, meaning that their perception 
of the relationship becomes frozen and unmovable. The group often closes off from 
creative problem solving, learning and external influences, and misinterpretations or 
hostility towards joint gains increase. In this way members of the group experience a 
psychological burden when the group`s autonomy and affiliation is low. The theory 
also points out that measures to build affiliation and respecting autonomy will 
encourage cooperation and more positive relations. The third and fourth step of the 
analysis will explain the arguments for preconditions for political actions and 
recommendations for change in more detail. 
 
The	  purpose	  of	  the	  thesis	  
This thesis aims at exploring the Relational Identity Theory further, and matching 
empirical observations with insight on how autonomy and affiliation plays a role in 
the expression of group emotions and the preconditions for group behaviour. This 
thesis will, in explicit, apply the relational identity theory to examine the collective 
expression of emotions that frames the environment that political decisions are made 
within. The arguments made by Shapiro will show how these frames encourage or 
discourage certain types of behaviour, and how these frames can be changed. The 
empirical investigation is purely linked to the official Saudi discourse, while the 
interpretation of the observations lay out certain implications for political decision-
	  	   18	  
making. The final step of applying the theory to the case moves away from focusing 
on the empirical observations of the discourse, and seeks to discuss hypothetical 
implications of the potential for change that the theory outlines. The application of the 
theory is therefore not limited by the scope of the methodological framework, but the 
theory is rather applied in full, with both it`s explanatory and it`s proscriptive 
elements.  
 
Theories of international relations have not yet included emotions into a coherent 
analytical framework, but emotional dimensions are still critical for understanding the 
foundation for sustainable, long-term positive relations (Shapiro, 2010:643). The 
global security realm depends in part on addressing emotional concerns and 
mitigating a rigidification of group loyalties, so that mutually beneficial outcomes can 
be attained. “Emotions are not a causally separate sphere: the challenge for theory lies 
in integrating an understanding of emotions into our analysis of reasoning processes, 
identity, identification, contestation, and cooperation” (Crawford, 2014:553 – 554).  
 
Added	  Value	  
So, why is it useful to look at emotions in international relations in this way instead of 
just keeping to classical structuralism theories? When analysing the relationship 
between two actors on the international arena it seems like the outcome of the 
analysis is the same no matter which approach you take. This can be illustrated with 
some hypothetical examples. Lets say that a basic assumption is that if two actors are 
significantly different, but have to relate to one another, they tend to have a tense 
relationship. According to a power balancing theory, two countries that have different 
interests based on different resources and geopolitical position, but operate within the 
same region tend to balance each other’s power in order to gain the most influence in 
the region. According to identity-based theories, two countries that have different 
identities, but operate within the same region also tend to compete over influence. 
Theories of emotions in international relations assume that a country that has certain 
negative emotional concerns in relation to another country, but operates within the 
same region again tends to be antagonistic in that relationship. Why should we then 
bother to investigate ambiguous internal emotions when a power balancing theory or 
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theories of identities yield the same result in a more easily observable and more 
replicable way?  
 
First of all, it is not a priori given that the result of each approach is the same. The 
only way to know that is by conducting different analysis by using the different 
frameworks. Secondly, emotions highlight different mechanisms than power 
balancing or identity theories do, and even though these emotional mechanisms may 
have the same outcome as the other theories predict they still highlight new ways to 
understand interaction and new ways to deal with interaction. Thirdly, and maybe 
most importantly, the analysis of group emotions provide a set of preconditions for a 
more specific mode of behaviour. As showed by Figure 2 certain emotional 
configurations are not only preconditions for conflictual behaviour, but also generate 
adversarial opinions. By using emotions to access identities and group dynamics in a 
more accurate way we gain knowledge about how identities are constructed and why 
the same structural conditions or the same identity incongruence result in different 
behaviour. Even though Saudi Arabia and the US have differing interests regarding 
oil and a Saudi nuclear defence, and have fundamentally different perceptions of their 
national identity, they do not consider each other as enemies. Saudi Arabia and Iran 
on the other hand share more interests of keeping the region peaceful, are more 
similar in their Muslim identity, but still engage in competitive behaviour and 
rhetoric. Balance of power theory and identity theories are not at all irrelevant in this 
regard, but emotional dynamics offer a more fine-tuned analysis of the preconditions 
for specific mechanisms in adversarial behaviour.   
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Methods	  
 
Case	  study	  
“Without theory there is nothing but description, and without methodology there is no 
transformation of theory into analysis” (Hansen, 2006:1). When doing a scientific 
study the choice of method “should be guided by which data best answers our 
question” (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994:68). This thesis has a qualitative research 
design, and investigates one case in order to get a close in-depth knowledge of the 
mechanisms in that case, and thus utilise the full potential of the theory. A case is in 
itself a “spatially and temporally delimited phenomenon observed at a single point in 
time or over some period of time” (Gerring, 2007:211). I will look at Saudi Arabian 
official perceptions of Iran, and how the emotional concerns in their relationship set 
specific frames for Saudi regional policies. This is naturally limited in space, and I 
have limited the temporal frame to focus on the four-year period from 2011 until 
2014.  
 
A case study is by definition “the intensive study of a single case where the purpose 
of that study is – at least in part – to shed light on a larger class of cases” (Gerring, 
2007:20). A case study is highly appropriate in this project because it captures more 
of the complexity of social behaviour, it eases the investigation of implications in a 
theory, and it encourages new findings and “light bulb moments”. When investigating 
group emotions it is important to get as close as possible to the subjects we study, and 
in order to fully explore the specific preconditions for action it is good to get an in-
depth knowledge of the case. In essence, this approach is better at gaining a high 
internal validity. 
 
Discourse	  analysis	  
In view of the theoretical framework of the thesis and the aim of the research 
question, namely to apply the relational identity theory in a way that has not been 
done before, the empirical investigations will follow the guidelines of discourse 
analysis. A discourse is “practices that systematically form the objects of which they 
speak” (Foucault in Neumann, 2001:17), and is a system for structuring and giving 
meaning to practices and statements. This system appears as more or less normal, and 
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delimits what can and cannot be said (Wæver, 2002:29). The analysis of these 
systems/discourses thus focuses on the preconditions for actions and behaviour 
(Neumann, 2001:38), and uncovers how statements confirm and constitute social 
practices (Neumann, 2001:83). The focus in discourse analysis is thus not to uncover 
the true perceptions and inner beliefs of individual persons, but to uncover which 
codes are used to justify and explain situations in public when actors` relate to each 
other (Wæver, 2002:26 – 27).  
 
This is linked to social constructivism where meaning is created by the perceptions 
and interpretations of social actors. A large part of discourse theory originated from a 
linguistic field of study, but the emphasis in this thesis implies that it is the link to 
social constructivism that makes discourse analysis an appropriate method. The aim 
of the thesis is not to discuss questions of philosophy of science, but rather to use 
discourse theory as a practical method for accessing data on group emotions. I will 
therefore not spend time elaborating on epistemological and ontological issues of 
debate, but rather present elements of the method that are usable for the empirical 
work of the thesis.  
 
Discourse analysis rests on three main assumptions. The first assumption relates to the 
construction of a social reality, and is common for both discourse analysis and social 
constructivism. Sensory perceptions are not immediate, but needs to be selected 
(Neumann, 2001:30). This selection in turn is not direct, but is mediated by our 
preconditions and models of representation (Neumann, 2001:31). Everyone needs 
models in order to grasp the world, and the representations we use to understand the 
world are the attributes of things and phenomena as they appear to us (Neumann, 
2001:33). Between the world and us there is a layer of interpretation, made 
meaningful through language and categories (Ibid.). Discourse analysis focuses on 
these representations, not the things or phenomena in themselves. This worldview is 
familiar from Senge et. al.`s ladder of inference (see the section on social 
constructivism). The implication for empirical research is that the researcher can 
focus on the subjective representations and perceptions of the discourse, because they 
are the elements that matter the most for behaviour. The elements that discourse 
analysis seeks to say something about are epistemological (Neumann, 2001:179). It 
	  	   22	  
seeks to reveal how knowledge is produced through language and interpretation, and 
how that knowledge frames behaviour (Neumann, 2001:178 – 179). 
 
Discourse analysis rests on two other main theoretical assumptions. If these 
assumptions do not hold, the point of studying discourses disappears. First of all, 
ideas and perspectives need to be displayed in a meaningful way through texts 
(Neumann, 2001:18). Text as a concept is not only written material, but also 
everything that can be studied as texts (Neumann, 2001:23).  This includes social 
actions such as conversations, speeches, propaganda or the use of symbols. In this 
way discourse analysis attains access to the collective perceptions of the actors 
participating in the discourse, through text, and can study the social world on its own 
terms, through text. Discourses establish rules for statements, and those rules “cannot 
be observed independently of the statements” (Wæver, 2002:29 – 30). This thesis is 
based on texts such as public statements, public speeches and interviews in the media.  
 
Secondly, language needs to have an independent meaning for social behaviour. This 
means that communication and expressions participate in the social construction of 
worldviews and representations. “Language is social and political” by constructing 
identities and differences and inserting these with meaning (Hansen, 2006:15). 
Discourses are not only a product of a structure of meaning, but actively contribute to 
that structure and reinforce the categories we live by. Language is the only way to 
construct a collective meaning and to make oneself comprehendible to a larger public, 
when considering `things` (Hansen, 2006:16). This is not to say that discourses never 
challenge an established structure of meaning, but they are core elements in the 
maintenance of a broader collective system of interpretation. Without this common 
social aspect meaning and representations would be purely individual evaluations. 
Even though there are diverse and sometimes opposing discourses in a given 
community, their existence adds an independent collective dimension to life. 
 
Discourse	  and	  power	  
Power is an embedded element in discourse analysis. Each discourse has some 
structures influencing the actors participating in the discourse, and those structures 
often shape the interests, identity and perceptions of the actors. Power in this sense is 
not about coercing the actions of any actor, but rather to persuade and freeze meaning 
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by constantly repeating specific representations (Neumann, 2001:143). Foucault 
(presented in Neumann, 2001:168) highlights that this type of power does not need to 
be known by the actors, and that things appear to be normal because of the power of 
the discourse supporting those interpretations. A certain way of framing determines 
how a case is built, what types of arguments are made and which references are made. 
In this sense discourse analysis often aims at revealing that things could be different 
(Neumann, 2001:115). This is taken into account in this thesis, and is included as a 
fourth and final step of the analysis. 
 
Discourse	  and	  materiality	  
Some critics argue that discourse analysis depreciates the role of material factors. The 
focus of this method is put on perceptions and ideational factors, but this is not to say 
that there are no material factors. To focus on representations of reality does not 
exclude the existence of a material reality with hard facts. An observable reality still 
forms the foundation of observations made by the actors, and we still have to take the 
materiality of the discourse as a given point of departure (Neumann, 2001:86; 
Hansen, 2006:20) The object of observation in discourse analysis, namely language, 
only consists of metaphors that re-present reality (Neumann, 2001:45). Since social 
communities and individual identities are constituted through language, they exist in 
essence as metaphors and representations. When studying the social world it seems 
appropriate to take these representations into consideration, and the neglect of 
studying material elements in their own appearance do not devaluate the inferences 
made from subjective social perceptions. The following analysis in this thesis focuses 
exclusively on subjective perceptions, and do not include evaluations of material 
elements in and of themselves.  
 
In addition to this, discourses are linked to materiality via the manifestation of 
dominating representations. When a discourse dominates an area it tends to be 
manifested and institutionalized through physical structures. This can be research 
institutions, political parties or organisations that embody and promote the ideas and 
values in the dominating discourse.  
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Discourse	  and	  emotions	  
Emotions are the central point of focus in this thesis and discourse analysis does not 
leave this element untouched. As noted discourses constitute a common reference 
point for members of a community, and it shapes the identities and perceptions of the 
members. The stronger those shared identities and perceptions are, the more they 
share common emotions (Bleiker & Hutchison, 2014b:500). Discourses thus provide 
a platform for converging personal emotions and forming a collective emotional 
reference. This is illustrated in Relational Identity Theory, where the tribes effect is 
often accompanied by “a narrative of righteousness and victimization” in order to 
legitimize the rigidity of group loyalty (Shapiro, 2010:639). Discourses also provide 
an arena for expressing emotions in political or communicative terms. Emotions are 
not expressed in any other ways than through communication, be that speech, body 
language or even silence2, and texts thus provide a good opportunity for studying 
emotions (Fierke, 2014:565). This is also the process through which emotions become 
political. “The countless stories that societies tell about themselves and others” 
constitute a significant part of political and collective behaviour, and these narratives 
are infused with emotions (Bleiker & Hutchison, 2014b:506). Expression is thus 
central in understanding and investigating emotions  and it “codifies the legacies and 
connotations of emotion through narratives” (Ling, 2014:582).  
 
Discourse	  and	  identity	  
As stated several times now, discourses constitute identities. Identities are both a 
product of and a precondition for discourses (Hansen, 2006:20). A discourse may tell 
you how to feel, how not to feel, how to react and where you belong. Identities are in 
themselves relational, meaning that groups identify themselves in relation to other 
groups. A conversation about the others is therefor always a conversation about who 
we are as well (Neumann, 2001:125). Political identity is particularly discursive and 
symbolic through its inherently collective manifestation. The study of identities in 
politics should therefor take such conversations into consideration, at the same time as 
studies of discourse should always be mindful of the political identities that are being 
formed and constituted through that discourse. Politics in itself may also become a 
task of telling people who they are, through creating and re-presenting an acting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Silence	  can	  send	  a	  strong	  message	  that	  the	  issue	  at	  stake	  or	  the	  relevant	  actor	  is	  not	  worth	  even	  mentioning.	  Such	  a	  neglect	  of	  addressing	  a	  person	  or	  an	  issue	  is	  also	  a	  form	  of	  communication.	  	  
	  	   25	  
collective Self (Neumann, 2001:123). Issues of identity, politics and communication 
are therefore intimately embedded in discourses about groups. This will be taken into 
consideration in the first step of the analysis in this thesis, where the construction of 
Iran`s identity is detected in the official Saudi discourse. 
 
Discourse	  and	  foreign	  policy	  
One of the goals of discourse analysis according to Hansen is to show that 
interpretations “are dependent upon a particular discursive framing of the issue in 
question, and that this framing has political effects” (Hansen, 2006:20). Foreign 
policy in particular can, simply put, be explained as a model where decision makers 
try to establish a stable link between identity and policy (Hansen, 2006:26). This link 
explains and justifies the policy chosen, and discourses can thus provide a way of 
conveying how the policy resonates with the nation`s self-image (Hansen, 2006:18; 
Wæver, 2002:27). Debates and disagreements within foreign policy are precisely 
about defining what is objectively at stake and how it matters for the nations’ self-
image. Wæver even goes so far as to say that an analysis of the discourse on a 
nation`s identity can explain, and to a certain point predict, foreign policies (Wæver, 
2002:20). It is nevertheless not a simple one-to-one relationship between policy and 
identity. Discourses and identities do not define exact policies, but they structure the 
frames within which concrete policy decisions are being made. Saudi Arabia`s 
relations to Iran is a good example of this. In this sense, discourses provide a certain 
optic for viewing different policy options, and provide frames for how an adequate 
foreign policy should be formulated (Hansen, 2006:5). The analysis in this thesis will 
therefore highlight the frames for Saudi foreign policy, and mechanisms pulling in 
specific directions. This is not to be confused with a prediction of exact policy 
decisions, but rather uncovers the constraints and justifications that lie within the 
structure that the discourse creates.  
	  
Discourse	  and	  change	  
When having a theory that is founded on social constructivism an inherent element is 
that things can change. Meaning is in itself not a stable given, because it does not 
exist outside the consciousness of people. Meaning lies in the interpretation of 
relations between different phenomena. Since the interpretations of such relations 
fluctuate, meaning fluctuates (Neumann, 2001:60). The arena for manifesting a 
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discourse, namely language, is also not a stable constant (Hansen, 2006:18). That is 
not to say that the social world is in total relativity. Social practices and narratives 
exist in terms of their stability and continuity, and discourses are often self-
perpetuating because of their own regularities (Neumann, 2001:133). Dominating 
discourses want to construct themselves as stable, because this adds legitimacy and 
weight to the content of the discourse (Hansen, 2006:18). Discourses sanction 
behaviour in a way that promotes actions that are in line with “the normal” and reject 
practices that break with the regular (Neumann, 2001:133). Even though change is 
possible it is not easy. Nietzsche (presented in Neumann, 2001:40) said that the only 
things needed for change to occur are new names, assessments and probabilities. This 
captures a good point in that efforts to change a discourse needs an alternative to 
replace it with, but the process of gaining momentum for that change can be long and 
unfriendly. As a researcher it is at least possible to show that things can be different, 
and expose the mechanisms upholding the current dominating discourse (Neumann, 
2001:115).  
 
Advantages	  and	  Challenges	  
The first and most obvious advantage of using discourse analysis is the fit with the 
research question. Emotions are expressed through communication, and discourses 
are infused with emotions. The approach of this thesis to emotions as a social 
phenomenon is not to study the brain or somehow get inside the mind of the actors, 
but rather to study emotions where they are expressed. The empirical object of study 
is thus expressed emotions through language. When discourses are examined with the 
aim of detecting emotions we get to see the world as the referent object sees it. The 
researcher in discourse analysis actively seeks to attain the perspective of a discourse, 
and this forms the basis of evaluating emotional influences in the relational identity 
theory. Secondly, discourse analysis allows for a close examination of 
communication, meaning that mechanisms and hypothesis can be evaluated and 
further developed. This hinges on a strong internal validity, where a closeness to and 
knowledge of the case in question is crucial. Thirdly, this method opens up for a lot of 
sources to be examined. The amount of texts relating to a discourse can be huge, and 
the relevance of such an amount of sources strengthens the internal validity.  
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There are nevertheless important limitations in discourse analysis that matters for the 
inferences one can make. First of all, the prospects of generalization are slim. 
Discourses are shaped by the historical and cultural circumstances, and any 
universally valid theoretical assumptions cannot be confirmed by an in-depth analysis 
like discourse analysis. This is a detrimental disadvantage if the aim is to test a theory 
in order to show its general significance. That is not the aim of this thesis, and the 
conclusions will be limited to showing how the theory can be applied in this specific 
case and what additional mechanisms the theory highlights that is not captured by 
other structuralism or identity-based theories. Secondly, this method can only be used 
to say something about the discourse, and unfortunately it does not fully cover all the 
aspects of the relational identity theory. The theory also contains an aspect of 
prescription and outline how change may come about. This can certainly be discussed 
in relation to discourses, but the empirical observations I make based on the frames I 
have chosen for the discourse, do not give any empirical data to base this discussion 
on. This signifies a mismatch between the method and theory, and I have chosen to 
not let the thesis be limited by this. The application of the prescriptive element of the 
theory to the case is therefore not based on the discourse, but is a purely hypothetical 
discussion informed by literature on the circumstances and context of Saudi Arabia. 
This makes the fourth step in the analysis somewhat different from the previous steps, 
but I consider the insight from discourse analysis on the first steps to be of such useful 
value, that discourse analysis is a suitable method to structure the main parts of the 
thesis. 
 
Thirdly, the basic assumptions of discourse analysis also challenge the researcher`s 
ability to attain and display knowledge. The researcher is not exempt from the social 
world, and she too participates in a structure of meaning and knowledge. This may 
influence the way she conducts research and the way she interprets findings. If these 
assumptions of the social world are accepted, no researcher can escape these 
constraints. The task of the researcher should then not be to strive for universal 
timeless objectivity, but rather to make clear the foundation of the interpretations and 
inferences. When transparency is ensured in this way people may disagree with the 
findings, but still know where it comes from. To acknowledge these predispositions 
and biases within the researcher places the research in the social world, instead of 
claiming to be above the influences of every other social aspect.  
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Delimiting	  the	  discourse	  
In this thesis I will focus on the Saudi Arabian discourse on Iran, more specifically 
the discourse relating to regional politics and Iran. The scope is limited to the Saudi 
perspective because it is the emotional concerns in the Saudi discourse and the Saudi 
predisposition that is being explored. Even though Iran is sure to have another 
impression of itself and probably another impression of their relationship to Saudi 
Arabia, it is the Saudi perspective that frames Saudi behaviour. The relevant thing to 
look at is thus how Iran is represented by Saudi Arabia and how the Iranian actions 
are described.  
 
To be clear, the emotions that are detected in this analysis are the emotions that are 
implied in the discourse, not the internal emotional concerns that Saudi decision 
makers have. This deviates from Shapiro`s theory to a certain extent, but shows a flaw 
in Shapiro`s original theory rather than sloppy research in this thesis. Shapiro does 
focus on groups, but he explains and argues for the internal dynamic and cognitive 
process that group members go through. There is an inherent methodological problem 
with this focus. It is not possible to gain access to actors` internal evaluations. As 
researchers we can only evaluate the uttered expression of group members, not their 
true internal experiences. As such, I have chosen to examine the collective expression 
that ultimately structures and frames the reality that Saudi decision makers operate 
within, namely the official Saudi discourse. The findings from examining this 
discourse are not to be equated with the actual internal attributes of the Saudi political 
elite, but the findings portray the emotional concerns in the discourse. As part of the 
dominating discourse, these emotional concerns frame the political environment that 
Saudi decision makers operate within. The implications of these emotional concerns 
are then explained by using Shapiro`s theory of Relational Identity Concerns. This 
theoretical interpretation of empirical observations creates a bridge from the 
expressed emotional concerns in the discourse, to the frames that structure the 
political decision-making. Individuals are ultimately the ones that make decisions and 
take action, but they must relate to the collective framing that is manifested in the 
discourse. This thesis therefore expands the original Relational Identity Theory in 
order to make it empirically examinable, thereby avoiding Shapiro`s methodological 
problem.  
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Operationalization	  
Actors	  
Thus far, I have talked about Saudi Arabia and its emotions as if it was a unitary 
actor. That is not the case, and I realize that there exist multiple differing feelings 
towards Iran within Saudi Arabia. My definition of Saudi Arabia as an actor will 
focus on groups, in line with Shapiro`s emphasis on tribes. I will therefore not seek to 
uncover the perceptions of all Saudi Arabians, but the ones that are included in the 
ruling elite as a group. This entails the central decision-makers in Saudi foreign 
policy, which is the King, his advisors and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs represented 
by the foreign minister. This group can make use of the state apparatus when 
choosing actions in foreign policy, and is thus the most relevant group in terms of 
international and regional relations. Given that Saudi Arabian politics follow such a 
strict hierarchy it is the ruling elite that shape the decisions made in foreign policy, 
and the constraints from domestic debate is not as strong as they are in more open 
democracies.  
 
Preconditions	  for	  Action	  
The implications to be considered are related to Shapiro`s linking of autonomy and 
affiliation to emotional reaction and action tendency (see Figure 2). I will use his 
theory to deduct preconditions for specific actions and reaction based on the 
emotional perceptions I detect in the discourse. I will not empirically analyse the 
actual decision-making and modes of action in this relationship, but rather point to the 
preconditions for specific actions. Given the type of emotional perception I detect, my 
findings will specify the predisposition of Saudi Arabia to certain types of actions, 
according to the relational identity theory. I do not claim that this theory is objectively 
more important than other theories of international relations, but simply point to a 
lacking degree of investigation and application of this theory. The primary value of 
this thesis is to show how this theory can be applied to a specific case and which 
additional mechanisms it highlights that does not appear from more traditional 
theoretical approaches. This will add insight on what type of balancing or rivalry 
behaviour Saudi Arabia is inclined to engage in, and not only predicting balancing 
and rivalry as realist theories do. The regional events I will focus on are the issues that 
appear in the official Saudi discourse, and include the civil war in Syria, unrest in 
Yemen and Iraq, nuclear negotiations between Iran and the leading world powers, and 
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Iranian involvement in other Gulf countries. Saudi Arabia and Iran are both involved 
in those issues and affected by them. They therefore have to consider each other in the 
decisions they make regarding these situations, and their behaviour also reflects the 
relationship they have to each other. Towards the end of the thesis I will also apply 
the section of the theory that argues for change in emotional concerns. I will evaluate 
the room for altering the emotional concerns as they are expressed in the discourse, 
and what kind of behaviour that would facilitate. This part of the thesis is not based 
on empirical observations, but discusses theoretical arguments applied to this case. I 
thus utilize the potential in discourse analysis for critical evaluation of the dominating 
discourse.  
	  
Approach	  
There are several ways to conduct a discourse analysis and there is no general 
agreement in international relations on what the best approach is (Milliken, 
1999:226). Neumann (2001) suggests a four-step approach, where you first identify 
the discourse of interests, secondly determine which representations are dominating, 
thirdly detect the discourse`s tiers, and fourthly define the discourse`s material 
manifestation. Milliken (1999) presents another approach, with much of the same 
elements, but divided into three steps. The first step according to Milliken should be 
to study the discourse as a system of significance (Milliken, 1999:229), meaning that 
the researcher should gather information about the constitutive elements of the 
discourse. The second step is to discuss and argue for the productivity of the 
discourse, meaning the way in which the discourse produce and reproduce 
perceptions and behaviour (Milliken, 1999:229). The third step is to address how 
practices become intelligible and legitimized, and highlight that there are other ways 
to interpret reality that challenge the dominating representations (Milliken, 1999:230).  
 
This thesis is built on Milliken`s three steps and use them as a framework for 
structuring the analysis and discussion. Since this is not a study for only portraying 
the discourse, but to uncover the relational identity concerns in that discourse the first 
step of the analysis is divided into two subsections. In explicit the analysis will first of 
all establish the basic discourse on Iranian identity as portrayed by the Saudi political 
elite. The second step will look into how the relational identity concerns are reflected 
within this official discourse. Thirdly the degree of autonomy and affiliation will be 
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interpreted through Shapiro`s analytical framework, in order to identify the 
preconditions for actions that the discourse sets. Fourthly, Milliken`s last step will be 
incorporated by evaluating alternative representations and how a change in the 
preconditions for actions can occur. This last step is purely theoretical, and rests on 
the arguments laid out in the Relational Identity Theory.  
 
Mindful of my own predispositions and biases as a research taking part in the social 
world, both the choice of structure and the theory that I use as a starting point is made 
with an assumption that Shapiro, Milliken and Hansen`s (see the section below) 
research is reliable. This is not an objective assumption that anyone would reach at 
any point of time, but is based on a tradition of trust in the thoroughness of the work 
of other researchers. To stand on the shoulders of giants is difficult without a trust in 
the strength or height of the “giants”. This assumption of reliability is perhaps the 
most basic predisposition I build my research on.   
 
Establishing	  the	  basic	  discourse	  
In order to establish a basic discourse on identity it is important to know what to look 
for, and how to evaluate the data. Lene Hansen (2006) writes about the Western 
discourse on “the Balkans” in the 1990`s, and she presents thorough arguments for the 
theoretical and methodological basis of her analysis. She elaborates on discourse 
analysis in itself, and introduces her own categories to structure the analysis. The 
Saudi elite`s discourse on Iranian identity is about defining Iran, and Hansen`s 
presentation of three core concepts is useful here. Hansen identifies the Western 
discourse on the Balkan identity based on the degree of Otherness, the attributed 
changeability and the responsibility of the West. These are the constitutive elements 
of the discourse, and I will use these categories when identifying the official Saudi 
discourse on Iran. 	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Figure	  3:	  Establishing	  a	  basic	  discourse	  on	  identity
 
 
The Otherness of Iran is both the contrasts to the Self of the Saudi elite, and the 
general attributions assigned to Iran. In order to make sense of how to interpret the 
representations of Iran I will make continuous references to the Saudi self-image. The 
changeability of Iran is determined from their portrayed ability to learn, ability to 
progress, solving problems and the degree of repeating their own actions. The 
responsibility of Iran is also an important part of the basic discourse, and it will be 
detected by asking who is to blame for the issues at hand, who have the responsibility 
to react to them, and whether Iranian actions (and their effects) are intended or 
random. 
 
When going through the data material I have divided the statements on Iran according 
to these three predefined categories. I have then looked at the main themes of the 
statements within these categories, and inductively defined some subcategories of 
statements to create an overall picture of the dominating trends in the discourse. The 
subcategories of Otherness are the general attributions of Iran and the contrast to the 
Saudi Self that is described. The subcategories of changeability are Iran`s ability to 
learn, ability to progress and Iran`s repetition of its own actions. The subcategories of 
responsibility are a view of who is to blame, who has the responsibility to act, and 
whether or not the effects are portrayed as intended or not. 
 
How	  are	  relational	  identity	  concerns	  reflected	  in	  the	  discourse?	  
In step two of the analysis I will look at how the relational identity concerns, 
autonomy and affiliation, are reflected in the basic discourse laid out in step one. This 
requires a close knowledge of autonomy and affiliation. Shapiro`s Relational Identity 
1.	  Otherness	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2.	  Changeability	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3.	  Responsibility	  
Discourse	  on	  Iranian	  identity	   Interpreted	  in	  light	  of	  Saudi	  self	  perception	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Theory is built on the many experiments he conducted where group identification was 
tested. He outlines 18 observations that led him to define autonomy and affiliation as 
the relevant core concerns (see Appendix 1). Based on these observations I have 
created four subcategories of autonomy and four subcategories of affiliation that can 
be investigated in the established discourse. In this step I therefore use the narrative 
from step one to portray the level of autonomy and affiliation in the official discourse.  
 
 
 Subcategory Based on observation nr3 
Autonomy Independence between 
issue and the other actor 
2c, 2i 
Ability to act 1e, 1i 
Room to be heard 1f, 1g, 2a, 2d, 2g 
Respect 2d, 2f  
Affiliation Empathy 1b, 1d, 2b, 2f 
Similar core identity 1h, 2c 
Creativity  1i 
Inclusion 2c, 2e 
Table	  1:	  Categories	  of	  autonomy	  and	  affiliation	   
In relation to autonomy, the independence of Saudi actions is essential. The actions 
are independent if there are few ties between the action or the issue acted upon and 
the relevant parties. This means that Saudi decisions on vaccination is highly 
independent from Iran, while issues concerning oil prices are more dependent. The 
ability to act and the room for being heard by the parties is also important in 
establishing the autonomy. This shows the degree of influence Saudi Arabia has. 
Lastly, the degree of respect that Saudi Arabia believes Iran shows also impinges 
upon the Saudi autonomy.   
 
In relation to affiliation, one basic element is the degree of empathy towards Iran. 
High empathy entails that Riyadh validate Iran`s arguments and motives, and include 
Iranian concerns in their own calculations in a favourable way. Another important 
element is the similarity of the core characteristics of the identity of Saudi Arabia and 
Iran. If Riyadh views Tehran to hold much of the same values or traits as themselves, 
Riyadh is more likely to have a closer affiliation to Tehran. The degree of creativity 
shown by the leaders can also affect the degree of affiliation by transcending 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  See	  Appendix	  1	  for	  a	  list	  of	  Shapiro`s	  observations.	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differences and evoking new categories of commonality. Lastly, the degree of 
inclusion in the decision-making process can either increase or decrease the perceived 
affiliation. When actors perceive that they are facing a shared problem, and they have 
to work together to solve it, this increase affiliation. As actors perceive a shared 
problem and work together towards a solution, this increases affiliation 
 
These categories are derived from observations in Shapiro`s experiments, and they are 
unfortunately not equally detectable in the official Saudi discourse. There are for 
example difficulties in detecting the Saudi ability to act and the room to be heard. 
These aspects of the Saudi autonomy cannot be fully investigated only by looking at 
the official discourse, but could entail the evaluation of alternative discourses or 
material facts as well. This is outside the scope of my methodological framework, and 
shows a shortcoming of pairing an analysis of the official discourse with research on 
emotional concerns. There are nevertheless some elements in the discourse that 
highlight the perception of the Saudi ability to act and their room for being heard. The 
following analysis will point to what the official discourse do in fact show about these 
categories, but keeping in mind that the categories are not fully illuminated by this. 
The insight that the official discourse provides for the other categories is nevertheless 
considered to be very valuable, and the official discourse is in total still a suitable 
focus for this purpose. This evaluation is based on an assumption that the number of 
other observations of autonomy and affiliation makes the findings strong enough to 
make inferences about the relationship. This again relates to my own cognitive bias as 
a researcher taking part in an academic tradition where higher number of observations 
is considered to yield good enough indications, even though some aspects remains 
clouded.   
 
Sources	  
The study is based on a combination of in depth textual analysis and semi-structured 
interviews. The textual analysis is based on 374 interviews and statements from the 
Saudi government, most of them from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA). These 
have been taken from the archives of the Ministry`s webpage, web archives of the 
American embassy in Riyadh and some interviews with government officials in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Far	  more	  documents	  were	  reviewed,	  but	  37	  of	  them	  proved	  to	  be	  useful	  in	  this	  context.	  	  
	  	   35	  
Saudi newspaper Arab News. I have included all relevant documents from the 
Ministry`s webpage dated between 2011 and 2014, and have supplemented this with 
searching after official statements and interviews with the King, Crown Prince and 
foreign minister containing the word “Iran”, “foreign”, “Syria”, “Yemen” or “Iraq”, in 
Arab News and the American embassy`s web archive.  
 
These are all statements transcribed in English, and therefore carry with them a risk of 
being different from Arabic sources. English sources have the disposition of being 
used by the elite for propaganda with the purpose of constructing a self-image for the 
international stage. As such, the elite may use the English statements to shape the 
international perception of them. This would not be a problem if all the sources were 
in Arabic. This is however not a serious problem that challenge the conclusions of this 
thesis. The trend in the discourse still sets the frames that Saudi decision makers 
operate under. The decision makers must relate to the discourse and situate 
themselves within its structure, regardless of how genuine and representative of 
individual internal emotions it is. In an attempt to balance a misunderstanding of 
sources I have used personal interviews to control for the trends I find in the data 
material. The interviewees all have a close knowledge of Saudi community and 
politics. It has also been useful in this regard that I stayed in Saudi Arabia for two 
months to do research, and I conducted several casual conversations with Arabic 
speaking diplomats, researchers and others (Saudis and foreigners), to test whether the 
trends I detect is in line with these peoples` perception of the discourse.  
 
During my stay in Saudi Arabia I got seven useful interviews on the record. Four of 
them were with foreign diplomats working in Riyadh, two were with researchers and 
one was with a spokesperson from the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The 
diplomats will be referred to as diplomat A, diplomat B, diplomat C and diplomat D 
in order to protect their anonymity. They were all diplomats from Western countries, 
and their perspectives and insights are probably coloured by this background. Even 
though they all have close knowledge of the official Saudi discourse and have 
participated in talks with the Saudi elite behind closed doors, I have regarded the 
information they have provided as their informed perspective, not the objective truth. 
Informal conversations with Saudis indicated that interviews with Saudi diplomats 
	  	   36	  
would have given other responds, and I expect the same is true if interviews were 
conducted with other Arab or Asian diplomats.  
 
The two researchers I interviewed did not need any anonymity, and is therefore 
referred to by name. Dr. Christian Koch made it clear that he was speaking on behalf 
of the Gulf Research Center, and the center is therefore listed as the reference. Both 
the Gulf Research Center and the other researcher I interviewed, Dr. Saeed Badeeb, 
have a history of defending Saudi policy and have been following Saudi foreign 
policy for decades. I therefore assume that they have close knowledge of the Saudi 
political sphere, and that they have an interest in portraying the Saudi regime in a 
favourable way. Since the Saudi regime is such a closed hierarchy it has not been 
realistic to get interviews with central decision-makers, so any contacts I got with 
expertise on Saudi foreign policy and especially security policy have been welcomed. 
These contacts have been sampled at random, following a snowball method, where 
one contact has put me in touch with other contacts and so on. This form of getting in 
touch with people is the “common way of business” in Saudi Arabia.  
 
The interviews have all been semi-structured, following some thematic issues such as 
regional security, the role of Iranian president Rouhani, and the role of Iran in Syria 
and Yemen (see the interview guide in Appendix 2). The interviews have been open 
for in-depth explanations of any potential additional information or insight that the 
respondents considers relevant. The interviews gave a good impression of Saudi 
concerns in the region, but some of the questions I asked did not yield directly 
relevant responds. Questions about the security agreement between Tehran and 
Riyadh in 2001 and questions about the role of the Iranian president Rouhani did not 
prove to be directly relevant for the analysis. In hindsight, the questions could have 
focused more directly on the interviewees recollection of the official Saudi discourse, 
or focused on the interviewees impression of Riyadh`s empathy with or respect for 
Iran. Because the interviews were conducted simultaneously with the gathering and 
processing of the data material it was nevertheless difficult to let the data material 
guide the questionnaire from the beginning.  	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Background	  
State	  building	  
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is geographically the largest country in the Gulf 
region, and it stretches out across 2.149 million square kilometres (Mabon, 2013:80). 
It has a relatively small population of about 28.7 million, where 5 million of those are 
expatriates (Mabon, 2013:6). The country was unified in 1932 but only after 
conquests done by Ibn Saud and his family and tribal allies (Mabon, 2013:81). The 
Al-Saud family entered into an alliance with both tribal leaders (Brynen et.al, 
2012:177) and the elites of the Islamic branch Wahhabism (Brynen et.al, 2012:82). 
The unification of tribes was an important precondition for controlling the territory, 
given the large military capacity of the tribes (Mabon, 2013:149). The political map 
of the territory was very fragmented before 1932, and Ibn Saud used marriage as a 
strategy for forging bonds between his own family and the tribes (Mabon, 2013:81). 
He actively made use of the Islamic right to marry four women and the right to 
divorce, in combination with co-opting tribal leaders (Mabon, 2013:147 – 148). A 
web of strong centralized political and military control, based on tribal loyalties 
therefore developed.  
 
The formation of the Saudi state also provides the most large-scale example of a 
structure founded on an alliance with the religious elites (Brynen et.al, 2012:198). The 
alliance with the Wahhabi elite was built on an agreement that the Al-Saud family 
would protect the Wahhabi elite against idolatry and unbelief, while the Wahhabi elite 
would continue to support Ibn Saud and his state building project (Mabon, 2013:86). 
The linking of Saudi rule to Wahhabism gave the regime religious legitimacy, and the 
Saudi national identity is today closely linked to a strict Wahhabi interpretation of 
Islam and the Kingdom`s role as host for the holy places Mecca and Medina. The 
international responsibility of Saudi Arabia as hosts of Mecca and Medina does 
however run opposed to the domestic alliance with Wahhabism to a certain extent. 
Wahhabism does not acknowledge Shi`as as Muslims, but the holy Mosques are still 
kept open to Shi`as and all forms of Sunnis. The regime in Riyadh therefore runs a 
fine line of balancing between a strict, exclusionary interpretation of Islam at home, 
while elevating its status as an including Muslim leader abroad. A clear religious 
identity is thus fundamental for Saudi Arabia both in its domestic and foreign policy.  
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Political	  structure	  
The Saudi political system is built on paternalistic and clientelistic mechanisms 
(Hertog, 2009:73). Ibn Saud became king of the unified state, and the monarchical 
rule has remained stable until today. The political system follows a strict hierarchy 
where the royal family controls the state and represses political opposition to the point 
of non-existence. There are large numbers of people working within the state, mostly 
in order to build loyalty and client relations to the regime. The state has thus been the 
“dominant channel of social mobility” and “the main or only vehicle to improve one`s 
life for most Saudis” (Hertog, 2009:76 – 77). This capacity of the regime is fuelled by 
oil rents from the international market. Given the strict hierarchical system in the 
Kingdom, the ultimate decision-making power lies with the King. In matters of 
foreign policy the Crown Prince, Deputy Crown Prince, Foreign Minister and Head of 
General Intelligence is also influential (Gulf Research Center, 2015). This means that 
the consultative bodies surrounding the King, like the Council of Ministers and the 
Majlis as-Shura5 do not contain independent power to question or control the 
decisions. Five interviews6 I had confirmed that there is in essence 2-5 people in the 
royal family ultimately making decisions in foreign policy. The five interviewees all 
agree that the King, Crown Prince and the Foreign Minister have the highest degree of 
power in this. Even though these figures may seem absolute in their power, they do 
have to consider domestic power balancing and alliances between social groups, 
religious groups and fractions within the royal family.7  
 
There are no political parties in Saudi Arabia, but that does not mean there are no 
ways to express political opinion. There are critical voices in the public realm from 
time to time, and sometimes there are even political demonstrations to put focus on 
grievances and social rights. Some groups in the Eastern province began in 2011 to 
demonstrate for increased Shi`a rights and to end the discrimination of Shi`a Muslims. 
In an attempt to curd the protests King Abdullah offered a great amount of money to 
increase domestic welfare, in addition to using security forces to clamp down the 
protests in a strict manner. These protests were centred on Shi`as in the Kingdom, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  One	  of	  the	  King`s	  consultative	  bodies.	  This	  assembly	  is	  appointed	  by	  the	  King.	  	  6	  Diplomat	  A,	  diplomat	  C,	  diplomat	  D,	  Gulf	  Research	  Council	  (GRC),	  and	  Dr	  Saeed	  Badeeb.	  	  7	  The	  King,	  Crown	  Prince	  and	  foreign	  minister	  have	  all	  been	  changed	  since	  January	  2015.	  This	  is	  a	  remarkable	  alteration,	  given	  that	  Saudi	  Arabia	  is	  built	  on	  conservative	  continuity.	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gave a clear signal to the regime that they have to consider Shi`as as a group to 
appease to keep a calm domestic environment.  
 
Another source of potential political instability is the structure of the monarchical 
rule. The line of succession is not vertical, where the crown is passed down to the 
oldest son. Rather, the succession is horizontal, meaning that the rule goes from 
brother to brother.  There is therefore a possibility that the different branches in the 
royal family, which now comprises of about 7000 people, will try to impose their 
lineage as a basis for vertical succession (Lacroix, 2011:58). When former King 
Abdullah died in January 2015 the throne was handed over to then Crown Prince 
Salman. Before he died Abdullah instated Muqrin as Deputy Crown prince, and the 
most powerful struggles over more immediate access to the throne thereby seemed to 
be curtailed. King Salman has nevertheless not kept Muqrin as next in line for the 
throne, but announced his nephew Mohammed bin Nayef as Crown Prince and his 
son Mohammed bin Salman as deputy Crown Prince in April 2015. Mohammed bin 
Nayef is the first in line for the throne that is not a son of former king Abdulaziz, and 
this marks a shift from one generation to another. In addition to creating the new post 
of Deputy Crown Prince, King Abdullah also established a Allegiance Council to give 
senior princes the capacity to choose who the future crown prince will be (Mabon, 
2013:82). This council, together with the establishment of the Deputy Crown Prince 
position, and the appointment of the first grandson of Abdulaziz in line for the throne, 
gives the impression of an enduring stability of the monarchical rule. The replacement 
of former Crown Prince Muqrin and the appointment of Mohammed bin Salman as a 
successor to the throne nevertheless imply some turbulence in the ranks. The foreign 
minister Prince Saud al-Faisal was the world`s longest serving foreign minister, with 
40 years in the position, but was also replaced in April 2015. What power struggles 
lies behind the closed doors of the palace and what changes may happen in the future 
is left to speculations. This	  thesis	  will	  not	  speculate	  in	  how	  the	  new	  leading	  figures	  will	  conduct	  foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  future,	  but	  keep	  focus	  on	  the	  period	  2011	  until	  2014.	   
	  
Foreign	  relations	  
The US has been a major power in the Gulf for decades. Saudi Arabia is no exception 
to the American influence in the region, but rather a focal point for American 
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presence. Their alliance has lasted for decades, and while the US has secured an 
access to oil, the Saudis largely rely on US military equipment, training and guarantee 
of external security (Aarts & Duijne, 2009:276). The withdrawal of American forces 
from Iraq, lacking American will to engage in Syria and waning American 
dependence on foreign oil facilitates a development where the US is decreasing its 
role in the Middle East. This poses a challenge to the regime in Riyadh who could end 
up losing an important strategic and military ally.  
 
Traditionally there has been three main powers in the Gulf, namely Saudi Arabia, Iraq 
and Iran. They have all had ambitious foreign policy aims, and have thus had to take 
account of one another in their foreign policy strategies (Gause, 2009:273). Other 
countries in the Gulf do not have aspirations or resources to gain regional influence in 
the same way. Qatar has nevertheless used its monetary, diplomatic and media-related 
resources to challenge Saudi hegemony in the region from time to time. The other 
monarchies in the Gulf, and Qatar`s co-members in the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC), Kuwait, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates and Oman, are all under heavy 
influence from Saudi Arabia. Yemen remains outside the council, and because of the 
fragile state structures and on-going violent insurgency it has been termed “Saudi 
Arabia`s soft underbelly” (Zambelis, 2014:6).  
 
Relations	  to	  Iran	  
The relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran is among the most heated friction 
points in the Middle East (Zambelis, 2014:4).  The rivalry between the two countries 
consisted in essence of two main parts, namely an ideological competition and a 
geopolitical competition (cf Mabon, 2013). The ideological competition concerns in 
part a history of suspicion between Arabs and Persians (Mabon, 2013:42 – 43), but 
mostly revolves around frictions between Sunni and Shi`a Muslims. The Saudi 
unification process and current national identity build to a large degree on the royal 
family being a moral leader of the Muslim world. This is ultimately what gives the Al 
Saud family importance both domestically and internationally. Iran directly 
undermine that authority by seeking to achieve leadership of or influence over Shi`a 
Muslims (Gallarotti, Elfalily & Tayyeb, 2012:17). This competition appears as a zero-
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sum game, where one actor cannot achieve any gains without the other one loosing 
(Mabon, 2013:44).  
 
The geopolitical element of the competition has a similar dynamic. This area is more 
concerned with the actual power and influence the countries have in the region. Given 
the Iranian and Saudi aspirations for political hegemony in the region they are natural 
competitors (Posen, 2006:254). The Iranian attainment of nuclear weapons would 
change the regional balance of power, and Saudi Arabia will perceive it as an 
existential threat (Mabon, 2013:61). In addition the two countries have diametrically 
different perceptions of the presence of global powers in the region. Saudi Arabia 
depends on the US for its own external security, while Iran wants to exclude outsiders 
from the region, and provides its own security. Thus, the US is perceived by Tehran 
as a military threat, while Riyadh perceives American presence as a precondition for 
security (Mabon, 2013:59). In this way the geopolitical competition can also be seen 
as a zero-sum game.  
 
History	  of	  relations	  to	  Iran	  
“The Iranian revolution changed the Gulf status quo enormously” (Gause, 2010:244). 
The new Shiite regime in Iran represented a direct threat to Saudi legitimacy, in terms 
of challenging the religious legitimacy and the monarchical foundation of the Saudi 
state (Gause, 2009:280). The new Iranian political leaders together with the religious 
leader Ayatollah Khomeini advocated strong sentiments against monarchies, strongly 
criticised Western interference in the region, and claimed Islamic leadership and 
supremacy in the region (Mabon, 2013:50). These elements challenged both the 
geopolitical position of Saudi Arabia and the internal stability of the Kingdom, given 
that the Iranian leadership directly approached Shi`a minorities in the Gulf countries, 
trying to export the revolution. The competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran 
culminated in the late 1980`s. In 1987 the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca saw great clashes 
between pilgrims and Saudi security forces, killing 450 pilgrims. Many of those killed 
were Iranian citizens, and the Saudi government accused most of them of being 
revolutionary guards from Iran, suicide actors and agitators trying to spread the 
revolution (Mabon, 2013:52). Riyadh cut off diplomatic bonds with Tehran in 1988 
(Amiri & Samsu, 2011:246), and during the Hajj in 1989 there were two explosions 
linked to persons with Iranian background (Mabon, 2013:52).  
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During the 1990`s the relationship started to move in another direction. There 
emerged a détente between them (Rich, 2012:473), largely due to the efforts of 
Iranian president Rafsanjani and his successor Khatami, to build confidence between 
the two countries (Amari & Samsu, 2011:247). Rafsanjani reduced the foreign aid to 
Shi`a groups and reduced the public criticism of the Saudi royal family, and the 
diplomatic bonds were restored in 1991 (Amari & Samsu, 2011:246 – 247). A 
highpoint was reached in 2001 when the two countries signed a bilateral agreement on 
security cooperation (Amiri & Samsu, 2011:246). This agreement never materialized, 
and when Ahmadinejad acceded to presidential office in Iran in 2005, hostile rhetoric 
resumed. 
   
The war in Lebanon and sectarian tensions in Iraq served as arenas for proxy battle 
between Saudi Arabia-led and Iran-led blocks, and talks about a new Arab Cold War 
emerged (Ryan, 2012).8 Several regional developments in addition to the war in 
Lebanon in 2006 have facilitated the revival of this rivalry, such as the Iranian Spring 
in 2009, Iranian nuclearization, the Arab Spring (Rich, 2012:474) and the decline of 
Damascus, Cairo and Baghdad as great regional powers (Ryan, 2012). As such Saudi 
Arabia and Iran are actors on the same stage, using several regional arenas to compete 
over power and influence. The rise in sectarian tensions in Iraq after the US invasion 
in 2003 was accompanied by Saudi support for Sunnis and Iranian support for Shi`as 
(Mabon, 2013:68). The civil war in Syria has also become a hotspot for foreign 
involvement, and Iran has stood by their ally, the Syrian regime, giving Saudi Arabia 
an opportunity to limit both Iranian and Syrian power by supporting the some of the 
rebel groups (Mabon, 2013:67). These dynamics have also been apparent in Yemen 
and Bahrain since 2011. The extent and depth of Saudi and Iranian involvement is 
nevertheless difficult to prove exactly, but their rhetoric and available channels of 
influence strongly support the assumption that they are involved.  
Other	  research	  on	  Saudi	  Arabia	  and	  Iran	  
Many researchers have studied Saudi Arabia or Iran as separate cases, but the 
literature regarding the regional aspect of their relationship is limited. Many 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  This term allude back to Kerr`s (1977) analysis of the competition between Egypt and Syria in the 
1960`s, and now denoted the cool relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran.	  
	  	   43	  
researchers look at the role of the US in the Gulf, the role of oil, and how those affect 
security (Bronson 2006; Clark, 2005; Cooper, 2011). There are nevertheless some 
scholars who have devoted attention to the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and 
these studies portray two main approaches to their relationship, namely a realist and 
an identity-based approach. Among the realist approaches we find Chubin and Tripp 
(2004) who are concerned with the structural factors constraining the relationship, and 
points to geopolitical differences as an explanation for differing regional interests. 
Lotfian (2002:110) is also advocating this approach when saying that a “major cause 
of tension is the regional arms race”, making references to the classical realist security 
dilemma. In this line of reasoning, a dilemma occurs when two actors are concerned 
for their own security and therefore want to arm themselves. The arming of one 
constitutes a threat to the security of the other, and the first actor is thus prompted to 
get even more arms, resulting in an arms race reducing the security for both actors. 
This is exemplified by several analyses of the prospects of a nuclear-armed Iran. 
Some predict that Saudi Arabia will seek to attain nuclear weapons if Iran attains 
them, and that the Saudis will look to Pakistan for assistance (Gause, 2010:248; Rich, 
2012:480; Riedel, 2010:373 – 374). Another example of using the security dilemma 
to analyse the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran is the notion of 
involvement in Iraq. When Iran increases its presence in Iraq, Saudi Arabia increases 
its presence in Iraq, which in turn increases the overall sectarian violence, resulting in 
a proxy war (Mabon, 2013:184). The driving mechanism of decision-making in this 
approach is an interest in balancing the power of aspiring regional hegemons, and 
Saudi Arabia thus seeks to counter every move Iran makes to increase its regional 
power. 
 
Gregory Gause elaborates on this argument in his analysis of Saudi foreign policy. He 
stipulates that the right frame for understanding Saudi foreign policy is to use “the 
regional balance of power battle between Riyadh and Tehran” (Gause, 2011). This 
does not only mean that the Saudi royal family will oppose Tehran, but that they will 
also counter balance the allies of Iran, for example the Syrian regime. Gause (2010:9) 
approaches this argument somewhat differently in his book The International 
Relations of the Persian Gulf where he explains that states react to external threats to 
internal stability, not primarily to external changes in power balance. In this view, 
Saudi Arabia is primarily concerned with regime security and the domestic effect of 
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external powers, not regional balancing per see (Gause, 2010:1). The link between 
external powers and domestic stability is manifested by transnational identities and 
the way these identities are utilised by foreign actors to gain influence (Gause, 
2010:10). He thus acknowledges that identities and ideas matter when framing our 
understanding of the material, but that the material resources at the same time enables 
the manifestation of ideas. 
 
This creates a bridge over to the second dominating trend in explaining the 
relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran, namely by pointing to identities. Barnett 
(1998) looks at this element in his book Dialogues in Arab Politics, and shows that 
symbols and perceptions among state leaders are more important than power politics 
in the Middle East. The self-perception of state leaders forms the basis of their 
interests, and they often use symbolic gestures to frame events and convey their 
message. In Barnett`s view this can result in a “symbolic security dilemma” where 
leaders counter each other`s moves by making other symbolic moves, leading to a 
spiralling of rivalry perceptions (Barnett, 1998). Al Toraifi (2012) has written 
extensively on the role of state identity in the foreign policy decisions of Saudi Arabia 
and Iran from 1997 until 2009. He argues that the changes in policy and attitudes in 
the Saudi-Iranian relationship in this period is caused by a change in Iran`s state 
identity. Mabon (2013) address another way of explaining the relevance of identities. 
He seeks to unveil what he calls the identity incongruence within and between the 
countries, and how this affects their relationship. The move from internal dynamics to 
external decision is linked by the “incongruence dilemma”, where an external security 
dilemma between Saudi Arabia and Iran influences an internal security dilemma 
between Riyadh and the domestic Shi`a minority (Mabon, 2013:10). 
 
Even though both these approaches seem to yield valuable insight into foreign policy-
making in Saudi Arabia and Iran, neither one of them address the fundamental 
emotional concerns that lie behind the decisions. This approach explores the deeper 
mechanisms of decision-making, which are yet to be uncovered, and can add 
important information on how to deal with this competitive relationship in a 
constructive and peaceful way.	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Step	  1,	  The	  Saudi	  official	  discourse	  on	  Iran	  
The analysis starts by drawing a picture of the overall Saudi discourse on Iran. It 
focuses on the view of the Saudi political elite, and is based on official statements 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supplemented by interviews. This outline of the 
discourse is structured around Lene Hansen`s (2006) categories for portraying a 
discourse on “The Other”, namely the degree of otherness, the changeability and the 
responsibility of the other group. The investigation of these categories follow 
Hansen`s own definitions, my own understanding of what it means to be different, 
able to change and responsible, and informed by the view of people living and 
working in Saudi Arabia that I got to know while I was in Riyadh. In this way I have 
tried to modify my own biases towards a Western, Norwegian understanding of the 
categories, to be more sensitive towards the Saudi structure of social meaning that the 
discourse operates within. This outline of the official discourse will serve as a 
foundation for detecting emotional concerns in the second step of the analysis.  
 
Iran is an important power in the Gulf and wider Middle East, and Saudi Arabia is 
mindful of Iranian political activity. The rivalry between the two countries has 
important implications for the conflicts in the region, especially in the states where 
government structures are weak. Going through the data material it is striking that 
none of the statements or speeches from the former Saudi foreign minister Prince 
Saud al Faisal9, has Iran as the main topic. Iran is nevertheless mentioned repeatedly 
in relation to other cases, or as an additional element to the original agenda. This may 
indicate reluctance by formal Saudi bodies to relate directly and exclusively to Iran. 
By talking about Iran in connection with other issues, they construct Iran as an actor 
that has a supporting role in the region, not playing a leading role in and of itself. Iran 
is most often talked about in connection to the Syrian crisis, but is also cast in the 
situation in Yemen, Iraq and other Gulf States. The exception from portraying Iran as 
a side actor is related to the negotiations between the permanent members of the 
Security Council10 plus Germany (P5 + 1) and Iran over the Iranian nuclear program.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Prince	  Saud	  al	  Faisal	  was	  the	  foreign	  minister	  throughout	  the	  period	  in	  focus.,	  and	  was	  replaced	  by	  currest	  foreign	  minister	  Adel	  Al	  Jubeir	  on	  29th	  April	  2015.	  This	  was	  after	  Prince	  Saud	  had	  served	  as	  foreign	  minister	  for	  40	  years.	  	  10	  USA,	  UK,	  France,	  Russia	  and	  China.	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On the other hand, while Iran is most often viewed as a supporting role in regional 
politics, former foreign minister Prince Saud al Faisal links Iran to many of the 
developments in the region. In this way, Prince Saud portrays Iran as an active player 
that has a hand in several important situations. Iran is thus not side lined as a state 
with minor influence, but is relevant for the Saudi perception of the regional situation 
in many areas.  
 
Otherness:	  
There are a lot of references in the discourse to what characteristics and traits Iran 
has. The following section will first show that Iran is portrayed as different from 
Saudi Arabia in the official discourse, and point to some elements of differences that 
do not appear in the discourse. The next section explains the few common traits 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia that appear in the discourse, and will also mention 
some common traits that one might expect to be part of the discourse, but that are not 
mentioned. Lastly attention will be given to the more general attributes of Iran in the 
official discourse that do not relate specifically to the Saudi self-image.  
 
Differences	  
The most frequent references to Iran by Saudi foreign policy decision-makers 
highlight how Iran is different from the Saudi identity. In March 2011 Prince Saud 
told the press that “we don`t have demonstrations like those in Iran” (Prince Saud, 
110309)11, pointing to Iran as an unstable country. This refers back to demonstrations 
that Iran experienced in 2009, where popular protests challenged the political 
leadership. Prince Saud further explained that “reform and advice cannot be made 
through demonstrations and means that raise sedition and cause disunity” (Prince 
Saud, 110309), showing that unity and compliance are central values for the Saudi 
leadership. By referring to demonstrations in Iran earlier in his speech, Prince Saud 
created a contrast between the unstable Iran and the united Saudi Arabia.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  The	  references	  to	  data	  material	  in	  the	  analysis	  will	  use	  a	  different	  style	  than	  the	  standard	  Harvard	  style	  used	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  text.	  The	  references	  will	  specify	  who	  made	  the	  statement	  and	  when.	  The	  six	  numbers	  following	  the	  name	  indicates	  year-­‐month-­‐day	  the	  statement	  was	  made	  or	  published.	  For	  example	  110309	  means	  the	  statement	  was	  made	  9th	  March	  2011.	  This	  is	  in	  order	  to	  make	  the	  text	  more	  readable	  and	  straightforward	  without	  drowning	  in	  the	  multiple	  references	  made.	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Another basic distinction between Iran and Saudi Arabia that become apparent in the 
official Saudi discourse is how Iran deals with sovereignty. Prince Saud has several 
times underlined how important sovereignty is for Saudi Arabia. He has made clear 
“the Kingdom`s absolute rejection of any interference in its internal affairs” (Prince 
Saud, 110309), that they value “mutual respect regarding sovereignty and 
independence” (Prince Saud, 120401), and that the “unity of the state and its 
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity” is vital for peace (Prince Saud, 
140911). This creates a sharp contrast to Iran`s “continued interference into the 
internal affairs” of GCC countries (Prince Saud, 120611), the Iranian “attempt to 
interfere in the countries of the region by all means” (Prince Saud, 130106), and 
Iran`s “military and political interference in the regional state” (Prince Saud, 
141014b). In total, a main point of critique from Saudi officials towards Iran is the 
meddling in internal affairs of other Middle Eastern countries. It is clear that in the 
official Saudi view, Iran is not respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
other states.  
 
This attribute is criticized in even harsher terms in relation to a dispute between Iran 
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) over some islands, and recently also in relation 
to the Syrian crisis. The Saudi discourse on these two conflicts expresses the view of 
Iran as an occupier. Since 1971 Iran has claimed control of the islands Abu Musa, 
Lesser Tunbs and Greater Tunbs in the Strait of Hormuz (Al Toraifi, 2012:11). In 
1992 Iranian forces took full control over Abu Musa, and UAE never gave up their 
claim for that island. This has remained a point of critique in the Saudi view of Iran 
ever since, and Prince Saud has said that Iran is occupying this island (Prince Saud, 
120625; Prince Saud, 120928). In Syria Prince Saud has said that in addition to 
fighting the regime the rebels are also “fighting a foreign occupier” (Prince Saud, 
130701) and that “Syria can only be described now as a an occupied country” (Prince 
Saud, 130525b). The former foreign minister has several times bashed Iran for its 
interference in Syria12, and although the “foreign occupier” is sometimes not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  See	  for	  example	  Prince	  Saud,	  130302;	  Prince	  Saud,	  130304;	  Prince	  Saud,	  130525b;	  Prince	  Saud,	  130625a;	  Prince	  Saud,	  130625b;	  Prince	  Saud,	  130902;	  KSA	  mission	  to	  the	  UN	  140211;	  KSA	  official	  statement,	  141014a,	  Prince	  Saud	  in	  Arab	  News,	  141014b.	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mentioned by name, it clearly alludes to Iran.13 In 2013 and 2014 Saudi officials 
stepped up their portrayal of Iran being an occupier, and said straight out that Syria is 
occupied because of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (Prince Saud, 130902, KSA 
mission to the UN 140211), and more generally that “the Iranians are actually an 
occupying force in Syria now” (Prince Saud, 141014b). This portrays Iran not only as 
an actor that interferes but one that actively takes control over foreign territory.  
 
In addition to this Iran has recently been described as a problem in and of itself. 
Prince Saud hinted to this in 2012 when he said that he “hope[s] that they [the 
Iranians] would change and become part of the solution” (Prince Saud, 121205a), 
implying that they are now part of the problem. The former Saudi foreign minister did 
not hold back however in October 2014 when he said that “Iran was always part of 
the security problem in the region and never part of the solution” (Prince Saud, 
141014a) and that Iran is still “part of the problem” (Prince Saud, 141014b).  
 
Based on these descriptions of Iran Saudi officials have added that Iran violates 
international principles and norms. The Iranian “invasion” of Syria for example 
“breaks every international law, protocol and principle” (Prince Saud, 130625a), 
while Iranian espionage against the Kingdom also “violates international norms” 
(Prince Saud, 130526). This again stands in sharp contrast to the Saudi self-image as 
acting “in accordance with the framework and resolutions of international legitimacy, 
with full respect for the principles of human rights and international humanitarian 
law” (Prince Saud, 120928). By constructing Iran as an actor that disregards 
international norms, Prince Saud transfers the concerns for Iranian actions from a 
bilateral and regional level, to being an issue for the entire international community.   
 
Elements	  of	  Otherness	  outside	  the	  discourse	  	  
Two elements of differences between Saudi Arabian and Iranian identity that didn`t 
appear in the official discourse, but that is a large part of other analyses, is the 
sectarian and ethnic division between the countries. Saudi Arabia adheres to a Sunni 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Saudi	  Arabia	  has	  also	  criticised	  Russian	  aid	  to	  the	  Assad	  regime,	  but	  has	  not	  pointed	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  Russian	  people	  in	  Syria.	  Iran	  is	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  accused	  of	  sending	  military	  personnel	  (Prince	  Saud	  in	  Arab	  News,	  141014b)	  and	  being	  present	  in	  Syria	  with	  the	  Iranian	  Revolutionary	  Guard	  and	  through	  its	  proxy	  Hezbollah	  (Prince	  Saud,	  130625a;	  Prince	  Saud,	  130902).	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tradition of Islam, while Iran follows a Shi`a tradition, and many point to this as an 
important factor for their relationship.14 As Diplomat C put it, the notion of being a 
Muslim leader “is always on their [Riyadh`s] mind”. Diplomat A mentioned 
nevertheless, that Riyadh would never say that this affects their foreign policy. In 
addition, some scholars have highlighted the differences of Arab and Persian 
ethnicity, and that the historical relationship between the two groups shapes the way 
Riyadh relates to Tehran.15 These two elements do not however appear in the official 
discourse on Iran. The Gulf Research Center (GRC) was very clear on the point that 
Riyadh does not promote sectarian tensions in their foreign policy (The Gulf Research 
Center, 2015). 
 
This does not mean that sectarian and ethnic divisions are irrelevant factors in the 
relationship, but that they are not part of the official discourse, and thus do not limit 
the space for manoeuvring according to the discourse. Divisions between Sunni and 
Shi`a, or Arabs and Persians may well be factors that influence the actions of Saudi 
Arabia and may well influence the way Riyadh talks about Iran. They are not 
however, directly observable in the official discourse. Since this thesis is looking at 
the expressed concerns of the discourse, sectarianism and ethnicity does not enter into 
the picture. These factors can still motivate action, but the analysis of these factors 
would entail a whole other study requiring a different approach than the official Saudi 
discourse provides. This being said, it is an interesting observation in itself that 
sectarianism and ethnicity are not parts of the official discourse.  
 
Common	  traits	  
Iran is nevertheless not constructed as a completely different Other without any 
common attributes with the Saudi self-image. Through the official Saudi discourse 
one commonality between Iran and Saudi Arabia appears. Iran is at times described as 
“a neighbouring country” (Prince Saud, 130525b), and even a neighbour that the 
Saudi government has relations to, will negotiate with and will talk to (Prince Saud, 
140514). In relation to the nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1, Prince Saud has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  This	  was	  underlined	  as	  a	  central	  concern	  for	  Riyadh	  in	  interviews	  with	  Diplomat	  A,	  Diplomat	  B	  and	  Diplomat	  D.	  See	  also	  Gause,	  2014,	  Gallarotti,	  Elfalily	  &	  Tayyeb,	  2012.	  	  15	  See	  for	  example	  Mabon,	  2013.	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several times talked about Iran and other countries in the region, to point to their 
common right to peaceful use of nuclear energy.16  
  
Elements	  of	  Common	  Traits	  outside	  the	  discourse	  
One commonality that I expected to find traces of in the discourse was the Muslim 
character of the national identity of the two countries. Islam plays a major role in both 
Iran`s and Saudi Arabia`s self-image, even though they adhere to different directions 
of Islam. Saudi Arabia has clearly stated the importance of “Islamic principles and 
values”, “the Holy Quran and the teachings of the Prophet” (Prince Saud, 110309), 
and the “blessings from God” (Former Crown Prince Salman, 150106). There has 
nevertheless been no reference to this common ground throughout the official 
discourse on Iran from 2011 until 2014, and it is clearly not an aspect that Riyadh 
wants to highlight. This can be explained by internal tensions within Saudi Arabia, 
between the regime and the Wahhabi opposition. Wahhabi forces in the Saudi society 
is always a concern for the decision makers, given the way the regime relies on 
alliances with and support from conservative factions. Wahhabism does not 
acknowledge Shi`as as real Muslims at all, but at the same time the Saudi regime 
accepts between 50 000 and 100 000 Shi`a pilgrims every year. If the official 
discourse would bring up the role of Shi`as and their affiliation to Sunnis this would 
stir up great domestic differences of opinion, and would ultimately challenge the 
power base of the regime. As will be shown in the fourth step of the analysis, this 
deprives Saudi Arabia of one aspect that could have increased affiliation to Iran in the 
official discourse.  
 
General	  attributes	  
In addition to these direct or indirect comparisons with the Saudi self-image there 
appear a number of other general attributes of Iran in the Saudi official discourse. 
First, Iran is not viewed as an actor with serious intensions. Rather, Iran is portrayed 
as not being serious. This is closely linked to the nuclear talks, and Prince Saud al 
Faisal has called on Iran to “conduct serious negotiations” in order to “remove all 
doubts about its nuclear program” (Prince Saud, 120312). There has been a pressing 
“necessity of Iran responding to serious international efforts” (Prince Saud, 130525), 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  See	  Prince	  Saud,	  120625;	  Vice	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Prince	  Abdulaziz,	  120928;	  KSA	  official	  statement,	  131125	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and a need for Iran to “take strategic steps in the near future to show a sincere wish to 
cooperate with the world community more than before” (KSA official statement, 
141014a). This implies that Iran has never been quite serious about cooperating and 
negotiating with the international community. The Gulf Research Center highlights 
this when explaining that Saudi Arabia is eager to engage with Iran, as long as it is 
“seen as being serious and responsible” (Gulf Research Center, 2015). The scepticism 
towards Iran`s seriousness is also supported by Prince Saud`s statements saying that 
“Iran does not respond to the efforts of the Group [P5+1] to resolve the crisis” (Prince 
Saud, 130106), and that Saudi Arabia is disappointed over “Iran`s failure to respond 
to these efforts” and “its attempts to evade them” (Prince Saud, 120625).  
 
In addition to not being serious, Iran is also constructed as an actor that is not to be 
trusted.17 This is also closely linked to the nuclear talks. The situation is seen as a 
crisis because of the doubts about the Iranian nuclear program, meaning that Iran is 
not honest about their intentions. A solution to this problem would have to remove 
“any regional and international uncertainty” (Prince Saud, 130525) and “alleviate all 
doubts concerning the program and guarantee that Iran will use nuclear power only 
for peaceful purposes” (Prince Saud, 130304). It is therefore not enough to trust that 
Iran will only use its nuclear program for peaceful purposes, but there needs to be an 
additional control mechanism. Saudi official statements have consistently pointed to 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the appropriate authority for 
ensuring such control.18 Diplomat A explains that Riyadh fear that a nuclear deal will 
make the US lose focus on the danger that Iran poses in the region, and forget that 
Iran is not to be trusted. In May 2013 Prince Saud was especially clear on the point 
that Iran could not be trusted, when he said that “the statements of Iranian officials 
and their actions were contradictory” (Prince Saud, 130526). The Gulf Research 
Center19 points to some hesitancy on the side of Saudi Arabia in their bilateral 
relations to Iran, because they “want to see Rouhani`s nice words translated into 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  This	  is	  confirmed	  through	  interviews	  with	  Dr.	  Saeed	  Badeeb,	  Diplomat	  A,	  Diplomat	  C,	  and	  the	  Gulf	  Research	  Center	  (2015).	  Dr.	  Saeed	  Badeeb	  also	  turned	  the	  perspective	  around	  and	  said	  that	  the	  problem	  is	  ultimately	  that	  Iran	  is	  not	  to	  be	  trusted	  because	  Iran	  does	  not	  trust	  anybody.	  	  18	  See	  Vice	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Prince	  Abdulaziz,	  120928;	  Prince	  Saud,	  130213;	  Prince	  Saud,	  130304;	  Prince	  Saud	  140416	  19	  Bearing	  in	  mind	  that	  this	  research	  centre	  is	  established	  by	  and	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  dr.	  Abdulaziz	  Sager,	  which	  has	  a	  very	  clear	  critical	  opinion	  on	  Iran.	  	  
	  	   52	  
concrete actions” (Gulf Research Center, 2015). In essence, Iran “preach what they do 
not practice, and practice what they do not say” (Prince Saud, 130526).  
 
Another attribute that appears in the official discourse on Iran is that Iran wants to 
promote conflict and fighting. Tehran wants conflict and actively seeks to spread it in 
the region. An official spokesperson from the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MoFA) said that Iran is aiming at blackmailing states, not just getting influence 
(MoFA, 2015). In relation to the nuclear issue Iran is conducting a “policy of 
escalation” (Prince Saud, 120312). In the Gulf region, Iran is accused of “taking 
advantage of the situation to instigate sedition” (Prince Saud, 121224). In relation to 
Syria, Prince Saud said that it is “very unfortunate that Iran is using such a threatening 
tone” (Prince Saud, 130525b). Even when it comes to the internal affairs of Saudi 
Arabia, Iran has a “hostile attitude” (Prince Saud, 130526). Riyadh has also pointed 
out that Iran has “forces fighting in Syria, Yemen, Iraq and other places” (Prince 
Saud, 141014a) and that Iran is providing “support for terrorist groups” (Prince Saud, 
141014b). Dr. Saeed Badeeb (2015) also supported this view by saying that Iran 
wants a bad relationship with Riyadh, and that they seek to surround the kingdom in 
the region. In this view Iran does not seek peace and security, but rather want to 
create conflict and chaos.  
 
This leads to the next point that appears from the discourse, namely that Iran succeeds 
in their aims for creating conflict. Iran is in itself portrayed as a threat. The nuclear 
issue is described as “one of the most important challenges that threaten international 
peace and security in general, and the security and stability in the Gulf in particular” 
(Prince Saud, 120928). Iran is in itself the threat in this regard, because Riyadh views 
the nuclear issue as arising from Iran`s lacking trustworthiness. Prince Saud makes 
this clear when he named the nuclear crisis the “Iranian challenge which constitutes a 
clear threat” (Prince Saud, 121114). The view of Iran as a real threat is also obvious 
in the Saudi view of the Syrian conflict. In March 2013 Prince Saud said that “there 
are some states that continue to aid and abet the slaughter of the Syrian people” 
(Prince Saud, 130302). Even if he didn`t mention Iran by name, this was a clear kick 
to Iran after already having established a view of Iran as aiding the Assad regime. In 
June 2013 Prince Saud was more clear spoken and said that the most dangerous 
development in Syria “is the involvement of foreign forces, foremost of which is the 
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motions of Hezbollah and others with support from Iran`s national guard in the mass 
murder of Syrians” (Prince Saud, 130625a). He further said that Syria is “facing 
genocide by the government and an invasion from outside the government”, referring 
to Iran (Prince Saud, 130625b). In this way, Iran constitutes a threat to the Syrian 
people as well as to the regional security situation.  
 
Even though it is not a big element in the Saudi official discourse on Iran, there are 
examples of Iran being portrayed as stupid. It would be a very harsh line to say out 
straight, but the former foreign minister has implied it. “Common sense say that in 
times of trouble, people should be little more prudent and tone things down, and not 
add fuel to the fire” (Prince Saud, 130525b). This was said after expressing concern 
over Iran`s threatening tone in Syria, and Prince Saud thus creates a contrast between 
Iranian actions on the one side and “common sense” on the other. In another 
statement Prince Saud said that “I don`t think Iran has a solution” regarding the 
Syrian crisis (Prince Saud, 121205b). This implies that Iran is not sensible and does 
not think ahead. In essence, this supports the previously explained notion that Iran is 
more interested in creating chaos than fixing it.  
 
All of the general attributes deducted from the discourse has up until now been 
viewed in negative terms. There do however appear some neutral characteristics of 
Iran in the discourse as well. As noted before, Iran does seem to violate international 
norms, but it does at the same time have rights in the international arena. This appears 
in connection with the nuclear negotiations, where Riyadh reaffirms “the right of Iran 
and the countries of the region for the utilization of nuclear power for peaceful 
purposes” (Prince Saud, 120625). This has been reiterated several times20 and also 
underlines Saudi Arabia`s commitment to international norms and Iran`s inclusion in 
the region.  
 
Even though Iran is to a large extent viewed in negative terms, Riyadh still recognise 
that it is an important actor in the region, with a weight that cannot be ignored. “Iran 
is also a large, important country, and Iran`s attitude has its weight” and “its position 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Prince	  Saud,	  120625;	  Vice	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Prince	  Abdulaziz,	  120928;	  KSA	  official	  statement,	  131125	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will have an impact” (Prince Saud, 121205a). Prince Saud has also stated that “the 
two countries [Saudi Arabia and Iran] are influential in the region” (Prince Saud, 
140514) and that regional security “requires an Iran at peace and happy with itself” 
(Prince Saud, 100215). In this way, Iran should be taken into account as an important 
regional actor.21  
 
Summary	  
In total, the picture of Iranian identity that arise from the official Saudi discourse on 
Iran, has several elements, but is mostly comprised of negative descriptions and 
contrasts to the Saudi self-image. While the Kingdom values unity and coherence, 
Iran is unstable. While the Kingdom strongly believes in the respect of sovereignty, 
Iran disregards it. Iran is interfering in the internal affairs of other countries in the 
region, and in some cases it even occupies another state`s territory. Iran also violates 
international norms and principles, and it is in itself a problem for the region. This 
stands in sharp contrast to the Saudi self-image of respecting and valuing international 
norms, and the Saudi commitments to solving regional issues peacefully. Even though 
central differences in sectarian and ethnic affiliation do not appear in the discourse, 
the other elements outlined creates an image of Iran as diametrically different from 
Saudi Arabia. The official Saudi discourse does to a certain extent acknowledge that 
Iran is part of the region and that it is a neighbouring country, but Riyadh does not 
highlight other commonalities such as both of them being Muslim.  
 
Among the other more general characteristics that are ascribed to Iran is a sense that 
Iran cannot be taken seriously and should not be trusted. Not only does Iran want to 
create conflict and chaos, but it also succeeds in promoting it. Iran thus poses a threat 
to the region. Iran is not portrayed a sensible actor, but still has international rights in 
line with the rest of the countries in the region. Ultimately, Iran is seen as an 
important regional actor that should be reckoned with. In total, these findings create a 
substantial basis for evaluating the autonomy and affiliation that appears in the 
official discourse. As will be shown in step two of the analysis, most of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  This	  point	  in	  the	  official	  Saudi	  view	  of	  Iran	  is	  confirmed	  through	  interviews	  with	  the	  Gulf	  Research	  Center	  (2015),	  Diplomat	  A,	  Diplomat	  C	  and	  Diplomat	  D.	  Diplomat	  A	  also	  adds	  that	  Riyadh	  pretend	  that	  they	  don`t	  take	  Tehran	  very	  seriously,	  but	  that	  they	  in	  fact	  do.	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characteristics defining Iran in the discourse underline a weak autonomy and low 
affiliation on behalf of Saudi Arabia.  
 
Changeability:	  	  
Another aspect of the Saudi perception of Iranian identity is the ability of Iran to 
change or adapt. This is the second element Hansen (2013) points to when 
establishing the official discourse on “The Other”. This section will show that Iran is 
portrayed as having a continuous behaviour, which fails to respond to progress. It will 
also be shown that the Saudi discourse advocates a hope that Iran has the ability to 
progress in the future. 
 
The first element that becomes apparent in the discourse is Iran`s tendency to 
continue its destructive actions. Prince Saud for example says that the Kingdom 
“rejects Iran`s continued interference into the internal affairs of member countries [in 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)]” (Prince Saud, 120625), and that “based on 
experience, Iran was always a part of the security problem in the region” (Prince 
Saud, 141014a).  
 
Although the continuation of Iranian behaviour in itself is just a small part of the 
picture of Iran, the Iranian failure to respond to progress forms a larger part of the 
discourse. This relates mostly to the nuclear negotiations, and Riyadh has repeatedly 
stated their disappointment in Iran`s failure to respond to the efforts of the P5+1 
group to solve the crisis diplomatically.22 This constitutes a tendency for Iran to evade 
attempts at progress and questions their will and ability to move forward and develop.  
 
There is not much focus on ways that Iran has changed or adjusted its policy over the 
four-year period from the beginning of 2011 until the end of 2014. If this is because 
Iranian policy has not changed or because Riyadh does not want to acknowledge the 
change is not relevant here. The relevant thing is how Iran is constructed in the 
official discourse in Saudi Arabia. If this discourse does not mention actual change 
that much, it makes up for it by mentioning the Saudi hope for change in Iranian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Prince	  Saud,	  120625;	  Prince	  Saud,	  130106;	  Prince	  Saud,	  130213	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policy. In March 2012, Prince Saud expressed a “hope that Iran would end its policy 
of escalation” (Prince Saud, 120312). This emphasises both that Iran is continuing its 
destructive policy, and that there is a potential for change if Iran only seize the 
opportunity. Further Prince Saud underlines that “our hope is that Iran become part of 
the effort to make the region as safe and as prosperous as possible” (Prince Saud, 
140514) and a hope that Iran would “work towards establishing strong relations with 
its neighbours, instead of escalating things with a threatening tone” (Prince Saud, 
130525b).  
 
Riyadh has also expressed hope of future progress and cooperation in specific areas of 
the region too, for example that they “hope that Iran plays a positive role in 
supporting Iraq`s territorial integrity and stability” (Prince Saud, 120114). Concerning 
Iran`s role in Syria Prince Saud expressed his hopes that Iran “would change and 
become part of the solution” (Prince Saud, 121205a), while in relation to the nuclear 
negotiations Prince Saud hopes that “Iran joins the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and 
GCC states to make the Middle East free from nuclear weapons” (Prince Saud, 
120114). All these expressions of hope does not place any particular faith in the actual 
ability of Iran to progress, but it leaves room open for Iran to choose these actions 
without struggling to fit such moves into the official Saudi discourse on Iran. In 
essence, these expressions in the discourse make it easier for Iran to change rather 
than continue its current policy.  
 
In sum, Iran is portrayed as a stagnant actor that continues a number of destructive 
policies, and fails to respond to efforts by international and regional actors to progress 
and improve the situation. At the same time Iran still has the potential to change if it 
so wishes. These elements highlight both a perception that Iran lacks respect for Saudi 
Arabia, and Riyadh`s lacking ability to be creative to invent new categories of 
commonality to cooperate from. Step two of the analysis will elaborate on what this 
says about the autonomy and affiliation of Saudi Arabia in the discourse.  
 
Responsibility:	  
The third element of establishing the basic discourse on identity that Hansen (2006) 
brings up is the placement of responsibility. This appears as a central part of the 
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official Saudi discourse on Iran as well. The responsibility that Riyadh places on Iran 
can be divided into three separate, yet related dimensions. First of all, Iran is 
responsible for some destructive consequences of their actions. Secondly, Iran is 
responsible for not having done enough in the past to promote peace. Thirdly, Iran has 
the responsibility to take action in the future to promote peace.   
 
Destructive	  consequences	  
Iranian policies attempt “to interfere in the countries of the region by all means and 
stir up unrest and problems in them” (Prince Saud, 130106). Prince Saud has also 
criticised Iran`s efforts to interfere, saying that it is “destabilizing the Middle East, 
undermining peace efforts, and scuttling attempts to root out terror groups” (Prince 
Saud, 141014b). These statements clearly point to negative consequences of Iranian 
actions. Prince Saud has also been more specific when placing the responsibility for 
destructive situations on Iran. The nuclear issue is for example said to be “one of the 
most important challenges that threaten international peace and security in general, 
and the security and stability of the Gulf in particular” (Prince Saud, 120928), and this 
issue arises from uncertain intentions of Tehran`s use of its nuclear program. There is 
also an “environmental danger of the Iranian program on the Gulf States, in addition 
to its threat to security and peace of the region and the world” (Prince Saud, 130106).  
 
A major focus in the official Saudi discourse is also how Iran is responsible for the 
crisis and atrocities in Syria. “They [the Iranians] are killing the Syrian people. They 
are spilling Syrian blood” (Prince Saud, 141014b). The presence of Iran is portrayed 
as “an occupying force in Syria” (Prince Saud, 141014b), and this occupation “adds 
an even deadlier element” to the crisis (Prince Saud, 130625a). There are numerous 
references to the way in which Iranian support to Assad and his regime “enable it to 
murder more and more of its people” (Prince Saud, 130304).23 The discourse thus 
portrays Iran as being partly to blame for the bloodshed in Syria.24 This does not 
remove any responsibility from Assad and his regime, and Riyadh does not hold back 
in criticising their actions. Still, the linking of Assad`s “killing machine” (Prince 
Saud, 130306) and “genocidal war against its own people” (Prince Saud, 130701) to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  For	  more	  references,	  see	  Prince	  Saud,	  130605;	  Prince	  Saud,	  130625b;	  KSA	  mission	  to	  the	  UN,	  140211;	  Prince	  Saud	  140310.	  24	  Part	  of	  the	  blame	  is	  also	  put	  on	  Russia	  and	  their	  support	  of	  the	  Assad	  regime.	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Iran`s policy also transfers some responsibility of the atrocities to Iran. As an official 
spokesperson of the foreign ministry said, Iran plays a destructive role in the entire 
region, and because of this “the region is almost boiling” (MoFA, 2015).  
  
Past	  efforts	  to	  promote	  peace	  
Another complaint from Riyadh against Tehran is that Iranian decision makers have 
not done enough to promote peace in the past. In essence, Iran is the one responsible 
for the failure of previous efforts to resolve conflicts in the region. Generally 
speaking, the peace and security of the region “cannot be achieved through the pursuit 
to possess deadly weapons through exercising an approach of hegemony and 
intervention in the internal affairs of countries in the region” (Prince Saud, 120928). 
This points to two of the elements that Riyadh has been criticising Iran for, namely 
the ambiguous intentions of Iranian nuclear capacity, and Iran`s involvement in the 
internal affairs of other countries. In addition, Prince Saud said that Iran`s blunt tone 
“complicates things and increase the chances that mistakes would be made by either 
side” (Prince Saud, 130525b), and that Iran`s interference in other states` internal 
affairs “has created a huge mess” (Prince Saud, 141014b). Iran`s blunt tone and 
interference thus appears as reasons for the continuation of conflict and problems, and 
Iran holds responsibility for this.  
 
Concerning the dispute between Iran and UAE over the islands in the Strait of 
Hormuz, the Kingdom expressed concern over “the threats and escalatory steps 
undertaken by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran in these islands” 
(Prince Saud, 120928) and has defined the situation as an Iranian occupation of 
Emirati islands (Prince Saud, 120625). Nothing points to a degree of blame at the 
Emirati account, but rather portrays Iran as the sole aggressor and reason for the 
continuation of the dispute. Off course, Riyadh`s account of the nuclear negotiations 
and the Syrian crisis also points to Iranian failure to promote peace and provide a 
solution to the problems. As mentioned, Prince Saud has several times criticised that 
Iran “fails to respond to the efforts of the 5+1 Group” (Prince Saud, 130106). 
Regarding Iranian responsibility in the continuation of the Syrian crisis, it is clear that 
Riyadh does not view Iran`s previous actions as constructive. “As for Iran, whether it 
wants to be part of the solution or part of the problem in Syria, we don`t think that 
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anyone looking at Iran`s policy would be able to say that it wants to be part of the 
solution” (Prince Saud, 121205a).  
 
Future	  efforts	  to	  promote	  peace	  
Despite all of this responsibility placed on Iran`s shoulders for previous instigation of 
conflict and prevention of solutions, this does not automatically mean that Iran has a 
responsibility to take future steps to establish peace and security. The official 
discourse in Saudi Arabia is a bit divided regarding this. In one way, a lot of 
responsibility for taking future steps towards peace is placed on Iran, but at the same 
time other actors are also highlighted as central to the establishment of future peace.  
 
In relation to the nuclear negotiations, Riyadh clearly says that Iran is the one that has 
to become serious in its efforts “in order to put an end to this crisis” (Prince Saud, 
120928) and to remove regional and international suspicions.25 There are also several 
steps Iran can take to defuse the crisis in Syria. “If Iran wants to be part of the 
solution, it has to pull out its forces from Syria. The same applies elsewhere, whether 
in Yemen or Iraq” (Prince Saud, 141014b). Prince Saud has also demanded “the 
immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces and armed elements of the Syrian 
territories, including the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Forces” (Prince Saud, 140123) 
and pressed for an international demand for “the withdrawal of foreign occupying 
forces from Syria” (Prince Saud, 130701). This illustrates Iran`s responsibility to take 
action to promote future peace.26 
 
At the same time, Riyadh does not see Iran as the only relevant actor for promoting 
future peace. Riyadh also takes a large degree of responsibility on itself, not in order 
to change past behaviour that promoted conflict, but out of the Kingdom`s “desire for 
spreading peace in the international community” (Vice foreign minister Abdulaziz bin 
Abdullah, 120905). In August 2014 Prince Saud and the Iranian deputy foreign 
minister, Hossein Amir Abdolahian, even agreed to “join forces in the fight against 
terrorist groups that have threatened the region`s security and stability” (Arab News, 
140827). What this joining of forces means is hard to say as this coordination between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  See	  Prince	  Saud,	  120312;	  	  Prince	  Saud,	  130130;	  Arab	  News,	  130306;	  Prince	  Saud,	  130525;	  	  26	  This	  is	  also	  underlined	  by	  an	  official	  spokesperson	  in	  the	  foreign	  ministry	  saying	  that	  “Iran	  has	  to	  be	  stopped”	  (MoFA,	  2015).	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Saudi Arabia and Iran never came up again in the official discourse during the 
remainder of the year.  
  
Other actors that Riyadh assigns responsibility for the regional security situation also 
includes the Assad regime, the United Nations Security Council, the Yemeni 
government, the Yemeni people and the Iraqi government. In Yemen, the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) brokered a peace agreement in 2011 called the GCC 
initiative, and since that, Riyadh has expressed its support for the Yemeni government 
and called upon the Yemeni people to respond to the efforts of the government to 
establish stability.27 The reference to foreign interference and Iranian meddling in 
Yemen appeared as part of the official discourse only after the Houthi takeover of 
Sanaa in September 2014.28 Saudi Arabia has also placed responsibility for regional 
security in part on the Iraqi government, saying that “there is a great responsibility on 
the Iraqis themselves” (Prince Saud, 130130). Riyadh has also promised to provide 
“the government and the new president [Haider al-Abadi] with the help they need to 
move forward” (Prince Saud, 140905).  
 
In relation to Syria, the picture is a bit more complicated, with several actors 
involved. The Kingdom has criticised Assad and his regime harshly29 but has never 
placed any hope in the change of behaviour of the regime. In September 2013 Prince 
Saud said that the regime “exceeds all red limits and lines” (Prince Saud, 130902), 
and the only solution in the Saudi view involves a removal of Assad and his 
accomplices. This does not only imply a solution to the conflict in Syria, but will also 
solve the problem of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).30 Early on, the 
Kingdom did however highlight the role of the UN Security Council, by saying that it 
“holds morally responsible the international parties that disrupt the international 
move” in Syria. This alluded to the Chinese and Russian veto for an approval for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  See	  for	  example	  Vice	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Prince	  Abdulaziz,	  120928;	  and	  Prince	  Saud,	  121205a	  28	  See	  for	  example	  Prince	  Saud,	  141015.	  This	  is	  confirmed	  through	  an	  interview	  with	  Diplomat	  D.	  29	  See	  Prince	  Saud,	  120218;	  Prince	  Saud	  120401;	  Prince	  Saud	  120625;	  Prince	  Saud	  121114;	  Prince	  Saud	  121205a;	  Prince	  Saud	  130130;	  Prince	  Saud,	  130302;	  Prince	  Saud,	  130306;	  Prince	  Saud,	  130525a,	  Prince	  Saud,	  130701;	  KSA	  mission	  to	  the	  UN,	  140211;	  Prince	  Saud	  140924,	  Prince	  Saud	  141014b.	  30	  Riyadh	  has	  since	  the	  summer	  2014	  linked	  Assad	  and	  his	  regime	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  ISIL.	  See	  Prince	  Saud,	  140924.	  This	  point	  was	  also	  raised	  by	  the	  Gulf	  Research	  Center	  (2015).	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intervention from the Security Council. Later Prince Saud pointed to the Security 
Council`s “responsibility to take a firm stand that preserves Syria`s security” (Prince 
Saud, 130213) and called upon “the international community to shoulder its 
responsibilities” in Syria (Prince Saud, 130902).  
 
Summary	  
In total, this shows that the official Saudi discourse frames Iran as being responsible 
for the negative consequences of Iranian actions. Iran is also responsible for not 
having done enough to promote peace in the past, either by not taking steps needed to 
end a conflict or even by taking steps that actively promotes conflicts. The 
responsibility of establishing regional peace and stability is divided between several 
actors, but Iran has a clear influence on the future attainment of peace. Iran`s 
responsibility in creating regional stability should nevertheless not be overstated. As 
the official Saudi discourse highlights several other actors that influence future 
projections, Iran is not the only one that needs to react to the regional situation. These 
elements in the discourse says something about Riyadh`s ability to act in issues of 
importance to them, and also sheds light on Riyadh`s perception of being heard in 
issues that involve both the countries. As step two of the analysis will show, this 
contributes to lowering the autonomy of Saudi Arabia as portrayed in the discourse. 
 
Summary:	  Who	  is	  Iran?	  	  
The previous section has outlined the official Saudi discourse on Iran and its place in 
regional events. The characteristics of Iran in the discourse are many, but there is an 
overwhelmingly predominance of portraying Iran as different from Saudi Arabia. This 
difference is most often viewed in negative terms, contrasting the good intentions and 
goals of Saudi Arabia. Iran is viewed as an unstable country that interferes in the 
internal affairs of its neighbours, and sometimes occupies their territory. Iran is in 
itself a problem to the region and violates international norms and principles. Still, 
Riyadh acknowledges that Iran is part of the region and is a neighbour that they have 
to relate to. The discourse also has several descriptions of Iran that do not relate 
directly or indirectly to Saudi Arabia`s own self-image. Iran is for exampled portrayed 
as not being serious and an actor that cannot be trusted. Moreover, Iran wants to 
create conflict and pose a concrete threat to regional and international security, and 
Iran is not a smart actor that conforms to common sense. Iran does however have 
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international rights in line with the rest of the regional countries, and is in itself an 
important and great player that has weight and influence in the region. 
 
When it comes to Iran`s ability to change and develop, the discourse highlights Iran`s 
continuation of its destructive policies. Iran fails to respond to efforts to progress and 
solve conflicts in the region, but Riyadh hopes that Tehran will change this trend and 
contribute to creating a safer more stable region. The official discourse also constructs 
Iran as being responsible for several direct or indirect consequences of its actions that 
have created negative effects in the region. At the same time, Tehran is responsible 
for not doing enough to promote peace in past efforts, and Iran partly has a 
responsibility for contributing to establishing peace in the future. This responsibility 
is nevertheless shared with several other actors, including Saudi Arabia.  
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Step	  2,	  Relational	  identity	  concerns	  	  
The second step in this analysis evaluates which collective emotional concerns vis-à-
vis Iran are portrayed in the official discourse outlined in step one. It explains how the 
expressed statements indicate emotions in the discourse, and what level of autonomy 
and affiliation can be derived from the discourse. Relational identity concerns largely 
shape the space for actions that is perceived as desirable. Emotions are no more 
separate from decision-making than thinking is, and collective group emotions are no 
exception. Affiliation and autonomy sets a frame for interaction, and this frame infers 
costs or rewards for certain actions. This is not to say that a specific level of 
autonomy or affiliation necessitates a certain behavioural respond, but that actions 
that break with the preconditions of the emotional concerns include an emotional cost 
that impinges on the group`s self-esteem. This is the section where I get to start the 
application of the relational identity theory and show how the theory can be used to 
shed light on a specific case. As explained in the section on relational identity theory, 
Shapiro (2010) argues that conflict management is influenced by emotions, and that 
these emotions follow from interaction between groups. Shapiro came to this 
conclusion based on several real life experiments, and the two core concerns he 
discovered as the most important ones were autonomy and affiliation. These concerns 
are the most prominent aspects in a situation where groups` identities are being 
challenged, and these concerns are important for setting preconditions for behaviour. 
In this case the expression of emotional concerns sets certain frames on Saudi foreign 
policy vis-à-vis Iran.  
 
The following section will evaluate the degree of autonomy and affiliation in the 
official Saudi discourse on Iran, based on eight subcategories that are derived from 
Shapiro`s observations in his experiments. The four subcategories constituting 
autonomy is perceived independence, ability to act, room to be heard, and perceived 
respect from the other group. The four subcategories constituting affiliation is 
empathy, perception of similar core identity, creativity and inclusion. The 
investigation of these categories follow Shapiro`s own descriptions, my own 
understanding of what they mean, and informed by the view of people living and 
working in Saudi Arabia that I got to know while I was in Riyadh. I have again tried 
to modify my own biases towards a Western, Norwegian understanding of the 
	  	   64	  
categories, in order to be more sensitive towards the Saudi structure of social meaning 
that the discourse operates within. 
 
Autonomy	  
Independence	  
As explained previously, autonomy refers to the sense of freedom an actor has to 
affect issues of importance to that actor, and the freedom from interference by other 
actors. This points to a degree of independence both between the two actors, and 
between the issue and the second actor. Put differently, if Saudi Arabia is to have 
complete autonomy in its relations to Iran, the Saudi decisions would have to be 
independent from Tehran`s influence, and the issue of concern would have to be free 
of influence from Tehran. The expression of this concern in the official Saudi 
discourse paints quite a different picture than such a kind of independence.   
 
As explained in the elaboration of the official discourse on Iran, Riyadh highlights the 
destructive consequences of Iranian actions, and portrays Iran as a threat to regional 
and international security. The official Saudi discourse repeatedly acknowledges that 
Iran has a great influence on issues that matter a lot to Saudi decision-makers.31 Iran 
has for example a “flagrant interference in the internal affairs of Arab countries” 
(Prince Saud, 120312) and Prince Saud has expressed concern for “Iran`s interference 
in GCC`s internal affairs” (Prince Saud, 121224). A spokesperson of the foreign 
ministry even said that when Iran wants access to a country but there are no Shi`a`s 
there, they simply invent their own group (MoFA, 2015). The Gulf Research Center 
(2015) also explained that Iran`s sectarian foreign policy facilitated the rise of ISIL. 
In addition to such general notions of Iran`s influence on Saudi foreign policy, two 
areas particularly stand out as being heavily affected by Iran. This concerns the 
nuclear profile of the region and the situation in Syria. Both these issues are portrayed 
as highly important to Saudi security and regional stability, and Iranian presence and 
effect on the issues are very apparent in the official discourse. According to the 
official discourse the Iranians are singlehandedly the ones that determine the nuclear 
threat in the region and the possibility of proliferation. Iran is the actor that needs to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  This	  is	  confirmed	  by	  all	  the	  interviews.	  Diplomat	  A	  (2015)	  especially	  underlined	  that	  Saudi	  Arabia	  see	  the	  hand	  of	  Iran	  everywhere,	  and	  that	  Iran	  in	  fact	  is	  the	  most	  important	  factor	  for	  Saudi	  Arabia	  when	  considering	  the	  region.	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change its course to ensure peace and security, and Iran is the actor that has failed to 
respond to progress in this issue in the past.  
 
Likewise, the situation in Syria is highly influenced by Iran and their proxies 
according to the discourse. Diplomat A (2015) highlighted that Iran has much 
influence on this issue. The discourse clearly states that Iran is occupying Syria 
through the presence of their revolutionary guard and Hezbollah, and this amplifies 
the suffering and killing of the population. This notion is supported through 
interviews with Dr. Saeed Badeeb and a spokesperson from the Saudi Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Dr. Saeed Badeeb (2015) estimates that there are around 5000 people 
from Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard in Syria now. An official 
spokesperson in the Saudi foreign ministry even said that Iran is the one with the final 
word in Syria, not the Syrian regime (MoFA, 2015). As such, the events in the region 
that matter most for Saudi decision-makers are tightly connected to Iranian foreign 
policy.32 This implies that the official Saudi discourse displays a low degree of 
autonomy vis-à-vis Iran.  
 
Ability	  to	  act	  
In addition to the independence of Saudi actions or the issue at hand, the ability of 
Saudi Arabia to act also matters for their perceived autonomy vis-à-vis Iran. This is 
unfortunately a category that cannot be fully investigated through the analysis of the 
official Saudi discourse, simply because this discourse does not highlight all the 
relevant elements of Riyadh`s ability to act. Considerations of the extent of Saudi 
involvement and frequency of donations, support or other actions will not be 
considered here. Such a fact-based evaluation would provide a more comprehensive 
view of this aspect, but it lies beyond the scope of the methodological framework of 
this thesis. The official Saudi discourse does however contain traces of this category, 
and the following paragraphs show what the discourse in fact do provide of insight 
into this, even though it is not completely comprehensive.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  This	  is	  confirmed	  by	  all	  the	  7	  interviews.	  Diplomat	  C	  nevertheless	  moderates	  this	  by	  saying	  that	  Iran	  is	  part	  of	  Saudi	  Arabia`s	  considerations	  in	  Syria,	  but	  not	  the	  main	  factor.	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Saudi Arabia has time after time confirmed their support of the principle of non-
interference in internal affairs of other countries, and a respect for their territorial 
integrity.33 In one way this restricts Riyadh`s possibility to take action to influence 
domestic developments in other countries. In relation to Iraq for example former 
foreign minister Saud al-Faisal has said that “there is a great responsibility on the 
Iraqis themselves” to establish a fair and secure environment (Prince Saud, 130130). 
This does not however restrict Riyadh completely from having a role in situations and 
conflicts contained in the borders of one country. Riyadh has sought to deal with the 
Syrian and Yemeni crisis by participating in and hosting international meetings and 
donor conferences.34 Saudi money has also had a far reach in Iraq, where Saudi 
Arabia recently donated $500 million “to cover the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi 
people” (Prince Saud, 140915). The foreign minister spoke about the aid to Iraq as an 
obligation for “providing the government and the new president with the help they 
need to move forward” (Prince Saud, 140915). In relation to Syria, the official Saudi 
discourse has heavily promoted support to the Syrian rebels, and the need for arming 
them to ensure their legitimate right to self-defence.35 A spokesperson from the 
foreign ministry has also confirmed that Saudi Arabia is training the Syrian 
opposition, and expects that approximately 5000 people will be graduating from the 
training in May 2015 (MoFA, 2015).  
 
This promotes an active role of Saudi Arabia as a supporting actor of the Syrian 
opposition, but Riyadh has often called on the “international community to shoulder 
its responsibilities” for diffusing and solving the conflict in Syria (Prince Saud, 
130902).36 The United Nations Security Council is especially highlighted as an 
institution that should be more active in its efforts to resolve the conflict (Prince Saud, 
120124; Prince Saud, 120928; and Prince Saud, 121205a). By pointing to the 
responsibility of other actors in these situations, Riyadh at the same time limits its 
own room for actions by acknowledging the supreme authority of the Security 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  See	  for	  example	  Prince	  Saud,	  110309;	  Prince	  Saud,	  120401;	  Prince	  Saud,	  130106;	  Prince	  Saud,	  140123;	  Prince	  Saud	  140911;	  and	  Prince	  Saud,	  140914.	  	  34	  This	  includes	  participation	  in	  the	  Friends	  of	  Syria	  Group,	  Friends	  of	  Yemen	  Group,	  and	  donor	  conferences	  for	  Syria	  and	  Yemen.	  For	  official	  speeches	  in	  the	  Friends	  of	  Syria	  meetings	  see	  for	  example	  Prince	  Saud,	  121216,	  and	  Prince	  Saud,	  130302.	  35	  See	  for	  example	  Prince	  Saud,	  130302;	  Prince	  Saud,	  130304;	  Prince	  Saud,	  130701.	  36	  For	  more	  calls	  on	  the	  international	  community	  to	  take	  action,	  see	  Prince	  Saud,	  120218;	  Prince	  Saud,	  120224;	  Prince	  Saud,	  130302;	  and	  Prince	  Saud,	  130701.	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Council to intervene, alleviating itself of the ultimate responsibility to “fix” the 
situation. In this way the official Saudi discourse does portray Saudi Arabia as able to 
act in matters of importance, but at the same time constricts the scope of actions by a 
stated principle of non-interference and by pointing to other parties` responsibility to 
act instead.37  
 
The issue of the Iranian nuclear program is a bit different in this regard. In the Saudi 
discourse, it does not appear that Riyadh can actually take action even though this 
issue affects the regional security. Prince Saud repeatedly encourages efforts by Iran 
or commends the efforts of the P5+1 in finding a solution to the insecurity38, but 
Riyadh does not seem to have any ability to influence this themselves. The discourse 
does not portray any other tracks to solving the nuclear issue than the current 
diplomatic negotiations. As such, this is an area where Saudi Arabia does not show 
any ability to act independently, and their perceived autonomy is thus reduced.  
 
Room	  to	  be	  heard	  
Another aspect of evaluating the autonomy of Saudi Arabia in its relations to Iran is 
how much space there is for Saudi Arabia to be heard in issues of importance. 
Specifically, the perceived autonomy is related to how well Iran listens to the 
arguments of Saudi Arabia. This is unfortunately also an aspect that is not fully 
illuminated through the official Saudi discourse. An evaluation of how many actors 
are involved in the issues at stake, and how much attention each actor is given by the 
others would elaborate on this category further. An analysis of the official discourse 
can however contribute by showing the appearance of other actors and their relation 
to the issue as depicted in the discourse.  
 
The Saudi official discourse on Iran in relation to Syria is for example built on a 
plethora of actors, and even though the discourse talk about the “Syrian people” as 
one group, it acknowledge that there are extremist fractions among the rebels (Prince 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  The	  Gulf	  Research	  Center	  (2015)	  highlights	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  that	  Riyadh	  is	  not	  capable	  of	  influencing	  matters	  of	  importance	  to	  them,	  because	  of	  the	  many	  interests	  at	  play	  and	  the	  structural	  failures	  in	  Iraq,	  Yemen	  and	  Syria	  that	  creates	  the	  foundation	  for	  the	  conflicts	  in	  those	  countries.	  	  38	  See	  for	  example	  Prince	  Saud,	  120625;	  Prince	  Saud,	  120928;	  KSA	  official	  statement,	  131125;	  and	  Prince	  Saud,	  140310.	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Saud, 130302) and that ISIL in particular has become a major factor in the Syrian 
crisis (Prince Saud, 140924). In addition to casting Iran and Hezbollah as central 
actors in the Syrian conflict, the international community through the UN is also 
included as an actor that is involved in the conflict. Regarding the issues in Iraq and 
Yemen, there is not the same degree of confusion in relation to the number of actors 
as in Syria. There are not as many voices to take into consideration as there might be 
in relation to Syria, and the room for Riyadh`s concerns to be heard is bigger. In the 
official Saudi discourse there is a clear focus on the Yemeni government and the 
Yemeni people39, in addition to some mentions of “Yemeni sectarian forces” (Prince 
Saud, 141014a) and influence of “foreign parties in the region” (Prince Saud, 
141015), alluding to Iran.40 Similarly, in Iraq there is focus on the Iraqi people and the 
Iraqi government41 in addition to some mentions of ISIL (Prince Saud, 141014b) and 
the alliance between former prime Minister Al-Maliki and Iran (Arab News, 140827). 
In total, this means that Saudi foreign policy makers do not see as much competition 
for voice-time in relation to Iraq and Yemen, as they do in relation to the Syrian 
crisis. The Syrian crisis is nevertheless portrayed as one of the most prominent 
dangers to regional security, more so than the conflicts in Yemen and Iraq. This 
implies that Saudi autonomy vis-à-vis Iran is relatively low concerning the conflict in 
Syria, because the importance of the “Saudi voice” is being challenged by so many 
other voices.  
 
A second aspect that illustrates the perception Riyadh has of the room for their voice 
to be heard is the amount of repetitions they use when addressing Iran in the official 
discourse. Saudi Arabian top officials do not have a long record of direct talks with 
Iran, but they often come with direct recommendations to Iran in their public 
statements. As the outline of the official discourse shows, Prince Saud has many times 
called on Iran to make stronger efforts to promote peace and security, and shamed 
Iran`s failure to respond to progress and their continuation of destructive behaviour. 
All this shows that even though Riyadh makes it clear what type of behaviour they 
want from Iran in certain issues, Tehran continues to do as they like. In explicit, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  See	  for	  example	  Prince	  Saud	  (120625);	  Prince	  Saud	  (120928);	  and	  Prince	  Saud	  (121205).	  	  40	  Diplomat	  D	  confirms	  that	  ”foreign	  intervention”	  in	  the	  Saudi	  official	  discourse	  often	  alludes	  to	  Iran.	  	  41	  See	  Prince	  Saud	  (130130),	  Prince	  Saud	  in	  Arab	  News	  (130526)	  and	  Prince	  Saud	  (140915)	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official Saudi discourse shows that Riyadh does not see that there is any actual space 
for their opinion in Tehran`s behaviour. This means that when Iran decides on matters 
that also affect Saudi Arabia, such as their nuclear program or their policy towards 
Iraq and Yemen, Riyadh does not have a great ability to influence Iran`s decisions. As 
such, Saudi autonomy and disengagement from Iran is low.  
 
Respect	  
This leads to the last aspect of the perception of Saudi autonomy vis-à-vis Iran, 
namely the respect that Riyadh gets from Tehran. As every other aspect, this is also 
based on the subjective perceptions of Riyadh as they are displayed in the discourse, 
and not on some objective facts. The perceived respect also has links to Iran being 
portrayed as an actor that continues its destructive policies and is not serious and not 
to be trusted. The reoccurrence of critique against Iranian interference in internal 
affairs in the Gulf shows that Riyadh does not feel respected. The Saudi appreciation 
of sovereignty and territorial integrity is not limited to only being valid for Saudi 
Arabia, but extends as a principle for every Arab country. When the official Saudi 
discourse time after time brings up instances where Iran has violated the principle by 
interfering in Saudi internal affairs, in other Gulf countries or even in Saudi Arabia`s 
relations to other countries, this implies that Tehran does not respect Riyadh`s 
opinion.  
 
Summary	  
According to the official Saudi discourse on Iran, the autonomy that Saudi Arabia 
appears to have vis-à-vis Iranian actions does not seem to be very high. There is a low 
degree of independence between Saudi and Iranian foreign policy, and some of the 
issues that are most important for the security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the 
region are highly influenced by Iran. Saudi Arabia does have a certain ability to act in 
most of the regional issues where they and Iran play a role. Even though Riyadh 
strongly supports a principle of non-interference in internal affairs, they are engaged 
in supporting Syrian rebels, the Iraqi government and the Yemeni government. 
Riyadh does on the other not have any say in the on-going nuclear negotiations, even 
though the official Saudi discourse highlight that the outcome of the negotiations has 
big implications for regional security. In the Syrian case, Saudi Arabia does have to 
compete with many other actors in order to be heard and taken into consideration by 
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Iran, but with regards to Iraq and Yemen they do not have to cut through the same 
amount of “noise”. Despite this, Tehran does not seem to listen effectively to what 
Riyadh has to say, and does not take into consideration the repeated calls from Riyadh 
for change in Iranian behaviour. This further implies that Iran does not respect 
Riyadh`s opinion sufficiently, and that Riyadh is not able to influence Tehran`s 
decisions on matters that affect the Kingdom. In total, this means that the official 
Saudi discourse portrays a very low degree of autonomy in Riyadh`s relations to Iran.  
 
Affiliation	  
Affiliation is the second emotional concern that matters for conflict management and 
shapes the behavioural mode in confrontational relationships. This is the degree of 
closeness and connection one actor feels in relation to the other actor. The following 
section will explain how the official Saudi discourse portrays the Saudi affiliation to 
Iran, by focusing on empathy, similarities in their core identity, the elements of 
creativity in the discourse and degree of inclusion of Iran as a problem solver.   
 
Empathy	  	  
A large part of feeling closeness to another group is the ability to feel empathy with 
them. This entails both to view the other group`s arguments and motives in a 
favourable way, and to include those arguments and concerns in your own 
considerations The Saudi view of Iranian motives and arguments demonstrates that 
this is not a discussion between equally respected positions. As mentioned, Riyadh 
does not view Iran as a serious or smart actor42, and the discourse highlight that Iran`s 
motives are to promote conflict and instability. Prince Saud has for example said that 
he hopes that “Iran would end its policy of escalation and conduct serious 
negotiations” in relation to the nuclear issue (Prince Saud, 120312) and that Iran`s 
“blunt tone only complicates things” in the region (Prince Saud, 130525b). This 
underlines the small degree of confidence Riyadh places in Iranian arguments and 
motives. The Gulf Research Center (2015) supports this when explaining that Iran`s 
actions continues to be seen as trying to undermine the security and legitimacy of the 
Kingdom. The former foreign minister`s statements in October 2014 made it clear that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Diplomat	  A	  explained	  that	  it	  is	  an	  important	  strategy	  of	  Riyadh	  to	  display	  Iran	  as	  dumb	  and	  not	  trustworthy.	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Iran was “part of the problem”, and thus underlined that the official discourse does 
not view Iranian arguments and motives favourably. This view was confirmed in the 
interview with a spokesperson in the foreign ministry (MoFA, 2015), who said that 
Iran plays a destructive role in the region and aims at blackmailing other states. Dr. 
Saeed Badeeb (2015) also explained that Iran does not want a good relationship with 
Saudi Arabia, and that they are trying to surround the Kingdom. Rather, Iranian 
motives and arguments seem to be opposed to what is regarded as good.  
 
The other aspect that signifies the empathy that Riyadh has for Tehran, is whether or 
not Riyadh includes Tehran`s concerns in their own concerns. First of all, given that 
the basis for Iranian concerns are not validated and recognised, the Iranian concerns 
in themselves are also not validated and recognised. This is also apparent in the way 
the official Saudi discourse view Iran as not to be trusted and as part of the problem. 
When the view of Iran is that they seek to mislead other states and create disunity and 
conflict, these aims are off course not included in Saudi Arabia`s own foreign policy 
aims. The Saudi foreign policy rather seeks to counter much of the portrayed Iranian 
policy by calling for change, leading the attention to the violations of international 
principles and supporting groups that want to restrict or deny Iranian influence. As 
such, there are no traces of empathy for the Iranian position in the official Saudi 
discourse.  
 
Similar	  core	  identity	  
Another aspect that builds affiliation between groups is the similarities in their core 
identity. This can relate to similarities in values that the group promotes or the traits 
that characterises the group. As noted in the outline of the official discourse Iran is 
largely viewed as different from Saudi Arabia. In relation to values, the dominant 
belief is that Iran does not respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other 
states by interfering in internal affairs and even occupying foreign territories. This is 
opposed to Saudi Arabia`s firm support of sovereignty and a principle of non-
interference. The discourse also shows that Iran violates international norms, while 
Saudi Arabia reaffirms the importance and their own compliance with international 
norms. In essence, there does not appear to be any common standing between the 
values of Iran and the values of Saudi Arabia, based on the official Saudi discourse. 
This is peculiar since the Saudi discourse does mention possibilities for coordination 
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and improvement of communication43, but such references are always made under the 
precondition that Iran changes itself, which means that the current situation is not 
good enough. The countries` common religious foundation in Islam could have been a 
point of reference that modified the contradictions in their identities, but this common 
origin is not mentioned at all. This may relate back to the internal tensions in Saudi 
Arabia between the Wahhabi rejection of Shi`as as Muslim, and the regime`s 
welcome of Shi`a pilgrims to Mecca.   
 
Most of the differences between Iran and Saudi Arabia that are highlighted in the 
official discourse relate to values that they have, and actions based on those values. 
Another way to view the similarities between the two is also to look at the more basic 
traits that appear in the discourse that characterise them. In this regard, there appears 
to be a bit more commonalities, although not an overwhelming amount. Iran is for 
example said to be a “neighbour”44 that is part of the region. It is also a country that 
has international rights that should be respected by the international community and 
other states45. This forms a common ground between Saudi Arabia and Iran, where 
Riyadh acknowledges that they have some similar traits that also matter in the issues 
they are involved with in the region. The Gulf Research Center (2015) underlines 
Saudi Arabia’s clear understanding that Iran has a role to play in regional matters. 
Prince Saud has for example said that “Iran is also a large and important country, and 
its position will have an impact” (Prince Saud, 121205b), and thus shows some degree 
of affiliation through being involved in common issues and being in the same region.  
 
Elements	  of	  Similar	  Core	  Identity	  outside	  the	  discourse	  
It is also interesting to note some of the elements that are absent from the discourse, in 
order to get a perspective of how the affiliation could have been if other factors were 
included. This puts the current expression of identity traits into perspective, and 
relates the discourse to a broader context. As mentioned in the outline of the official 
discourse, two aspects that are frequently referred to in academic writings and on the 
streets in Saudi Arabia relates to the Sunni – Shi`a divide, and the division between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  See	  for	  example	  Prince	  Saud,	  130525b,	  and	  Prince	  Saud,	  140514.	  44	  See	  for	  example	  Prince	  Saud,	  130525b;	  and	  Prince	  Saud,	  140514.	  45	  The	  statements	  about	  this	  refers	  to	  their	  right	  to	  use	  nuclear	  energy	  for	  peaceful	  purposes.	  See	  for	  example	  Prince	  Saud,	  120625;	  Prince	  Saud,	  120928;	  Prince	  Saud	  140416.	  .	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Arabs and Persian. The sectarian division between the Sunni (Wahhabi) dominated 
Saudi Arabia and the Shi`a rule in Iran marks a sharp contrast and simmering rivalry 
between the two countries.46 If this constituted a part of the official discourse the 
distance and lacking affiliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran would be even larger. 
The same goes for the issue of Arabs versus Persians. The official Saudi discourse 
does mention “the Arab world” or “Arab countries” at times47, but it is not a 
prominent part of the discourse, and it is not contrasted with the Persian ethnicity of 
Iran. In this way, some of the most pressurized and sensitive divisions between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran are not officially highlighted, and the affiliation between the two 
could have been worse.   
 
Creativity	  
One element that Shapiro discovered in his experiments of group negotiations was 
that the creativity of the groups affected the level of affiliation between them. In this 
regard, the creativity of Saudi Arabia to find new categories of commonality or 
transcend differences influences the affiliation Riyadh experiences towards Iran. 
Based on the previous outline of the official discourse, there are few signs of such 
creativity. The Saudi foreign minister has pointed out that Iran fails to respond to 
international and regional efforts of progression, but he fails to suggest alternatives 
for how both Iran and Saudi Arabia can find a common way to improve the security 
situation and move forward. In light of the official discourse, Iran is the one that has 
to make an effort to change the situation for the better, while Saudi Arabia and the 
international community stands ready with the answer when Iran decides to change. 
This is apparent of the multiple ways Riyadh has called on Iran to change, but without 
acknowledging how Iranian interests and concerns can fit into that change, or what 
Riyadh can do to ease the process. This rigid view of “the way forward” does not 
promote creativity, and thus indicate a low degree of affiliation in line with the 
differences between the countries. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Diplomat	  A	  (2015)	  confirms	  that	  sectarianism	  is	  one	  of	  the	  main	  concerns	  of	  officials	  in	  Riyadh.	  	  47	  See	  for	  example	  Prince	  Saud,	  121205;	  Prince	  Saud,	  130330;	  Prince	  Saud,	  130424;	  and	  Prince	  Saud,	  140310.	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Inclusion	  	  
The sense of inclusion between two groups also signals how the affiliation between 
them is. Inclusion in this sense means that the problems negotiated are shared 
problems for both the groups, and that they are working together to solve the 
problems. Most of the problems and issues in the relationship between Saudi Arabia 
and Iran are portrayed as issues where Iran is contributing to the problem rather than 
contributing to the solution. As noted in the outline of the discourse, Iran is largely 
seen as an actor that wants to create conflict, and actively seeks to instigate sedition. 
A spokesperson from the foreign ministry explained that “the region is almost 
boiling” because of Iranian interference (MoFA, 2015). The Gulf Research Center 
(2015) also said that Iran`s sectarian policies contributed to the divisions and conflict 
in Iraq. Even though Iran is said to have a large degree of responsibility for solving 
the problems and making the region a more secure place, the discourse does not praise 
or acknowledge any steps that Iran has already taken to promote peace. When Prince 
Saud (141014b) has been blunt enough to say that Iran is part of the problem in itself, 
there exists little room for seeing Iran as a viable partner to cooperate with over a 
solution. Dr. Saeed Badeeb (2015) supports the view of the official discourse by 
saying that Iran is responsible for much terrorism both in terms of finances and 
military means. In the Syrian case, Prince Saud even said that he does “not think that 
Iran has a solution” (Prince Saud, 121205b), and dr. Saeed Badeeb (2015) said that 
the problem is ultimately that Iran does not trust anybody. Diplomat C strongly 
confirms that there is a strong sense of mistrust in the relationship between the 
countries. 
 
There are ways to imagine how issues in the region can pose a common problem for 
both Saudi Arabia and Iran, but the official discourse does not construct any such 
commonality. The nearest Riyadh has been to taking steps to improve the inclusion of 
Iran in their regional foreign policy, and thus increase the affiliation to Iran, was in 
August 2014, when Prince Saud declared that Saudi Arabia and Iran had “agreed to 
join forces in the fight against terrorist groups” (Prince Saud, 140827).  Taken at face 
value, this statement seems to represent a new direction in Saudi relations to Iran, and 
open up for a new era of cooperation and coordination. Nevertheless, when this 
statement is put into context and seen in light of how the discourse as a total is 
constructed, then the proclaimed “joining of forces” does not seem to carry much 
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weight.48 This is the only time in the period from 2011 until 2014 that Riyadh has 
talked about an agreement on security cooperation, and there is a multitude of other 
statements portraying Iran as an obstacle rather than an asset in the way towards a 
solution. Only one and a half month later,  Prince Saud declared that “Iran is part of 
the problem” (Prince Saud, 141014b). In total, the official Saudi discourse does not 
view the problems that Saudi Arabia face in their foreign policy as shared problems 
with Iran, but rather as problems created by Iran. 
 
The view of the road towards a solution to the problems is a bit more nuanced, where 
Riyadh does see a prominent role for Iran, through its responsibility to take action and 
promote peace. Nevertheless, in order to be part of the solution Iran has to change its 
behaviour to comply with a solution already envisioned by Saudi Arabia. It is 
therefore not a matter of opening up for including Iran in the process of finding a 
solution, but rather telling Iran how to behave in order to be part of an already 
established solution. The content of “the solution” off course depends on which issue 
or problem is at stake, but in the case of Syria, for example it involves a complete 
withdrawal of the Iranian support for the Assad regime, and the removal of Iranian 
forces from the Syrian territory (Prince Saud, 141014b). In the case of Iraq and 
Yemen, Iran also have to “pull out its forces” in order to be part of the solution 
(Prince Saud, 141014b), and in relation to the nuclear negotiations Iran has to comply 
with international resolutions and follow the efforts and suggestions of the P5+1 and 
IAEA.49 In relation to Iran`s interference in countries in the region in general, the 
official Saudi discourse makes it clear that Iran has to withdraw and stop the 
meddling, be that to give up its occupation of the islands in the strait of Hormuz or 
withdraw its support for Shi`as in Bahrain. In this way, Iran is regarded as playing a 
role in the solution of regional problems, but the content of that role is already defined 
by Riyadh, and the inclusion in this case is not one that promotes affiliation. In 
contrast to being part of the solution, Iran is part of the problem and “has to be 
stopped” (MoFA, 2015). In total, the official Saudi discourse does not include Iran as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Diplomat	  B	  has	  also	  confirmed	  that	  there	  are	  no	  signs	  of	  cooperation	  or	  relaxation	  of	  tensions	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  because	  of	  ISIS.	  Diplomat	  D	  adds	  that	  it	  is	  merely	  wishful	  thinking	  to	  talk	  about	  a	  common	  strategy	  by	  Saudi	  Arabia	  and	  Iran	  against	  ISIS.	  	  	  	  49	  See	  Prince	  Saud,	  120625;	  Prince	  Abdulaziz,	  120928,	  Prince	  Saud,	  130106a;	  Prince	  Saud,	  130213;	  and	  Prince	  Saud,	  130525b.	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an actor that contributed to solving shared regional problems, and Iran is not granted 
enough confidence to take part in developing solutions. This again indicates a low 
degree of affiliation.  
 
Summary	  
To summarise, the degree of affiliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran that appears in 
the official Saudi discourse is quite low, but there are still some elements that draw 
the countries closer together. There is virtually no empathy in Riyadh`s view of 
Iranian arguments or motives in the region, and the discourse does not show any signs 
of Iranian concerns being included in Saudi considerations. Most of the values that 
are assigned to Iran through comments on their actions are opposed to the values in 
the official Saudi self-image, and this severely restricts the space for affiliation 
between the two countries. On the other hand, some of the less value-laden 
characteristics of Iran indicate that Iran does have some commonalities with Saudi 
Arabia, by being part of the same region and playing a role as a big power in the Gulf. 
Despite of such a heavy focus on the differences between Iran and Saudi Arabia, there 
is space for transcending such differences by invoking creative new categories for 
creating common links. This nevertheless does not appear to be the case in the official 
Saudi discourse and most of the expressed proposals for common platforms for Saudi 
and Iranian coordination presupposes that Iran changes to be more in line with Saudi 
foreign policy and regional aspirations. This is both an expression of the result of low 
affiliation and a cause of the continued low affiliation. These calls for cooperation and 
closer relations are thus not based on creativity and do not transcend the differences 
that the discourse has established. Lastly, the inclusion of Iran in the Saudi view of 
the regional situation does not promote affiliation either. Iran is mostly portrayed as 
an active part of the problem, and the problem is thus not an external issue that can be 
approached by cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Iran on equal footing. The role 
of Iran in a possible solution is thus portrayed as purely a compliance with Saudi and 
international pre-established solutions, and not an inclusion in the formation of a new 
solution. In total, this means that the affiliation that Saudi Arabia has to Iran is quite 
low, even though there are examples of ways it could have been worse. 	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Step	  3,	  Preconditions	  for	  behaviour	  
Now that the basic discourse on Iran is established and the extent of autonomy and 
affiliation that the official Saudi discourse portrays is detected, we can turn attentions 
to the implications this has for behaviour. As noted, this is where the focus on 
emotions gives an added value to the study of international relations, and the aim is to 
show how this fine-tuned analysis identifies the predispositions of Saudi foreign 
policy in the region. Instead of settling for a theory concluding that Saudi – Iranian 
relations are competitive, this section will show how the relational identity theory lay 
out more specific modes of behaviour. The theory does not aim to specify 
contemporary Saudi foreign policy in practice, but to draw a picture of the space that 
Saudi decision makers operate within when deciding on a certain policy. This section 
is purely aimed at showing how the relational identity theory use arguments about 
emotions to interpret the findings from step two of the analysis. This third step of the 
analysis will therefore first explain Shapiro`s arguments on how behaviour is linked 
to autonomy and affiliation, then discuss how the Saudi political elite`s official view 
of Iran sets frames for polarization, isolation, violence, cooperation, misinterpretation 
and view of mutual gains. Since Riyadh`s concern for Iran is not limited to their 
bilateral relations this will be placed in a regional setting, to view how the theory 
explains that these frames can influence Saudi regional policy.  
 
Shapiro`s	  predictions	  
Shapiro`s main aim is to highlight how the core concerns autonomy and affiliation 
affect conflict management. He suggests three ways in which this influence works. 
First of all, the character of autonomy and affiliation shapes the norms in the 
relationship. The relational identity concerns curbs the normative expectations about 
what the actors should think and feel under the given circumstances (Shapiro, 
2010:636 – 637). Secondly, a frustrated perception of autonomy and affiliation can 
create “negative emotions and subsequent adversarial behaviour” while a satisfied 
perception of autonomy and affiliation can create positive emotions resulting in 
cooperation and mutual gains (Shapiro, 2010:637). Based on this Saudi Arabia`s 
relationship to Iran is marked by enmity without cooperation. This is shown by the 
location of Saudi – Iranian relations in Figure 4.  
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The low degree of autonomy and affiliation creates an environment encouraging an 
adversarial cognitive state, characterized by a behavioural mode aimed at attacking 
the other group and defending your own group. Such a prediction does not say much 
more than any realist or identity based theory would predict, but Shapiro dives into 
the mechanisms behind these general preconditions, and develops the concept of 
tribal effect.  
 
Tribal	  effect	  
As explained in the section on emotional concerns and behaviour, the tribal effect 
refers to “the rigidification of a tribe`s relational identity vis-à-vis another group” 
(Shapiro, 2010:639). This happens when one group perceived their relationship with 
another group as low on autonomy and affiliation. The official Saudi discourse does 
not portray high levels of autonomy and affiliation, and the Saudi political elite is 
therefore exposed to the framing of such a tribal effect. This means that the Saudi 
political elite operates within an environment heavily influenced by the tribal effect. 
In such an environment norms of group loyalty develops, where the Saudi political 
elite is pulled towards a closer commitment to their own group and increasingly view 
Iran as a threat to the identity and existence of their own group.  This is accompanied 
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by a greater acceptance and encouragement of defending the Saudi political elite even 
at great costs. Such a loyalty carries with it several implications for behaviour.  
 
Polarization,	  isolation	  and	  violence	  	  
One distinct direction in which the Saudi behaviour is likely to move is towards 
polarization. Since Iran is viewed as a problem and a direct threat to Saudi Arabia, the 
Saudi political elite is pulled towards taking a stand with even sharper distinction 
from Iran, creating as large a distance between them as possible. It becomes more 
acceptable to attack and criticize Iran in different ways, while at the same time 
defending Saudi Arabia against any mentions or critique that may come from Iran. 
This again encourage the Saudi political elite to close off from feedback that might be 
constructive or scrutinizing their own policy in order to improve it. 
 
This leads to the second element, namely the pull towards isolation. The low 
affiliation and autonomy vis-à-vis Iran increase the valuation of their own group, and 
the Saudi political elite is therefore inclined to withdraw from contact and 
communication with Iran, in order to restore and protect the group`s pride. When Iran 
is portrayed in the dominating discourse as a threat the relational identity concerns 
encourage the Saudi political elite to seek closer together and focus on own arguments 
and its own hard-line in order to protect its identity.  There will effectively be a pull 
towards closing off from outside influence in order to protect their identity, dignity 
and pride.  
 
In such a tense situation the possibility of violent resistance towards the other group is 
not unthinkable. Even though Saudi Arabia and Iran do not interact directly with each 
other`s governments, they do come close in other situations in the region. The threat 
that Iran poses to Saudi Arabia in those regional situations instigates an emotional 
framing that accepts and even encourages violent responses.50 In Syria, this means 
that Iranian presence and involvement increase the Saudi acceptance of violent 
clashes, if it protects Saudi emotional concerns and counters Iranian threats to the 
Saudi identity and disrespect of the Saudi autonomy and affiliation.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  The	  current	  Saudi	  military	  involvement	  in	  Yemen	  against	  the	  Houthis	  can	  for	  example	  be	  seen	  in	  light	  of	  Riyadh`s	  relations	  to	  Iran,	  and	  the	  subsequent	  tollerance	  of	  violence	  in	  situations	  where	  Iran	  is	  seen	  to	  play	  a	  part.	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Cooperation	  
Another aspect relates to the effect autonomy and affiliation has on cooperation. High 
autonomy and affiliation that is based on a feeling of respect from the other group 
“tend to elicit cooperative norms”, in the same way as cooperation tends to promote a 
high degree of autonomy and affiliation (Shapiro, 2010:637). When a group perceives 
that another group disrespects their autonomy this leads to mistrust, rejection of the 
other`s ideas (whether useful or not), and a reluctance to implement agreements with 
the other. In this way, Saudi Arabia`s frustrated autonomy encourages the Saudi 
political elite not to listen to Iran, not to trust them, and ultimately not cooperate with 
them. These levels of autonomy and affiliation effectively reduce the motivation to 
listen, solve problems and learn, and creativity is strongly undermined. These 
elements are also factors that decrease the perception of autonomy and affiliation 
further, and a negative mechanism is therefore triggered, with a spiralling effect 
towards deteriorating confrontational relations.  
 
This means that Saudi Arabia will not trust Iranian intentions in the region, and will 
not work together with Iran, as long as the perceived autonomy and affiliation is low. 
Because the relational identity concerns relate to the identity of the groups and not the 
issue at stake, this reluctance of cooperation will exist in all issues where Saudi 
Arabia and Iran are involved. It is easy to say that Iran and Saudi Arabia will not 
cooperate in order to reach a solution in Syria, but the frustrated relational identity 
concerns imply that they will not cooperate in other regional matters either. The 
resulting situation is one where Saudi Arabia is pulled towards choosing a policy with 
a minimal involvement of Iran, regardless of the usefulness of coordination or the 
overlapping interests of the two countries.  
 
A case that illustrates this point is the threat that ISIL poses. ISIL threatens the 
stability and security in the entire Gulf region, and directly challenge the religious 
legitimacy of both Saudi Arabia and Iran. ISIL is currently based in Iraq and Syria, 
but groups in several other countries in the Middle East, like Egypt, Libya and 
Yemen, have pledge support to ISIL. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran have harshly 
opposed ISIL, and speculations have been made whether or not they would cooperate 
or coordinate efforts in a joint anti-ISIL campaign. Even though both have a joint 
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interest in containing and combating ISIL a coordination of strategies has not 
materialized, and there are no indications that such cooperation will evolve any time 
soon. 
 
Mutual	  gains	  
In this way, the currently low level of autonomy and affiliation also implies that Saudi 
decision-makers are hostile towards prospects of mutual gains. In this frustrated 
situation, any form of compromise is associated with injury to Saudi pride (Shapiro, 
2010:639). The gain that Saudi Arabia attains through a compromise does not matter 
in and off itself, because the injury to the Saudi self-image and emotional concerns 
puts an agreement in such a light that the consequences of the coordination seems less 
important. It is therefore not the outcome of a compromise that weighs most in these 
considerations, but the act of acknowledging Iran and their interests. By 
acknowledging Iran`s interests and place in the region, Saudi Arabia also recognizes 
that Iran`s arguments and motives have weight and should be considered. Even 
though a possible compromise could for example only concern efforts to stop ISIL, 
and is in itself a positive outcome for both Saudi Arabia and Iran, this positive effect 
will be strongly undermined by the damage it will inflict on the Saudi pride and self-
image. Because of the contrasts that are put up between the Saudi identity and the 
Iranian identity in the official Saudi discourse, even the act of talking together seems 
to burden the pride and identity of the Saudi political elite. This is not explained 
because of differing interests or only differences in identity, but comes from the 
infringement of Saudi Arabia`s emotional concerns.  
 
Misinterpretations	  
In addition to these elements, a situation of frustrated low autonomy and affiliation 
makes misunderstandings more likely. When a group experiences a frustrated level of 
autonomy and affiliation it closes off from external influence and learning, and 
instead relies on its own assumptions and observations to guide behaviour (Shapiro, 
2010:639). In such an environment stereotypes, prejudices and misunderstandings can 
flourish without being effectively challenged by any outside accounts. The amount of 
information that Saudi decision-makers rely on is in this case limited to their own 
observations, and they run the risk of either missing important information or 
misunderstanding the relevance and implications of the information they have. Since 
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the Saudi autonomy is portrayed as heavily restricted in regional issues such as the 
civil war in Syria, the uprisings in Yemen and the security threat in Iraq, Saudi 
decision-makers are prone to acting upon limited or even misinformed data. Negative 
emotions arising from low autonomy and affiliation can also lead to tunnel vision, 
which slows down the ability to think clearly and creatively. This suggests that it is 
very difficult for Saudi Arabia to play a constructive role in the conflicts in the region, 
and that Saudi Arabia`s conflict management efforts are likely to bear heavy marks of 
their relationship to Iran.  
 
Regional	  relevance	  
These implications do not paint a bright picture of Saudi Arabia`s contributions to 
diffusing tensions and ensuring peace in the region. The space for Saudi foreign 
policy is limited because considerations of Iran keep weighing in when Riyadh 
considers regional situations. The considerations that Riyadh makes in this regard are 
framed by the normative landscape set out by the perceived autonomy and affiliation 
vis-à-vis Iran. There is a strong potential for a tribal effect being present in Saudi 
foreign policy, and Riyadh`s emotional concerns in their relationship to Iran 
encourage polarization, isolation and violence. As a result of this, cooperation 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran is very unlikely, and a compromise that yields mutual 
benefits to both countries is still portrayed as injuring the Saudi political elite. In such 
an emotional, tense environment misinterpretations can grow, and the information 
that Riyadh bases its decisions on may be both limited and biased. These 
preconditions for Saudi behaviour are manifested in the situations where both Saudi 
Arabia and Iran are involved. The low degree of direct official interaction between 
Riyadh and Tehran means that their relationship is played out in issues that involve 
other actors as well. This may be through proxies in Syria, or through tactical support 
to and influence on opposing groups in Yemen. The main point is that the 
implications of Saudi emotional concerns vis-à-vis Iran have repercussions in regional 
conflicts where they both play a part. In this way, the preconditions for Saudi 
behaviour in Syria, Iraq and Yemen is strongly influenced by the relational identity 
concerns that are manifested in their relationship to Iran.  
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Step	  4,	  Alternatives	  
The relationship between two groups is nevertheless not static. This last section of the 
analysis discusses how the relational identity theory opens up for debating how 
current emotional frames may change. This is a purely hypothetical discussion, 
showing what the relational identity theory says about change. The theory does not 
aim at predicting policy, but merely explaining how other ways of addressing the 
emotional concerns can facilitate change. This is done by relating the discussion to 
Saudi foreign policy, in order to illustrate how the theory can be used on a specific 
case. First, it will be explained how autonomy can be increased, then how affiliation 
can be increased. After this, the theory suggests some practical steps to facilitate such 
a change in the emotional concerns of the official Saudi discourse.  
 
That the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran is characterised by a tribal effect 
does not mean the states have to remain enemies in the future. Relational identity 
concerns are socially constructed, and since the social environment can change so can 
the expression of autonomy and affiliation in the official discourse. In order to 
promote cooperation and effective conflict management, we should not focus on the 
enmity between the groups in itself. Instead Shapiro (2010) advises us to try to 
improve the relational identity concerns. “The foundation for integrative problem 
solving and long-term positive relations between conflicting tribes [read: groups] is to 
have them respect each other`s autonomy and build intertribal affiliation” (Shapiro, 
2010:641). It is therefore the process of interaction that needs to change for a 
reduction of tension to occur in group relations, not a primary change in the content of 
the group identities. Given that the official Saudi discourse shows such low levels of 
autonomy and affiliation vis-à-vis Iran, there is a clear potential for improvement.51 A 
member of the Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy Committee in Iran even 
recommended the two countries to establish a balance, reduce offensive policies, and 
in essence increase the respect and affiliation in their relationship (Shafi`i, 2015).  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Diplomat	  D	  acknowledge	  this	  potential,	  and	  points	  to	  the	  Rouhani`s	  presidential	  period	  as	  a	  clear	  opportunity	  to	  improve	  the	  ties	  between	  Riyadh	  and	  Tehran.	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Respecting	  Autonomy	  
In order to respect the autonomy of a group it is important to involve key-decision 
makers of the group in decisions that affect them (Shapiro, 2010:641). In order for the 
autonomy to be portrayed as high in the official Saudi discourse it is important that 
the Saudi elite is portrayed to have influence on the situations that affect Saudi 
security and interests in the region. This means that Riyadh should be consulted on 
matters concerning Saudi security in Syria, Yemen and Iraq. At a very least Riyadh 
should be timely informed about decisions that affect them. Since the focus of this 
analysis is on the relationship with Iran, this means that Iran should inform and 
include Riyadh in their decisions, in order for the discourse to portray the Saudi 
political elite as respected. The Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Arab and African 
Affairs, Hoseyn Amir Abdollahian, said that Iran is working for a brighter future for 
the region by initiating “measures for consultations with Saudi Arabia” (Press TV 
Tehran, 2015). Even though this is a vague formulation that may entail very differing 
practical measures, it serves as an example of efforts that can promote a higher 
respect for Saudi autonomy and more positive relations. 
	  
Building	  Affiliation	  
In order to build affiliation you have to “turn adversaries into partners facing a shared 
problem” (Shapiro, 2010:642). A central task is to redefine the situation into a joint 
problem-solving task, while utilizing mutually legitimized, shared identity attributes. 
Diplomat D noted that Iran and Saudi Arabia will always remain rivals much because 
of the division between Sunnis and Shi`as, and their engagement in a natural zero-
sum game over influence in the region. When affiliation is strengthened such 
divisions fade, and new categories of commonalities appear as more important. Iran 
will then not be seen as a main part of the problem in the region, but rather a partner 
in handling regional instability jointly. In this case, to view Iran`s policy as “unable to 
abandon terrorism as a weapon to achieve its [Iran`s] political and religious goals” 
(Badeeb, 2014:9) is counterproductive and only works to decrease affiliation.  
 
In order to attain a higher degree of affiliation it is also important to increase 
communication and contact. Again, Nowzar Shafi`i from the Majlis National Security 
and Foreign Policy Committee in Iran promoted such efforts when he recommended 
to find “various opportunities for official and unofficial talks with [Saudi] Arabia 
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regarding regional issues and the issues of common interest to the two countries” 
(Shafi`i, 2015). In a more concrete manner, Shapiro (2010) suggests some strategies 
that groups can use to build affiliation. First of all, leaders can meet either in an 
official or unofficial capacity. There can be common workshops and activities 
between the two countries, or they can hold meetings for addressing and tackling 
taboo issues in their relationship. They can also initiate a negotiation process where 
they sort out their differences in an incremental way, gradually solving one issue at a 
time, without making an effort at fixing everything at once. This approach is 
supported by Stephen Hertog (2014), who explains ways to increase economic 
integration and cooperation in the Gulf by focusing on more specialized 
administrative and technological tasks, rather than the ambitious goals. In this way the 
steps taken are less likely to be captured or cancelled by diplomatic conflicts. 
Diplomat D also supports the idea of building meaningful cooperation and increasing 
trust on the basis of technical matters. If direct violence between the two groups has 
broken out, Shapiro also suggests inviting a peacekeeping force to strengthen the 
common security of the groups. This is not an option that the theory portrays that is 
especially helpful for improving Saudi relations to Iran, but the other strategies may 
be helpful. In this way we see that the relational identity theory`s recommendations 
are not all suitable to specific cases.  
 
Examples:	  
Is it at all possible to increase autonomy and build affiliation between Saudi Arabia 
and Iran in the circumstances that surround them today? In what areas and in what 
ways is there potential for invoking new categories of commonalities and including 
the countries in a coordinated regional approach? I will not try to answer these 
questions exhaustively. For that a whole new study of the actual policy decisions of 
Saudi Arabia and Iran is necessary. Instead I will suggest some areas where the 
relational identity theory is suitable to point to the potential for a more positive 
relationship to develop in the specific case of Saudi relations to Iran. This includes 
more personal meetings between high officials, cooperation over security issues such 
as the containment of ISIL, and their common religious base in Islam. This section 
also shows how the relational identity theory gives more specific tools to understand a 
rivalry than traditional structuralism or identity-based theories do, and the ultimate 
aim is still to show how this theory can be applied in practice.  
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Direct meetings can in themselves work to promote autonomy by creating an arena 
for sharing information and opinions. It can also increase affiliation by showing each 
other respect and acknowledge the role each group plays in the issue at hand. In 
September 2014 there were rumours about improvement of Saudi ties to Iran, after 
former Saudi foreign minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal met with Iranian foreign minister 
Javad Zarif in New York.52 The Iranian vice foreign minister was also visiting Jeddah 
in September, and diplomat C interprets this as an important signal for the willingness 
to improve ties. Diplomat B on the other hand did not see these meetings as a big deal 
in themselves, and points out that there has been no new substantial warmth in their 
relationship since those meetings. This was again moderated by diplomat D, which 
didn`t see any other impact of the meetings than a mere symbolic value. Diplomat D 
effectively separated between practical value and symbolic value, but when 
considering relational identity concerns symbolic gestures can affect perceptions, and 
thus affect practise through a change in affiliation or autonomy.  
 
There were thus differing opinions among the interviewees about the impact of 
personal relations on the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Some said that 
the personal relations between Saudi officials and Iranian officials did matter a lot53, 
while others thought that this played too small a part to influence the overall 
relations.54  There is nevertheless clear indications that the previous Iranian presidents 
Rafsanjani and Khatami were more popular in Saudi Arabia than other presidents 
have been55, and this had repercussions into the affiliation between the two countries. 
The period of Khatami and Rafsanjani`s rule in Iran is referred to as a period of 
relaxation between the two countries56, with the signing of a mutual security 
agreement in 2001 as a highpoint. This observation is supported by the findings of 
Aronoff (2014), which concludes that personal connections and personality does 
matter in politics and the formation of grand national strategies. Symbolic gestures 
towards these presidents are also of importance, and even though they are relatively 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  See	  for	  example	  Al	  Arabiya	  News,	  140922.	  	  53	  Diplomat	  B,	  diplomat	  C,	  diplomat	  D.	  54	  Dr	  Saeeb	  Badeeb	  (2015);	  Sadjadpour	  (2015).	  55	  This	  was	  confirmed	  through	  talks	  with	  dr	  Saeed	  Badeeb	  (2015),	  diplomat	  A	  and	  diplomat	  D.	  	  56	  See	  Cecilie	  Næss	  (2005)	  Relasjonen	  mellom	  Iran	  og	  Saudi-­‐Arabia:	  en	  studie	  av	  årsakene	  til	  den	  
økte	  graden	  av	  samarbeid	  etter	  1997	  for	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  period.	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popular, the degree of Saudi affiliation toward them is not unlimited. As late as in 
2014 the Saudi ambassador to Tehran was sent home after meeting with Rafsanjani, 
allegedly because their greeting with kissing each other on the forehead showed an 
unacceptable large affiliation.57 This is an example of the large personal risk Saudi 
officials that want to promote closer relations takes. Because of internal power 
struggles steps that encourage closer relations with Iran can be used as a point of 
criticism to limit the power of those inclined to increase cooperation with Iran.  
 
Another example of the importance and potential of personal relations among the 
leaders involves the late King Abdullah. King Abdullah is said to have had a strong 
engagement in the Saudi policy towards Syria and a strong antipathy for the Syrian 
president Assad. Diplomat D said that King Abdullah felt betrayed after Assad 
completely disregarded his advice when the upheaval started in 2011, and Abdullah`s 
own perception of the Saudi relational identity concerns vis-à-vis Syria may have 
been damaged because of this. Even though this example relates to the relationship 
between Saudi Arabia and Syria, it shows that personal relations and experiences may 
influence the relational concerns and emotional framing of Saudi foreign policy.  
Opening up the official Saudi discourse for more meetings and personal encounters 
between Saudi and Iranian officials therefore has the potential of increasing the 
overall affiliation and autonomy.  
 
Another potential area for strengthening the autonomy and affiliation vis-à-vis Iran is 
in relation to ISIL. This organisation poses a threat to both Saudi Arabia and Iran, and 
they have a common interest in limiting ISIL`s influence in the region. By focusing 
on this as a common problem, the affiliation between the Saudi political elite and Iran 
can increase and lay the foundation for coordination or cooperation in their regional 
security policy. Unfortunately, it is not as easy as this seems. Sadjadpour (2015) 
points out that even though Saudi Arabia and Iran may have a common enemy in 
ISIL, they do not diagnose the problem in the same way. In essence, “the Iranian 
government is willing to fight ISIL but it doesn`t want it to be totally eradicated, 
while the Saudi government would like to see ISIL eradicated, but it doesn`t want to 
fight it” (Sadjadpour, 2015). In the same way, diplomat A, diplomat B, diplomat D 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  See	  Karami	  (2015)	  for	  more	  on	  this.	  
	  	   88	  
and dr. Saeed Badeeb (2015) do not view it as likely that Riyadh will step up 
cooperation with Iran over ISIL. There are many reasons why coordination between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran is unlikely in this issue, but suffice it to say that there has not 
been any sign of such efforts to this date, ten months after ISIL suspended parts of the 
border between Syria and Iraq. As such, even though the fight against ISIL represents 
an issue for potential improvement of affiliation, there does not seem to be 
willingness to make use of this opportunity.  
 
In relation to transcending differences in their identities, and creating new categories 
of commonality, there exists an untapped potential in the countries` common Muslim 
foundation and common practice of Hajj/Umrah.58 Iran has its own Hajj and 
Pilgrimage Organisation, and Tehran and Riyadh do cooperate on practical matters 
regarding the pilgrimage. This cooperation can be expanded on, or highlighted as a 
valuable and functional part of their relationship. Hajj/Umrah is not an issue void of 
political relevance, and as late as in April 2015 the Iranian Minister of Culture and 
Islamic Guidance, Ali Jannati, suspended Umrah in protest against sexual harassment 
against two Iranian nationals at Jeddah airport (Mehr News, 2015). Since there exists 
precedence for infusing Hajj/Umrah with political meaning, there should not be any 
structural constraints against using this area as a platform for creating new categories 
of commonality. Even though there are differences between the Sunni and Shi`a 
direction of Islam, they both have a common foundation and a common history. The 
official Saudi discourse has several times pointed to “Islamic principles and values” 
(Prince Saud, 110309), the rights of all Muslim people (Prince Saud, 121205), and the 
tolerant teachings of Islam (Prince Saud, 141203). If the differences between 
Wahhabism and Shiism is downplayed and defined as an internal matter, the common 
grounds of all Muslims can appear as a strong push towards building affiliation.  
 
Such an approach is off course risky, because the active involvement of Muslim 
identity in the discourse can easily provoke a counter reaction. More conservative 
forces may seek to promote the division between Sunnis and Shi`as instead. Each 
move towards closer relations can be countered by conservative forces that wish to 
maintain distance. This may be out of fear of losing the group`s identity or out of fear 	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  to	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  and	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  five	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for losing influence and power. Either way the sectarian division in the Gulf has deep-
rooted implications, and the invoking of Islam into the foreign policy discourse 
carries with it a great potential for further distance and enmity between Riyadh and 
Tehran, in addition to the potential of bringing them closer together. In other words, 
Saudi Arabia is dealing with competing Muslim identities and competing boundaries 
for the Ummah.59 This pits the exclusionary Wahhabi tradition against the inclusive 
pilgrimage tradition. Another risk posed by counter reactions to constructing common 
Muslim grounds, is the alienation of Shi`as living in Saudi Arabia. If conservative 
groups in the Kingdom openly work against a common standing between Sunnis and 
Shi`as, they can push the Shi`as living in the Kingdom closer towards Iran and further 
away from the Wahhabi majority. During the protests in Saudi Arabia in 2011 there 
seemed to be a rapprochement between Sunnis and Shi`ites in rallying behind the 
same demands. Later on, the sectarian divisions within the Kingdom as well as in the 
region was more strongly emphasised, and much of the unrest and demonstrations in 
Saudi Arabia was blamed on Shi`ites (Lacroix, 2014:13). This created a gap between 
Saudi Sunnis and Saudi Shi`as, and because of a stronger sectarian focus on the war 
in Syria, Shi`ites were again associated with Iran (Lacroix, 2014:5). Most Shi`as 
living in Saudi Arabia do not initially support Ayatollah Khomeini and the clerical 
rule in Iran. Rather they support the Iraqi Shi`a leader Al-Sistani, which explicitly 
rejects Iran`s religious rule. This is not only the case for Shi`as in Saudi Arabia, but 
for most Shi`as in general.60 An active attempt to exclude Saudi Shi`as from the 
national self-image creates a greater risk of domestic demonstrations, riots and attacks 
from a Shi`a minority, which is alienated and pushed away. In order to employ the 
right kind of responses for building affiliation there is a need for carefully planned 
cautious moves with a great deal of sensitivity to the context and historical 
preconditions. If this approach is to be successful it cannot expect results over night, 
but must respect that Saudi foreign policy is not impulsive, and involves decisions 
that are made in a slow manner including careful considerations.  
 
If some of these efforts of improving Saudi autonomy and affiliation vis-à-vis Iran are 
successful, their relationship and the subsequent preconditions for Saudi foreign 	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  Ummah	  is	  an	  Arabic	  word	  referring	  to	  Islamic	  community	  and	  the	  unity	  of	  all	  Muslims.	  60	  An	  exception	  to	  this	  is	  the	  Shi`as	  in	  Lebanon	  that	  support	  Iran	  through	  Hezbollah.	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policy will change. The relational identity theory shows that a less competitive and 
emotionally constrained relationship can make space for more cooperation and reduce 
the risk of misinterpretations and tunnel vision. In the case of Saudi relations to Iran, 
this will in no way automatically create peace in Syria, Yemen and Iraq, but it will 
reduce the transmission of regional tensions into the domestic conflicts. Tensions 
arising from Saudi regional interests and Iranian regional aspirations are still present, 
but the relational identity theory suggests that improvement of autonomy and 
affiliation will change the discursive landscape that decisions are made within. A 
change in relational identity concerns implies a change in the official Saudi discourse, 
and this in turn changes the framing that Saudi decision makers operate within. Such a 
change will nevertheless not happen overnight. Both discourses and groups` common 
emotional perceptions are shaped by long-term patterns of interactions and reactions. 
In the case of Saudi policy, it is also founded on values of continuity and stability, and 
any change that has hopes of lasting will have to be embedded into the social 
environment incrementally. Only then are the risks of conservative backlash 
minimized. It is therefore evident that the relational identity theory has to take the 
unique circumstances of each case into consideration if it is to provide substantial 
insight into the preconditions for political actions. This does not make the theory 
relativistic in the sense that its advantage over more traditional structuralism or 
identity-based theories is lost. The additional value of a more fine-tuned and specific 
view of the mechanisms within a competitive relationship is still there, but the 
application of the theory to the case of Saudi relations to Iran shows that the context 
and circumstances of the case still has an impact on how the theory can be utilized.  
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Conclusion	  
Summary	  
This thesis has applied the relational identity theory to Saudi Arabia`s relations to 
Iran. The research question has been: How can the study of emotions in international 
relations help understand Saudi relations to Iran between 2011 and 2014? What 
preconditions and possible changes for Saudi behaviour do this entail? The research 
is based on a curiosity about how the study of emotions helps understand international 
relations, and has used Saudi relations to Iran between 2011 and 2014 as a specific 
case to illustrate the application of such a theory. The relational identity theory has 
shown its additional value over other traditional structuralism or identity-based 
theories by explaining which preconditions for Saudi behaviour the emotional 
concerns sets vis-à-vis Iran. This provides a more fine-tuned view of the mechanisms 
that are at play within a tense relationship. The case also shows that the preconditions 
for actions that are derived by the theory have important influence on the regional 
environment and on conflicts in other countries in the Middle East. The application of 
the theory has shown both a great value in detecting specific emotional mechanisms at 
play in the case, but has also shown that the theory has to take into consideration the 
circumstances and context of the case. This means that the utility of the theory may 
vary according to the context it is applied to. In the case of Saudi relations to Iran the 
theory has painted a thorough picture of how the relational identity concerns shape the 
space for actions that Riyadh operates within. At the same time, the theory is vaguer 
and less comprehensive in its recommendations on how to improve autonomy and 
affiliation in this case. The theory can thus not be said to be fully comprehensive and 
cover every aspect of Saudi Arabia`s relations to Iran, but still offers useful insights 
that expand our understanding of the relationship in a way that has not been explored 
by other theories.  
  
The Saudi state was built through military conquests and tribal and religious alliances. 
A fundamental element of the legitimacy of the state is the connection between 
religious and national identity. An alliance between Ibn Saud and the Wahhabi elite in 
the 1930`s ensured this linkage between religious and national loyalty. This alliance 
represents a central aspect of the considerations that Saudi rulers have to make today 
as well. The Saudi regime must balance an exclusionary Wahhabi interpretation of 
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Islam with the role of an inclusionary Muslim leader at the international stage. This 
also has implications for how the Saudi regime relates to Shi`a Muslims. 
Saudi Arabia is one of the most influential powers in the Gulf region, but in 1979 the 
Iranian revolution was accompanied by a direct threat to Saudi legitimacy and power 
in the region. The revolution was based on a Shi`a revival, and Iran sought to export 
their ideology to other countries with Shi`a minorities in. This ideological competition 
with Saudi Arabia was paired with a geopolitical competition over regional political 
influence. The relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran have varied through better and 
worse periods since 1979. A highpoint was reached around the turn of the 
millennium, but since 2005 their relations have grown increasingly antagonistic.  
 
There are some studies on this relationship, and most of them focus on trying to 
explain why the two compete. The realist approach emphasise power balancing and 
security dilemmas as main factors, while identity-based studies emphasise self-
perception and diverging identities as main factors. There are however no studies to 
date that explore the room for action that Saudi Arabia operates within, and what 
specific types of actions the rivalry encourages. A focus on relational emotional 
concerns dives into these mechanism in a more comprehensive and specific way, and 
help us see which action tendencies Riyadh is pulled against in their relations to Iran. 
This approach goes beyond a conclusion of the existence of rivalry, and explores the 
mechanisms at play within that rivalry.  
 
The theoretical framework of this thesis is built on a social psychology constructivist 
worldview. This means that beliefs, identities and perceptions shape our 
understanding of the reality, and therefore also our behaviour. Material factors do not 
entail any implications for behaviour in and of themselves, but material factors are 
given meaning through our interpretation of them, informed by our assumptions and 
beliefs. Emotions are instrumental in shaping our assumptions and beliefs, in the same 
way rational thinking is. The study of international relations have long neglected the 
role of emotions, and regarded them as insignificant or inaccessible. Recent scholarly 
contributions argue on the other hand that emotions play a central role on the 
international stage, by constructing dominant trends within groups. By identifying 
with a group you also subscribe to the dominating emotional trends in that group. 
Emotions are in this way part of the group identity.  
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The Relational Identity Theory builds on this by showing the role of two core 
emotional concerns in conflict management. These two concerns are the perceived 
autonomy and affiliation that one group experience in relation to another group. This 
is derived from multiple real life experiments, where people engage in group 
negotiations with an imminent (hypothetical) danger of being extinct. Autonomy 
signifies the freedom a group has to influence issue of importance without anyone 
else interfering, while affiliation is the sense of connectedness a group feels towards 
the other group. A low level of perceived autonomy and affiliation is accompanied by 
an adversarial behavioural mode, and encourages a rigidification of loyalty to your 
own group. This in turn encourages polarization, isolation, violence and 
misinterpretation. The preconditions for actions that this creates discourage 
cooperation and remove the experienced value of attaining mutual gains.   
 
In order to apply the relational identity theory to the Saudi relationship to Iran I have 
used discourse analysis. This approach highlights the dominant perceptions through 
language and texts, and adheres to the social psychology constructivist assumption 
that perceptions shape the social world we live in. Collective perceptions are in this 
sense expressed through public texts and language. These expressions have an 
independent impact on behaviour, and shape interaction and re-actions. The analysis 
in itself is based on 38 speeches, statements and interviews from the Saudi political 
elite. This constitutes the basic Saudi official discourse on Iran. Seven interviews 
have been conducted in Saudi Arabia, with researchers, foreign diplomats and a 
spokesperson from the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These are used to elaborate, 
support or challenge the findings from the data material. The analysis was divided 
into four separate steps, where I firstly defined the elements in the official discourse, 
secondly defined the level of autonomy and affiliation in that discourse, thirdly 
explained the preconditions for Saudi behaviour this entailed, and fourthly explored 
some potential for change in the perception of autonomy and affiliation.  
 
The official Saudi discourse described Iran in sharp contrast to the Saudi self-image. 
Iran was portrayed as unstable, an intruder and occupier with disregard of 
international norms, and a problem to the region. Riyadh still acknowledged that Iran 
is a neighbour in the region and has certain international rights on equal footing with 
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the rest of the Gulf countries. Iran was also portrayed as not being serious, not to be 
trusted and aspiring regional chaos. Iran is said to continue its destructive actions and 
fail to respond to progress. Riyadh also views Iran as responsible for many negative 
effects in the region, and says that Iran must make stronger efforts to promote peace 
in the future. 
 
The degree of autonomy and affiliation in this discourse is very low. The official 
Saudi discourse highlights a strong dependence between issues of importance to 
Riyadh and Iranian actions. Even though the discourse cannot fully explain the Saudi 
elite`s ability to act and room to be heard in these issues, the discourse still point out 
some relevant elements. According to the discourse, Riyadh does have a certain 
ability to act in regional issues of importance, but there are many other voices to 
compete with to win support on the ground. At the same time Iran is not seen to 
respect and consider Saudi efforts and interests in these regional issues, and the 
overall level of autonomy is therefore low. When considering the perceived 
affiliation, the degree of empathy that Riyadh shows in relation to Iran is very low. 
There are very few common identity traits highlighted in the discourse, and the 
discourse does not show any significant degree of creativity to transcend these 
differences. Riyadh does want Iran to contribute to a solution to regional problems, 
but does not include Iran in the process of developing such solutions. In total, the 
degree of affiliation detected in the official Saudi discourse is also low.  
 
This means that Saudi Arabia is engaged in an adversarial relationship with Iran. The 
Relational Identity Theory explains that the Saudi decision-makers’ space for actions 
is very constricted. The preconditions for behaviour laid out by the emotional 
concerns encourage polarization, isolation, misinterpretations and violence. This 
creates a difficult environment for Riyadh to initiate cooperation, and mutual gains 
can easily be viewed as a burden and infringement on the Saudi elite`s identity. This 
has repercussions into other conflicts in the region, where Saudi Arabia and Iran both 
play a part. The application of the relational identity theory shows that the frames of 
Saudi foreign policy in Syria, Yemen or Iraq is therefore influenced by their 
relationship with Iran, and restricted by the same trends as outlined above.  
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This does not mean that Riyadh is doomed to an aggressive rivalry with Iran, only 
that the emotional costs of acknowledging Iran`s legitimacy and their aspirations are 
high. The theory explains that change is possible in order to build greater autonomy 
and affiliation to reduce the pull towards isolation and antagonism. The theory 
suggests that in the case of Saudi relations to Iran, there is potential for improving the 
emotional concerns by arranging personal meetings between Saudi and Iranian 
officials, finding specific technical issues to cooperate on or cultivating more of the 
commonalities in their Muslim national identities. This is nevertheless not easily 
initiated or attained, and the theory`s recommendations have to be modified by the 
context and circumstances of the case in question. Parts of the relational identity 
theory`s limitations are thus reviled through applying the theory to the Saudi case.  
 
Robustness	  
This analysis has been based on the methodology of discourse analysis. This has 
elaborated on the emotional concerns as they appear in the official discourse, but 
there are other ways of evaluating emotional concerns as well. Other types of 
consideration of more subjective elements can for example give other insights into 
how the relational identity theory can be applied. In-depth interviews with the 
political elite would also have given valuable insight into their experience of 
affiliation and autonomy. These types of studies would nevertheless yield different 
types of conclusions, because they in essence investigate different material. This 
thesis has shown what the official Saudi discourse entails, and the conclusions relate 
to the preconditions for action that the discourse sets. Individual evaluations by 
members of the Saudi political elite or subjective fact not apparent in the official 
discourse can also be bases for applying the relational identity theory. This does, 
however, not devaluate the use of official discourses as material for detecting 
relational identity concerns.  
 
The investigation and interpretation of the data material is also to a certain extent 
shaped by my own predispositions as part of a Western academic tradition and part of 
a Norwegian social structure. This frames the way I view factors such as empathy, 
changeability or respect. In an effort to moderate this bias I have spent time to get to 
know the Saudi society and tapping into the insight of people living and working in 
Saudi Arabia. I do not claim that my view of the categories in this thesis is objectively 
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true, but I have strived to explain my understanding of the categories in such a way 
that my foundation for making inferences is clear and understandable to all, no matter 
how much the reader agrees or disagrees. I have thus places my own research in the 
social world instead of striving to be above the influences of the structures I take part 
in.  
 
Conclusion	  
In total, this thesis shows that the study of emotions in international relations 
highlights other mechanisms than what is considered in a traditional realist approach 
or an identity-based approach. The study of relational identity concerns point to other 
mechanisms in the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran between 2011 and 
2014, than has previously been emphasised in other scholarly works. The low degree 
of autonomy and affiliation detected in the official Saudi discourse means that the 
preconditions for Saudi behaviour are marked by a pull towards polarization, 
isolation, misinterpretation, violence and a decreased valuation of cooperation and 
mutual gains. The investigation of the relational identity theory`s recommendations 
for change has also highlighted parts of Riyadh`s relationship to Tehran that has not 
been considered in structuralism or identity-based theories. The thesis has thus shown 
how the relational identity theory can be applied on a specific case to give more 
thorough insights than more traditional theories of international relations. 	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  Session	  of	  Arab	  Foreign	  Ministers	  on	  Syrian	  Crisis.	  	  Prince	  Saud,	  120312.	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs:	  Syrian	  Regime	  Continuous	  Attack	  
on	  Its	  Own	  People	  is	  a	  declared	  intent	  to	  continue	  this	  Attack	  	  Prince	  Saud,	  120401.	  Opening	  Statement	  of	  Prince	  Saud	  Al-­‐Faisal	  in	  the	  Joint	  Press	  
Conference	  with	  US	  Secretary	  of	  State.	  
	  	   102	  
	  Prince	  Saud,	  120625.	  Speech	  of	  HRH	  the	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  during	  the	  
Joint	  Ministerial	  Meeting	  between	  the	  GCC	  and	  the	  EU.	  	  Vice	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Prince	  Abdulaziz,	  120928.	  Kingdom	  Speech	  at	  the	  
United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly	  67th	  Session	  –	  September	  2012.	  
	  	  Prince	  Saud,	  121114.	  Prince	  Saud	  Al-­‐Faisal	  Calls	  for	  Quick	  End	  to	  Escalating	  
Humanitarian	  Tragedy	  in	  Syria.	  	  Prince	  Saud,	  121205a.	  Opening	  Statement	  for	  the	  Press	  by	  Prince	  Saud	  Al-­‐Faisal,	  
Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs.	  	  Prince	  Saud,	  121205b.	  Prince	  Saud	  Al-­‐Faisal	  Welcomes	  UN`s	  Resolution	  on	  
Granting	  Palestine	  the	  Status	  of	  an	  Observer	  State	  at	  the	  UN.	  	  	  Prince	  Saud,	  130106a.	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Re-­‐Affirms	  Depth	  of	  Saudi-­‐
Egyptian	  Relations.	  	  Prince	  Saud,	  130130.	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  and	  his	  Tunisian	  Counterpart	  
Chair	  Second	  Session	  of	  Political	  Follow-­‐up	  and	  Cunsultation	  between	  
Kingdom	  of	  Saudi	  Arabia	  and	  Tunisia.	  	  Prince	  Saud,	  130213.	  Speech	  of	  HRH	  Prince	  Saud	  Al-­‐Faisal	  during	  Joint	  Press	  
Conference	  with	  H.E.	  Vice	  Chancellor	  of	  Austria	  and	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  
Affairs.	  	  Prince	  Saud,	  130302.	  Speech	  of	  HRH	  Prince	  Saud	  Al-­‐Faisal	  during	  the	  Friends	  of	  
Syria	  Meeting	  in	  Rome.	  	  Prince	  Saud,	  130304.	  Opening	  Statement	  By	  HRH	  Prince	  Saud	  Al-­‐Faisal	  during	  the	  
Joint	  Press	  Conference	  With	  US	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Mr.	  John	  Kerry.	  	  Prince	  Saud,	  130525a.	  Opening	  Statement	  of	  HRH	  Prince	  Saud	  Al-­‐Faisal.	  Ministers	  
of	  Foreign	  Affairs.	  Joint	  press	  conference	  with	  His	  Excellency	  the	  Minister	  of	  
External	  Affairs	  of	  India,	  Salman	  Khurshid.	  	  	  Prince	  Saud,	  130525b.	  Prince	  Saud	  Al-­‐Faisal	  Joint	  Press	  Conference	  with	  H.E.	  the	  
Minister	  of	  External	  Affairs	  of	  India.	  
	  Prince	  Saud,	  130625a.	  Opening	  statement	  of	  HRH	  Prince	  Saud	  Al-­‐Faisal	  Minister	  of	  
Foreign	  Affairs.	  Joint	  Press	  conference	  with	  His	  Excellency	  United	  State	  
Secretary	  of	  State	  John	  Kerry.	  	  Prince	  Saud,	  130701.	  HRH	  Prince	  Saudi	  Al	  Faisal	  Speech	  at	  The	  Second	  Consultive	  
Meeting	  of	  The	  Golf	  Cooperation	  Council	  in	  Mnamah.	  	  	  Prince	  Saud,	  130902.	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs:	  Syrian	  Regime	  Exceeded	  All	  Red	  
Lines	  and	  Limits.	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  KSA	  official	  statement,	  131125.	  Saudi	  Arabia	  welcomes	  Geneva	  Agreement	  on	  
Iranian	  nuclear	  program	  as	  first	  step.	  	  Prince	  Saud,	  140123.	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Delivers	  Kingdom`s	  Speech	  in	  
Geneva	  2.	  	  KSA	  mission	  to	  the	  UN,	  140211.	  Saudi	  Arabia`s	  Response	  to	  False	  Syrian	  regime	  
allegations.	  	  Prince	  Saud,	  140310.	  Foreign	  Minister:	  The	  Kingdom	  has	  Expressed	  its	  stance	  
Through	  Issuing	  Laws	  and	  Legislations	  Criminalizing	  Terrorism	  and	  
Organizations	  Supporting	  it.	  	  Prince	  Saud,	  140416.	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  Emphasizes	  The	  Importance	  of	  
The	  Syrian	  National	  Coalition	  Occupying	  Syria`s	  Seat	  at	  The	  Arab	  League.	  	  	  Prince	  Saud,	  140514.	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Underlines	  Importance	  of	  First	  
Arab	  Cooperation	  and	  Economic	  Forum	  with	  Central	  Asia	  and	  Azerbaijan.	  	  Prince	  Saud,	  140924.	  Foreign	  Minister	  Prince	  Saud	  Al-­‐Faisal	  address	  to	  the	  Global	  
Forum	  on	  Counter-­‐Terrorism.	  	  KSA	  official	  statement,	  141014a.	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Holds	  Meeting	  and	  
Press	  Conference	  with	  the	  German	  Foreign	  Minister.	  	  Prince	  Saud,	  141014a.	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Hold	  Meeting	  and	  Press	  
Conference	  with	  the	  German	  Foreign	  Minister.	  	  	  Prince	  Saud,	  141015.	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Speech	  During	  the	  Joint	  press	  
conference	  with	  The	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  of	  Federal	  German	  in	  
Jeddah.	  	  
	  
Quotes	  from	  news	  articles	  	  Prince	  Saud,	  121224.	  “GCC	  economic	  union	  under	  spotlight	  at	  Manama	  summit”,	  
Arab	  News.	  Available	  at	  <http://www.arabnews.com/saudi-­‐arabia/gcc-­‐economic-­‐union-­‐under-­‐spotlight-­‐manama-­‐summit>	  [Last	  accessed	  10.04.15]	  	  	  Prince	  Saud,	  130306.	  “Saudi	  Arabia,	  US	  put	  Syria,	  Iran	  on	  notice”,	  Arab	  News.	  Available	  at	  <http://www.arabnews.com/saudi-­‐arabia/saudi-­‐arabia-­‐us-­‐put-­‐syria-­‐iran-­‐notice>	  [Last	  Accessed	  13.04.15]	  	  	  Prince	  Saud,	  130526.	  “Prince	  Saud	  says	  Iran	  indulging	  in	  deception”,	  Arab	  News.	  Available	  at	  <http://www.arabnews.com/news/452633?page=3>	  [Last	  Accessed	  13.04.15]	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Prince	  Saud,	  130625b.	  “KSA	  slams	  Iran,	  Hezbollah	  intervention	  in	  Syria”,	  Arab	  
News.	  Available	  at	  <http://www.arabnews.com/news/456134>	  [Last	  Accessed	  13.04.15]	  	  Arab	  News,	  140827.	  “Iranian	  officials	  hails	  positive	  Saudi	  talks”,	  Arab	  News.	  Available	  at	  <http://www.arabnews.com/featured/news/621481>	  [Last	  Accessed	  13.04.15]	  	  Al	  Arabiya	  News,	  140922.	  “Saudi,	  Iran	  foreign	  ministers	  meet	  in	  New	  York”,	  Al	  
Arabiya.	  Available	  at	  <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-­‐east/2014/09/22/Saudi-­‐Iran-­‐foreign-­‐ministers-­‐meet-­‐in-­‐New-­‐York.html>	  [Last	  Accessed	  16.04.15]	  	  	  Prince	  Saud,	  141014b.	  “KSA:	  Tehran	  is	  occupying	  force	  in	  Syria”,	  Arab	  News.	  Available	  at	  <http://www.arabnews.com/news/644086>	  [Last	  Accessed	  13.04.15]	  	  Former	  Crown	  Prince	  Salman,	  150106.	  “Saudi	  Arabia	  an	  “oasis	  of	  peace”	  amid	  chaos:	  King	  Abdullah”,	  Asharq	  Al-­‐Awsat.	  Available	  at	  <http://www.aawsat.net/2015/01/article55340142>	  [Last	  Accessed	  29.01.15]	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Appendix	  
 
Appendix 1  
Shapiro`s observations from the experiments, pointing to autonomy and affiliation as 
the relevant core concerns in relational identity theory. 61 
 	   Shapiro`s	  
observations	  
Relation	  
to	  
Autonomy	  
Relation	  
to	  
Affiliation	  
Other	  Comments	  
1,	  
Mitigating	  
Tribal	  
Effect	  
A,	  Leader	  takes	  
charge	  of	  
intertribal	  
negotiations	  
	  
	   	   Unclear.	  Spokespersons	  know	  and	  accept	  their	  role	  (leader	  vs	  not-­‐leader).	  Respected	  role	  promote	  autonomy	  and	  affiliation	  (Shapiro,	  2010:637)	  
B,	  Dominant	  
consistent	  norm	  of	  
compassions	  and	  
empathy	  between	  
tribes	  
	  
	   High	   	  
C,	  Groups	  trained	  
in	  leadership	  skills	  
	   	   Unclear.	  Role	  in	  place	  and	  respected?	  
D,	  Structural	  
affiliation	  
between	  the	  
spokespersons	  of	  
the	  tribes	  
	   High	   They	  relate	  to	  one	  another	  by	  common	  structural	  experience	  
E,	  Clear	  hierarchy	  
of	  authority	  
High	   	   	  
F,	  Ca	  15	  or	  less	  
people	  in	  the	  
exercise	  
High	   	   Improves	  each	  participant`s	  airtime.	  Not	  constrained	  by	  each	  other	  
G,	  Ca	  4	  or	  fewer	  
tribes	  
High	   	   Not	  constrained	  by	  each	  other	  
H,	  No	  cross-­‐tribal	  
differences	  
relating	  to	  
	   High	   They	  are	  much	  alike	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  Three of Shapiro`s 18 observations was difficult to determine how affected autonomy or affiliation, 
and are therefore not part of my subcategories. These observations related to the quality of leadership, 
and the physical facilities of the negotiations. The observations were number 1a, 1c and 2h.	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identity-­‐divisive	  
questions	  
I,	  Creative,	  
socially	  inclusive	  
responses	  to	  
identity-­‐divisive	  
questions	  	  	  
High	   High	   They	  can	  be	  much	  alike	  if	  they	  imagine	  it.	  They	  are	  creative	  and	  not	  constrained	  by	  taboos?	  
2,	  
Promoting	  
Tribal	  
Effect	  
A,	  Tribes	  do	  not	  
listen	  effectively	  
to	  each	  other	  
	  
Low	   	   Low	  respect,	  low	  influence	  on	  the	  decisions	  because	  overlooked.	  They	  are	  constrained	  by	  the	  Other	  not	  listening	  
B,	  At	  least	  one	  
member	  of	  a	  tribe	  
is	  viewed	  as	  
aggressive	  and	  
egoistic	  by	  other	  
tribes	  
	   Low	   They	  are	  different	  and	  bad.	  
C,	  Spokespeople	  
advocate	  their	  
own	  tribe	  over	  
other	  tribes	  
Low	   Low	   The	  lower	  tribe	  is	  not	  able	  to	  affect	  decision	  as	  it	  wants.	  We	  are	  different	  and	  hence	  deserve	  more.	  
D,	  A	  tribe	  feels	  
insulted	  by	  not	  
getting	  proper	  
respect	  and	  
attention	  
regarding	  voice	  
time	  or	  core	  
attributes	  	  
Low	   	   	  
E,	  No	  
consideration	  of	  
the	  process	  of	  
reaching	  a	  
consensus	  
between	  the	  tribes	  
	   Low	   Don`t	  know	  role?	  	  Inclusion	  in	  reaching	  an	  agreement	  is	  random	  or	  not	  known.	  	  	  
F,	  Strong	  feelings	  
of	  disrespect	  
Low	   Low?	   Frustrated	  status	  	  
G,	  40	  or	  more	  
people	  in	  the	  
exercise	  
Low	   	   Little	  speaking	  time	  
H,	  Feeling	  of	  being	  
crammed	  into	  a	  
small	  room	  
	   	   Unclear.	  Physical	  constraint?	  	  
I,	  Intertribal	   	   Low	   Spokespersons	  are	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differences	  on	  
core	  beliefs	  that	  
become	  central	  to	  
the	  negotiation	  
put	  on	  the	  spot,	  having	  to	  defend	  their	  tribe	  or	  being	  seen	  as	  a	  traitor.	  We	  are	  different.	  	  	  	  
Appendix	  2	  
Interview Guide, Saudi relations to Iran:  
 
1. How are foreign policy decisions made in Saudi Arabia?   
a. What role did King Abdullah play? What role did the former Crown Prince Salman,  
Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal or Prince Turki Al-Faisal play?  
 
2. What do you see as the most important development for Saudi Arabia in the region 
today? Why?  
 
3.How could a deal on Iran`s nuclear program affect relations to Riyadh?  
 
4.What was the aim of the security agreement between Riyadh and Tehran in 2001?  
a. Why didn`t this cooperation work?   
b. Is a similar agreement likely again in the near future?  
 
5. Why is Syria important to decision-makers in Riyadh?  
 
6. What role do Iraq play in Saudi Arabia`s security politics?   
a. What can Tehran do in Iraq to improve relations to Riyadh?  
 
7. How has Rouhani`s leadership in Iran affected the relationship to Saudi Arabia?   
a. Has there been any difference in the Saudi approach to Iran between Rouhani`s  
leadership and Ahmadinejad`s leadership?   
 
8. To what extent do Wahhabism play a role in Saudi foreign policy?  
a. To what extent do Riyadh put focus on sectarian divisions when talking about Iran?   
 
9. How do you think Riyadh`s relations to Tehran affect Saudi Arabia`s policy in the 
region? 	  
